PAKISTAN is currently in the global spotlight for mediating between the United States and Iran. Islamabad’s rigorous mediation efforts helped bring about a much-needed ceasefire between the US and Iran in April, which culminated in the Islamabad Memorandum of Understanding in June 2026. Analysts see the current mediatory position as a new shift in Pakistan’s foreign policy priorities, with Islamabad attempting to assert itself as a middle power and a relevant strategic player in Middle Eastern geopolitics. However, a comprehensive historical analysis reveals that mediation has remained one of Pakistan’s most essential foreign policy imperatives.

Pakistan has long adopted an active strategy of mediation to prevent, manage, and settle disputes in the Middle East and within its immediate western neighbourhood. Far from being a passive regional actor, Islamabad has often positioned itself as a mediator in conflicts ranging from great-power rivalries to intra-Muslim problems. This approach is based on a deliberate foreign policy calculus determined by geography, strategic alliances, and the need to protect national interests while expanding diplomatic influence beyond South Asia.

The logic behind Pakistan’s mediating role

The primary strategic motive behind Pakistan’s mediation diplomacy is the need to keep regional disputes from spilling over onto its own borders. Unlike great powers, which may approach mediation largely for geopolitical or ideological reasons, Pakistan’s security is immediately influenced by conflicts in its near neighbourhood. Regional conflicts have historically been accompanied by refugee flows, cross-border terrorism, interruption of trade routes, arms trafficking, narcotics smuggling, and humanitarian crises, all of which have imposed significant economic and security costs on Pakistan. For Islamabad, mediation, therefore, constitutes a preventive tactic meant to contain problems before they evolve into greater challenges to Pakistan itself.

Afghanistan is a glaring example of this security rationale. For over four decades, Afghanistan’s instability has had far-reaching implications for Pakistan, including inflow of millions of refugees, increased terrorism and border insecurity, and enhanced economic burden. As a result, Pakistan expended enormous diplomatic capital in promoting the intra-Afghan peace process, as well as talks between the Taliban and the US. Islamabad’s coordination and facilitation resulted in the 2020 Doha Agreement. These efforts were primarily motivated by Islamabad’s desire to construct a relatively stable Afghanistan capable of denying space to transnational terrorist organisations and minimising fears of long-term instability along the Pakistan-Afghan border. Thus, mediation is a strategic investment in Pakistan’s domestic security.

A comprehensive historical analysis reveals that mediation has remained one of Pakistan’s most essential foreign policy imperatives.

A similar rationale supports Pakistan’s efforts to defuse tensions in the Middle East, particularly efforts to reduce tensions between Iran and Saudi Arabia. Pakistan shares a lengthy border with Iran while also maintaining strong strategic ties with Saudi Arabia and the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) states. The signing of the Strategic Mutual Defence Agreement in 2025 has further increased Pakistan’s geopolitical stakes in the Middle Eastern security environment, as has the recent mutual defence pact with Turkiye and Saudi Arabia. Any escalation between Tehran and Riyadh could place Pakistan in a perilous strategic position. These confrontations have often exposed Islamabad to opposing geopolitical realities, as well as exacerbating local sectarian tensions. The 1990s era of sectarian violence has had a significant impact on Pakistan’s strategic thinking. Islamabad doesn’t want to allow space for another wave of sectarian violence influenced by the Middle Eastern security environment.

This is why Pakistan has continuously pursued a policy of passive or active mediation between Saudi Arabia and Iran. For instance in 2016, when tensions between Saudi Arabia and Iran escalated due to the execution of a famous Saudi Shia cleric, Sheikh Nimr al-Nimr, Pakistan hurried to utilise shuttle diplomacy to defuse tensions. Pakistan’s then-prime minister Nawaz Sharif and chief of army staff Raheel Sharif advocated holding direct discussions between Saudi Arabia and Iran in Islamabad and recommended that both countries establish focal persons to keep communication lines open for dialogue. These activities were widely considered as an effective tool for reducing tensions between Saudi Arabia and Iran.

Similarly, in June 2017, a Saudi-led quartet (also including the United Arab Emirates, Bahrain, and Egypt) broke diplomatic relations and implemented a rigorous land, air, and sea blockade against Qatar. Saudi Arabia put enormous pressure on Pakistan to take Riyadh’s side. Rather than supporting the blockade, Pakistan maintained its neutral posture and initiated a joint diplomatic push with Kuwait and Turkiye to ease tensions between Qatar and the Saudi-led quad. Although the attempts did not yield significant results, they did reduce pressure on Pakistan’s foreign policy.

Similarly, following strikes on Saudi oil sites in 2019, the then-prime minister Imran Khan conducted shuttle diplomacy between Tehran and Riyadh in an effort to ease tensions and foster dialogue. Although Pakistan was not the primary architect of the ultimate Saudi-Iranian rapprochement, its diplomatic efforts highlighted Islamabad’s preference for regional de-escalation over bloc politics. More recently, Pakistan’s co-mediation with Qatar in supporting US-Iran negotiations under the Islamabad MoU demonstrated its broader goal of preventing another potentially destabilising conflict in its western neighbourhood.

Secondly, Pakistan’s mediation diplomacy strengthens its strategic relevance within an increasingly competitive international system. As global politics grows more polarised, middle powers seek influence through diplomatic rather than coercive means. Pakistan positions itself as a responsible regional partner or net security stabiliser, capable of maintaining communication lines in situations where direct dialogue has become politically challenging. Islamabad believes that successful mediation in regional conflicts can boost Pakistan’s diplomatic profile by presenting it as a proactive rather than reactive actor in regional disputes. This is especially relevant in the context of global preferences to look at Pakistan through the security and counterterrorism lenses. Mediation allows Islamabad to change global perceptions by demonstrating diplomatic ability and a commitment to peaceful conflict settlement.

Pakistan also wants to demonstrate its strategic value to major powers through mediation. High-profile facilitation operations, such as organising Henry Kissinger’s secret 1971 visit to Beijing, highlighted Pakistan’s ability to bridge the gap between Washington and Beijing. As of today, Beijing recognises Pakistan’s facilitation efforts, which have improved its status in Washington and Beijing.

Islamabad has been consistently seeking strategic goodwill in the international community. States that successfully facilitate negotiations frequently collect diplomatic capital, which can later be used to gain political support, strengthen bilateral relations, or increase influence within multilateral institutions. Pakistan’s active participation in facilitating dialogue in Afghanistan, and encouraging regional de-escalation in the Middle East, allows it to strengthen ties with a wide range of international actors, including the US, China, Gulf states, Central Asian republics, and Muslim-majority countries. The diplomatic goodwill broadens Pakistan’s foreign policy options while reducing the likelihood of strategic isolation.

Islamabad believes that an active mediatory role in regional conflicts can protect and further secure Pakistan’s long-term economic interests. Regional instability discourages foreign direct investment, interrupts trade corridors, increases international trade insurance costs, and causes large infrastructure projects to be delayed. As Pakistan strives to transform itself into a regional connectivity hub through projects like the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC), peace in neighbouring regions has become an economic necessity rather than a diplomatic aspiration. Stability in Afghanistan is critical for developing overland trade with Central Asia, while lower tensions between the Gulf states and Iran can improve the security of Pakistan’s energy imports, and enhance the utility of Gwadar port. As a result, mediation indirectly helps to create an external environment that promotes economic growth and regional integration for Islamabad. Furthermore, effective diplomatic engagement can boost investors’ confidence by portraying Pakistan as a stabilising rather than destabilising regional actor. International investors often prefer regions with political certainty and amicable interstate relations.

Finally, Pakistan’s mediation efforts are motivated by its overall diplomatic identity. Since independence, succeeding governments have continuously prioritised peaceful conflict resolution, negotiation, and negotiated agreements in their official foreign policy rhetoric. Individual mediation initiatives are definitely shaped by geopolitical goals, but Pakistan has often depicted itself as a country eager to provide good offices whenever conflicts endanger regional peace and international security. Whether facilitating dialogue in Afghanistan, encouraging Saudi-Iran engagement, or launching a diplomatic initiative to defuse tensions between the US and Iran, Islamabad has sought to position itself as a bridge between competing actors rather than a participant in regional rivalries.

The historical record

Pakistan’s diplomatic role as a successful mediator or back-channel facilitator started in late 1969 when Islamabad facilitated the US-China rapprochement. Pakistan facilitated a secret historic visit of Henry Kissinger to Beijing. The visit paved the way for US-China diplomatic and economic engagement, which dramatically reshaped Cold War geopolitics. This episode remains a typical successful example of Pakistan using its contacts to achieve a significant diplomatic outcome.

In Afghanistan’s context, Pakistan was a key player in the 1988 Geneva Accords, alongside Afghanistan, the Soviet Union, and the United States. The accords ultimately resulted in the evacuation of Soviet forces from Afghanistan’s territory. This outcome is widely recognised as Pakistan’s most significant multilateral diplomatic achievement. More recent initiatives have produced mixed outcomes. Pakistan facilitated the 2015 Murree peace talks, which were the first publicly acknowledged direct engagement between the Afghan government and the Afghan Taliban. However the process eventually halted. Throughout the protracted Afghan peace process (2009-2020), Pakistan continuously promoted negotiations and backed the Doha Agreement. Islamabad’s initial coordination and efforts to bring the Afghan Taliban and the US to the negotiation table eventually resulted in a US-Taliban pact. However, Pakistan’s efforts did not result in a comprehensive intra-Afghan settlement.

Limits of Pakistan’s mediation

Despite Pakistan’s long history of promoting dialogue and providing good offices in regional and international conflicts, its overall success rate remains low. According to a qualitative assessment of Pakistan’s mediation record, only about one-third of its initiatives have resulted in concrete diplomatic outcomes, with the majority focusing on confidence-building, maintaining communication channels, or preventing further deterioration of warring parties’ relationships rather than achieving comprehensive conflict resolution. This lower success rate does not reflect lack of diplomatic expertise, but rather the institutional and structural limits Pakistan faces.

One of the main issues is that Pakistan frequently mediates highly complex disputes. Conflicts such as the intra-Afghan conflict, external invasions in Afghanistan, Saudi-Iran tensions, Middle Eastern conflicts, and US-Iran tensions involve various stakeholders with competing strategic goals that cannot be resolved only by external mediation. Mediators can facilitate discourse, but they cannot compel opposing parties to compromise when the political costs of concessions are excessively high. As a result, Pakistan’s participation has frequently been restricted to facilitating negotiations, with ultimate decisions determined primarily by warring parties on their own political and strategic calculations.

Another important restraint is Pakistan’s low diplomatic leverage in comparison to other regional and extra-regional countries. Successful mediation frequently necessitates the capacity to offer economic incentives, security guarantees, reconstruction assistance, or political assurances that motivate opposing parties to reach difficult concessions. Countries with significantly more financial resources, political power, and diplomatic networks to sustain long-term peace initiatives include the US, China, Norway, Qatar, the UAE, and Saudi Arabia. In contrast, Pakistan typically focuses on persuasion, trusted relationships, and geographical familiarity rather than economic incentives. While these assets are valuable, they are largely insufficient to resolve longstanding disputes.

Pakistan’s internal security environment further complicates mediation efforts. Persistent tensions with India, ongoing instability along the Pak-Afghan border, menace of terrorism, and periodic economic crises all divert diplomatic focus and reduce the resources available for long-term international mediation. Effective mediation is a long-term process that requires consistent diplomatic engagement, technical expertise, and institutional capacity. Pakistan’s diplomatic machinery usually operates with competing internal and regional environments. This makes it difficult to maintain long-term involvement in various peace processes.

Perceptions of neutrality also challenge Pakistan’s mediatory efforts in Middle Eastern conflicts. Theoretically, for mediation efforts to be successful, all parties must believe that the mediator is impartial and trustworthy. However, Pakistan’s deep strategic ties with Saudi Arabia and other Arab Gulf states often cause concern among opposing parties. For example, Pakistan’s longstanding defence and security partnership with Saudi Arabia has historically hampered its ability to be perceived as completely neutral by Iran, despite Islamabad’s consistent efforts to maintain cordial relations with both nations. Similarly, Pakistan’s extensive engagement with the Afghan Taliban has occasionally prompted segments of the former Afghan political elite and some Western policymakers to question Islamabad’s neutrality, even though Pakistan actively encouraged negotiations and political settlements in Afghanistan prior to the fall of Kabul in 2021. These perceptions, whether accurate or not, frequently undermine the warring parties’ willingness to fully embrace Pakistani mediation.

The geopolitical climate further limits Pakistan’s effectiveness as a mediator. Many recent conflicts are increasingly impacted by great power competition, and leave little diplomatic space for middle powers to independently secure comprehensive settlements. The Afghan peace process, for example, brought together the strategic interests of the US, China, Russia, Iran, India, Qatar, and numerous other Gulf states. Similarly, the ongoing conflict between Iran and the US is driven by larger issues such as nuclear proliferation, sanctions, Israel’s security, insecurity of GCC states and regional proxy conflict. In such cases, Pakistan can encourage dialogue and propose confidence-building measures, but it lacks the ability to address the underlying strategic calculations that drive the conflict.

Another rationale for Pakistan’s relatively low success rate is the nature of the mediation role Islamabad normally adopts. Unlike well-established and well-known mediators such as Qatar, the UAE, and Norway, who aim to reach binding agreements, Pakistan has frequently served as a facilitator, host, bridge-builder, or provider of good offices. These roles are less apparent yet nevertheless diplomatically significant. Facilitators generate opportunities for dialogue, provide conducive environment for dialogue, establish communication channels and decrease misperceptions. Although these measures may not result in landmark peace treaties, they frequently keep preventing crises from escalating into broader armed conflict. Hence, measuring Pakistan’s mediation record exclusively based on the number of signed agreements understates its overall contribution to regional stability.

Finally, Pakistan’s mediation activities have occasionally suffered from a lack of follow-up by the opposing parties themselves. Several times negotiations brokered by Pakistan began with hope but later disintegrated due to one or more sides withdrawing due to their domestic political factors or altered external or regional developments. Pakistan’s mediatory experience in intra-Afghan dialogue exemplifies this challenge. Although Pakistan played a crucial role in supporting the Doha talks, the subsequent political trajectory in Afghanistan, combined with deteriorating Pakistan-Afghanistan relations after 2021, proved that successful mediation does not guarantee long-term peace. Similarly, Pakistan’s efforts to de-escalate tensions between Saudi Arabia and Iran in 2016 and 2019 were overshadowed by broader regional forces before China helped broker the 2023 diplomatic reconciliation.

Nevertheless, Pakistan’s moderate success rate as a mediator should not be regarded as diplomatic failure. International mediation is inherently risky, and even the most experienced mediators have struggled to reach long-term settlements in prolonged conflicts. Pakistan’s comparative advantage is less in imposing solutions than preserving dialogue when contact between adversaries has broken down. Despite Islamabad’s structural limitations, its geographic proximity, long-standing regional relationships, understanding of local political dynamics of Iran and Afghanistan, and ability to maintain engagement with mutually hostile actors such as Saudi Arabia and Iran are valuable diplomatic assets. As regional crises become more frequent, Pakistan’s role as a facilitator and confidence-builder is likely to remain a significant component of Islamabad’s foreign policy strategy.

The writer is a strategic analyst of international security. The views expressed are his own.

Intellectual independence is key to a nation’s progress. Pakistan needs intellectual autonomy to inspire people to feel pride and a sense of collective duty towards national progress. Indeed, Pakistan succeeded in acquiring nuclear power through this very shared intellectual capital — a matter of pride for the nation — enabling it to become militarily strong and live confidently in this conflicted world. Significantly, to make Pakistan strong politically, culturally, and economically, there is a crucial need for intellectual independence by all means.

What are the challenges to Pakistan regarding intellectual independence, both at the individual and at the national level? The colonial-style governance, imperialism, the indoctrination-based educational system, and lack of political vision, will and training have caused a kind of intellectual unproductivity in Pakistan. For instance, the prevalent rote learning in educational institutions discourages critical thinking. In the absence of an intellectual environment, people neither develop nor accept intellectual arguments to resolve conflicts that ultimately lead to violence in society. Where there is no intellectual capability, there is violence. There is, however, a solemn quest for decolonisation and de-imperialisation by all means to achieve intellectual independence in Pakistan, with an emphasis on reforms in education and governance to foster critical and independent thought.

Iqbal is primarily a philosopher of human development holding a steadfast belief in human agency as the capacity to be creative, moral, and sovereign. Iqbal’s political philosophy fosters three significant values that undergird intellectual autonomy — equality, solidarity, and freedom — meaning that all citizens have equal rights, that all share humanity, and that all have freedom of thought. He emphasises that intellectual freedom is necessary not only for the self-realisation of the individual but also of the nation. He articulates: “Elevate your khudi so high that before every destiny is written, God Himself asks you: ‘Tell Me, what is your will?” Iqbal’s idea of khudi has both individual and social implications: at the individual level, it cultivates human potential for creativity, morality, and productivity; at the social level, it enriches the nation’s welfare. Hence, a state, in Iqbal’s vision, is the self-realisation of the individual and the nation.

At the national level, khudi fosters the nation’s capacity to safeguard self-respect and development

To acquire intellectual fortitude in society, Iqbal rejects blind imitation, orthodoxy, and conformity, arguing that ideas should not be accepted uncritically. Accepting ideas uncritically is blind imitation that mars intellectual capacity. Instead, he cherishes rationality, creativity, and novelty in life. An intellectual culture creates a public sphere that bolsters public reasoning in society. In an intellectual community, people debate politics, economics, history, science, arts, and literature. Austrian-British philosopher Karl Popper’s significant work, Open Society and Its Enemies, posited the idea of such a community in which people are free to think critically without any fear of coercion. Coffeehouses, book clubs, study circles, scientific and literary societies, social media, and television channels are different forms of the public sphere, in which people engage in the intellectual conversation necessary to bring about intellectual transformation in society.

Accordingly, the elixir for Pakistan’s challenges lies in developing an intellectual environment that instils democratic political discourse, reforming educational policies, adopting a rational approach to life, upholding ethical values, and reaching a consensus for national unity that transcends cultural and ethnic divisions.

Like Martin Luther, who started the intellectual renaissance in the Western world, Iqbal brought about an intellectual renaissance in the Muslim world through his philosophical ideas expressed in both prose and poetry. Iqbal, a trained philosopher with degrees from Punjab University (MA), Cambridge University (BA Hons), and Munich University (PhD), contested the intellectual heritage and sought to reconstruct it in light of modern knowledge to transform society.

Some people incorrectly argue that Iqbal is not a philosopher but just a poet. What is a philosopher? A philosopher is a person with an intellectual mind who develops ideas. In his Prison Notebooks, Italian activist and philosopher Antonio Gramsci defines ‘intellectual’ by saying that “all human beings are intellectuals, but not all have the function of intellectuals in society”. In the Gramscian sense, no other thinker than Iqbal influenced the Pakistani nation through his ideas. By any definition of philosophy, Iqbal is a trained philosopher who attended excellent educational institutions of the world. Philosophers usually articulate in prose; Iqbal also expressed his ideas in poetry; he may be better called a philosopher-poet rather than a poet-philosopher.

Iqbal’s The Reconstruction of Religious Thought in Islam is a magisterial philosophical work in the Muslim tradition that challenged traditional thought and promoted intellectual curiosity, encouraging people to see the world from new perspectives. The subject matter of Iqbal’s philosophical thought is human, universe, and God. Iqbal states, “The search for rational foundations in Islam may be regarded to have begun with the Prophet [PBUH] himself. His consistent prayer was, ‘God grant me knowledge of the ultimate nature of things.’ ” Reason is a distinctive attribute of human beings that helps them know the ultimate nature of things. The Pakistani mind requires a rational foundation for a better life.

Iqbal promotes a rational approach to life. For instance, through his key ideas of khudi and ijtihad, he supports independent reasoning. He states, “The ultimate aim of the ego is not to see something, but to be something”. The ego is capable of creating reality. Iqbal articulates, “Create your own world if you truly possess life; the human spirit bears the creative command of ‘Be!’ ” Becoming is a creative process that begins with intellectual freedom. Iqbal addresses youth, designating them as falcons, not cockroaches, to be something and transform the nation with their determined wills. By the way, cockroaches have no will, no vision, no integrity, no choice, no dignity and no freedom, while falcons have all these traits.

Like the French philosopher René Descartes, who said, ‘I think, therefore I am’, meaning thinking causes existence, Iqbal believes that being is the main goal of the ego at both the individual and national levels. At the individual level, khudi empowers people’s human capabilities. At the national level, it fosters the nation’s capacity to safeguard institutional self-respect, scientific development, economic productivity, cultural creativity, and ethical responsibility.

The term ijtihad, meaning ‘independent reasoning’, is generally used in religious jurisprudence. Generally, independent reasoning is key for all aspects of human life. Iqbal writes, “The teaching of the Quran that life is a process of progressive creation necessitates that each generation, guided but unhampered by the work of its predecessors, should be permitted to solve its own problems.” Based on the Quran, Iqbal argues that every generation faces its own challenges, which cannot be met without rationality.

Iqbal is a modernist philosopher who advocates building intellectual capital based on current advances in knowledge. He believes that reality is not static but continuously evolving; if reality is evolving, knowledge should also evolve. Knowledge cannot evolve without intellectual wandering. An intellectual approach is vital for religion, economics, politics, science, law and public policy. So, neither the individual nor the nation evolves without intellectual freedom.

First of all, the state must give priority to education, and to critical education, not indoctrination. Critical education fosters creative minds, while indoctrination makes them dormant. Critical education creates new knowledge while indoctrination repeats inherited ideas. In Pakistan, education could not get rid of indoctrination that supports accepting ideas uncritically. In the absence of critical education, a disorder of intellectual impotency emerges — an inability to generate new ideas. An indoctrination-based educational system controls the human mind. Brazilian philosopher Paul Freire’s influential work, The Pedagogy of the Oppressed, explains this kind of system that produces imitators rather than creators.

There is a structural paradox in Pakistan’s education system: building higher education without primary and secondary education is like building a roof without walls. The Higher Education Commission (HEC) was established in 2002 to promote and improve the quality of higher education in Pakistan, but there is no such body that analyses and makes policies for primary and secondary education. In the provinces, education departments administer the schools and colleges; they have no capacity for policymaking. The solution is that a federal education commission should address all levels of education: primary, secondary, and higher. There should be organic coordination between all provincial education bodies and the federal education commission to promote, monitor, and sustain the quality of education across all provinces. With proper coordination between provinces and the centre, new educational policies can be devised to meet emerging challenges.

Pakistan needs an educational system in which people have the freedom to flourish. Without strengthening the institution of education, there is no path to a nation’s progress. Pakistan has an abundance of schools, colleges, and universities; the dire need is to improve the quality of education with promising reforms and a substantial increase in the education budget.

The pedagogical methodology of critical thinking rather than rote learning, creativity rather than blind imitation, open-mindedness rather than narrow-mindedness, scientific thinking rather than emotional thinking, and a national approach rather than a tribal approach is required to meet the country’s cultural, economic, and political challenges. Critical education creates philosophers, statesmen, economists, educationists, inventors, entrepreneurs, and ethically responsible citizens.

Pakistan was an outcome of the democratic process; a political party demanded it, and the decision for independence was made through an election. What is democracy? Democracy is a means, not an end, for transforming society. Democracy is a process, an attitude, a way of life, a set of freedoms, and a means of making decisions, ranging from electing leaders to policymaking across all aspects of public life. Balloting is a democratic strategy for resolving conflict. Sometimes, democracy is misunderstood as only majority rule. Making decisions by majority rule is one aspect of the democratic process. A democratic action ought not to be independent of the ethical values of self-respect, dignity, and respecting others’ opinions.

Democracy is a process that requires continuity. Since 1947, the democratic process in Pakistan has been interrupted several times, which has negatively affected the development of democratic attitudes, values and the training of democratic leadership. Democracy needs a public sphere for public reasoning; parliament is such a space for intellectual discourse. The spirit of the democratic process requires that all decisions should be made through rational debate in the public sphere. The German philosopher Immanuel Kant rightly says that without rational autonomy, it is not possible to make laws that benefit humanity.

Recently, the debate has started to “reset the system”. In the history of Muslim countries, Kemal Atatürk in Turkiye successfully reset the system, thereby transforming the Turkish nation. If the system is reset without vision, will, and capability, it may not solve people’s problems. For instance, the creation of new administrative units by dividing provinces requires democratic discourse, and citizens should not only understand why these units are vital but also be convinced by the decision. After administrative divisions of provinces, if people’s wellbeing could not be made better, what would be the next thing to do? What needs to be reset is moral conscience at the individual, social, and institutional levels to demonstrate moral commitments to creating a corruption-free society, ensuring the fair distribution of resources, and upholding the rights to life, property, and liberty in Pakistan.

The pristine principle of democracy is agreeing to disagree with an ethical spirit of mutual respect. For a successful democracy, educated citizens, ethical leadership, accountability, and public reasoning are indispensable. Thus, democracy is an inclusive process in society that fosters civic virtues such as self-respect, dignity, tolerance, and dialogue, and it is above elections.

Pakistan is a multi-ethnic nation, and each ethnicity is distinct, with its own cultural values. The national identity, beyond diverse ethnicities, is vital and is underpinned by a sense of Pakistaniyat, a patriotic love for our homeland. The creation of Pakistan is indeed a historic phenomenon whose survival depends on national unity. The sense of Pakistaniyat is the feeling that we are Pakistan, and any act, decision, or policy must be for the betterment of our country.

A country is a common treasure; the citizens can protect or destroy it. If citizens prioritise self-interest over the country’s interests, the country cannot make progress. Garret Hardin’s concept, The Tragedy of the Commons, explains that when individuals pursue their own self-interest, a shared resource will be destroyed, even though they know that being selfish would not be in everyone’s long-term interest. Hardin illustrates the idea with an example. Imagine a village shares a common pasture for grazing their cows. By means of a social contract among the herders of the village, it was decided that each herder would hold a specific number of cows according to the capacity of the pasture. If each herder increases the number of cows to gain more benefit, overgrazing will soon destroy the pasture. Each herder must obey the social contract of the village to hold a specific number of cows for the common good. The existence of the pasture depends upon respect for the law. Like a pasture, a country’s survival depends upon its citizens’ respect for the Constitution that fortifies national unity.

One of the moral lessons of The Tragedy of the Commons is that disobeying the social contract and constitution devastates common resources, institutions, and states. The concept of the tragedy of the commons helps us understand that respecting the Constitution underpinning national unity is indispensable for the common good. A strong sense of social consciousness for national unity requires a democratic spirit that promotes freedom of thought rather than controls it by force.

Pakistan confronts the challenges of overpopulation, terrorism, illiteracy, poverty, climate change and low human development. Public discussion about these problems will help devise promising policies. Public intellectuals play significant roles in a country’s development by identifying problems, analysing their root causes, and finding their solutions. According to Gramsci, teachers, clergy, philosophers, lawyers, journalists, writers, artists, and statesmen have the functions of intellectuals in society. Pakistani intellectuals have a moral and political obligation to develop and advance intellectual capital to build a better future for all.

We cannot reset the past in Pakistan, but we can set the future and pledge to strengthen democratic institutions, ethical values, and intellectual culture. In the contemporary epoch, intellectual capital helps to excel in artificial intelligence, biotechnology, environmental sustainability, economic growth, social justice and peaceful coexistence. Intellectual independence would bring about decolonisation, de-imperialisation, economic growth, and national sovereignty — all of which are essential for a thriving Pakistan. Hence, Iqbal’s vision of an independent state could not be fully realised without fostering freedom of thought in Pakistan.

The writer holds a PhD from the University of Canterbury, New Zealand, and teaches philosophy at the University of Punjab, Lahore.

X: @saad_malook

Pakistan’s national identity has consequently remained closely associated with the ideas that formed the raison d’être for the Pakistan Movement. Its history offers lessons that can be learnt from significant events, most notably the political crisis of 1971, which culminated in the separation of East Pakistan.

The post-1971 period also witnessed continuing debates over the nature of the federation, provincial autonomy, and national identity. These debates underline the importance of learning from history rather than using it to promote narrow political narratives. Pakistan’s political experience demonstrates that national cohesion depends not only on shared historical ideals but also on constitutional governance, political inclusion, social justice, and respect for diversity.

The enduring challenge, therefore, is to reconcile Pakistan’s historical foundations with the requirements of a modern, democratic, and inclusive state to dispel the spread of unsubstantiated narratives against the Two-Nation Theory as an ideological basis of Pakistan.

Pakistan’s leadership must follow the Quaid’s democratic vision and understand the primacy of Jinnah’s thoughts in tackling constitutional, political, economic and security challenges.

The dilemma that crystallised after the 1857 War of Independence was the result of wilful distortions and misconceptions about the Muslims of British India. The British believed that Muslims were the real ‘troublemakers’ responsible for the uprising. Their hostile attitude towards Muslims caused exploitation and generated feelings of deprivation among them. They lost social status and suffered cruel punishments.

During this dark phase of the community’s life Sir Syed Ahmad Khan dispelled the idea that Muslims were responsible for the war. The Aligarh movement he launched was based on a trinity of ideas: loyalty to the British, distance from politics, and devotion to education. His educational movement started to bring lasting change in the outlook of Muslim community.

In the beginning Sir Syed was in favour of Hindu-Muslim unity; he considered India as a bride and Hindus and Muslims as the two eyes of the bride. Nevertheless, in 1867, after the Hindi-Urdu controversy, he realised that both communities were separate. Thus, Muslims became aware of their own distinctive political identity in the subcontinent. They acted on the advice of Sir Syed and cooperated with the British. They did not join the Indian National Congress (INC), which was established in 1885 to provide a common platform for Indians and to introduce the concept of one nation. It was clear that the organisation based on Western type of democracy would not be able to protect Muslim interests due to dominance of Hindus. Crystallisation of Sir Syed’s thoughts formed the Two-Nation Theory.

It was not only the religious and social aspect of life where there were divergences between the two communities. There were little or no common customs and traditions shared by both communities. The structure, function and shape of houses and places of worship belonging to both communities were different. The variance was much wider in cuisine. There were no common festivals and celebrations among Hindus and Muslims.

The language spoken by Hindus and Muslims was Hindustani, used for the purpose of communication. However, for literary purposes Muslims used Urdu, which absorbed many Arabic, Persian and Turkish words. Hindus used Hindi as a source of literature, which consisted of high percentage of Sanskrit words. Thus, both languages expressed fundamentally different ideas and shared different cultural expressions. This difference went deeper in poetry. Urdu poetry expressed themes of loneliness, amazement, and depiction of Muslim life shared across many countries in a very different way using metaphors, abstraction, and philosophical manner compared to Hindi poetry, which depicted local environment and described emotions.

Muslims realised that they had different outlook, beliefs, traditions, language, and inclinations. Their apprehension of losing their status and suppression of their identity motivated them to bring homogeneity to their nationhood under the prevailing claustrophobic social and political order. The Two-Nation Theory impelled its adherents to follow a joint line of action for the accomplishment of their goal. It shaped the ideological form of the Pakistan Movement and gave birth to a new nation. The Two-Nation Theory was a revolt against the prevailing exploitation of Muslims by the British and domination of Hindus in British India, where Hinduism was being imposed on Muslims and their culture.

Based on the Two-Nation Theory Muslims demanded a separate electorate in 1906. The British, through the Minto-Morley reforms, allowed separate electorates by recognising Muslims as a separate nation. Achieving separate statutory status was a triumph and proved a hallmark in Indian politics.

Through the Lucknow Pact of 1916, the Quaid tried to bring the two communities closer, and he was called the “ambassador of Hindu-Muslim unity”. It was a tremendous achievement of Jinnah that Congress also recognised Muslims as a separate nation. Jinnah worked towards the goal of uniting both communities until M.K. Gandhi started playing the communal card. Gandhi publicly said that “a body of converts cannot call themselves a nation.” In response to this the Quaid replied in a public statement that by all canons of international law, the Muslims constituted a nation.

Quaid-i-Azam understood that the Indian Muslims could compete with the Congress only when they showed they could settle their own differences. Jinnah declared the Muslims to be a nation with its own “distinctive culture and civilisation, language and literature, art and architecture, names and nomenclature, sense of values and proportion, legal laws and moral codes, customs and calendar, history and tradition, aptitude and ambition.”

The expression of the Two-Nation Theory was reflected in his famous 14 Points. This legal framework provided for effective representation of Muslims in all law-making bodies, protection of Muslim territories, their religious liberty, culture, language, education, personal laws, customs, and their religious institutions.

The movement for the partition of India gained strength when the poet-philosopher Allama Dr Muhammad Iqbal conceived the geographical shape of a homeland for Muslims. During his address in 1930 at Allahabad, Allama Iqbal said: “I would like to see the Punjab, North-West Frontier Province, Sindh and Baluchistan amalgamated into a single state. Self-government within the British Empire, or the formation of a consolidated North-West Indian Muslim state, appears to me to be the final destiny of the Muslims at least of North-West India.”

The Quaid’s return from England to India in 1934 marked a turning point in politics. He was convinced that constitutional safeguards alone might not secure the political future of India’s Muslims, and began to articulate a more determined vision of separate homeland for Muslims by converting Iqbal’s dream into reality.

The Government of India Act 1935 introduced provincial autonomy, expanded the electorate, and established provincial legislatures. Despite reservations, both the Congress and the Muslim League contested the 1937 elections. Congress emerged victorious in several provinces and formed ministries, including in areas with Muslim majority.

The Congress rule proved politically devastating for Muslims. The Congress ministries promoted Hindu culture and policies at the expense of Muslim identity. The Wardha education scheme became a particular source of controversy. Congress, for revival of Hinduism, introduced Wardha scheme to downgrade Muslims, exploit their resources and impose Hindu values, customs, and traditions.

The Pirpur Report of 1938, prepared by a committee headed by Raja Muhammad Mehdi, documented alleged discrimination against Muslims, while A.K. Fazlul Huq’s Muslim Suffering Under Congress Rule presented further claims of Muslim grievances.

Jinnah turned these grievances into a wider political argument. Addressing the Sindh Provincial Muslim League Conference in Karachi in 1938, he criticised the Congress leadership for its hostile attitude towards the Muslim League. At the League’s Patna session later that year, he argued that Congress rule had further weakened the prospects of a genuine Hindu-Muslim settlement.

The resignation of Congress ministries in 1939, following the outbreak of the Second World War, gave Jinnah another opportunity to consolidate Muslim political opinion. He called December 22 the ‘Day of Deliverance’, presenting the end of Congress rule as a moment of political relief for Muslims.

Yet the significance of 1937-39 extended beyond immediate grievances. The experience convinced many Muslims that a political system dominated by a permanent majority could threaten their cultural, economic, and political interests. Jinnah responded by reorganising the Muslim League, strengthening its finances and parliamentary machinery, and transforming it from an elite organisation into a mass political movement.

The Congress rule thus became an important catalyst in the development of Muslim political consciousness. Under Jinnah’s leadership, the League increasingly transformed Muslim apprehensions into a coherent political demand, ultimately paving the way for the Pakistan Movement.

The Lahore Resolution was adopted by the All-India Muslim League at Lahore in its 27th annual session on March 23, 1940. Congress leaders, including Jawaharlal Nehru and Gandhi, opposed the Lahore Resolution, which they termed the “Pakistan Resolution”, arguing that it threatened the idea of a united India.

Two years later, in 1942, British minister Sir Stafford Cripps arrived in India to resolve the political deadlock and secure Indian cooperation in the Second World War. His proposals offered India dominion status after the war and the right to frame its own constitution. The Provinces were given the option of not joining the proposed Indian Union, while the princely states were offered participation in the constitutional arrangement.

Congress rejected the proposals because it wanted an immediate transfer of power, rather than waiting until after the war. The Muslim League also rejected them, as the scheme did not explicitly recognise its demand for a separate Muslim state. By then, the League was firmly committed to the political direction set by the Lahore Resolution.

With the end of WWII in 1945, the British government faced mounting pressure to resolve India’s constitutional crisis. Viceroy Lord Wavell invited the Congress and Muslim League leadership to the Simla Conference, proposing greater transfer of power to Indians while retaining the viceroy as a constitutional head. The conference, however, failed to bridge the differences between Congress and the Muslim League, particularly over Muslim representation.

The British subsequently turned to elections to gauge political support. In the 1945-46 elections, the Muslim League achieved a remarkable victory, winning all 30 Muslim-reserved seats in the Central Legislative Assembly and about 95 per cent of the Muslim seats in the provincial legislatures. The results strengthened Jinnah’s claim that the League represented the political aspirations of India’s Muslims and provided a powerful electoral mandate for the demand for a separate homeland.

In February 1946, the British government sent the Cabinet Mission, comprising Lord Pethick-Lawrence, Sir Stafford Cripps and A.V. Alexander, to negotiate a constitutional settlement. Its plan proposed a relatively weak central government responsible mainly for defence, foreign affairs and communications, while provinces retained substantial autonomy. Although the plan did not fully satisfy the Muslim League’s demand for Pakistan, Jinnah initially saw the reflection of the Two-Nation Theory within its proposed system of provincial groupings.

The political crisis deepened when disagreements emerged over the interpretation and implementation of the plan, particularly the grouping of provinces and the formation of an interim government. The Muslim League eventually withdrew its acceptance and called for direct action to press its demand. Jinnah announced Aug 16, 1946 as Direct Action Day.

By the end of 1946, the debate over provincial grouping had further sharpened the political divide and Jinnah’s point of view gained immense prominence and increased the momentum for creation of a new country.

Since our independence, Pakistan’s record of experimenting with almost every form of government indicates that the successive rulers have failed to understand the Quaid’s vision for statehood. Our history as a nation is replete with political crises that perhaps no other country in the world has experienced because we deviated from Jinnah’s principles, ideals, and vision. Thus, crime and corruption are rapidly becoming a way of life. Aversion to the rule of law, poor governance and economic downfall have become formidable challenges due to inchoate nature of institutions.

The political institutions have failed to deliver, and people’s aspirations have not been fulfilled. As a result, people began to shift their loyalties and looked towards alternative religious and ethnic-based platforms which paved the way for undemocratic forces and planted the seeds of extremism, radicalisation, ethnic nationalism, and sectarian violence. These challenges were not properly dealt with by the leadership in the nascent state of Pakistan and thus the feelings of ethnic nationalism permeated both East Pakistan and West Pakistan, which triggered disunity and disintegration.

The purpose of the Two-Nation Theory was to create a separate homeland for Muslims. The battle between the Muslim League and Congress was political, not religious. In a 1948 speech the Quaid said: Islam and its idealism have taught democracy, equality, and fair play. After the creation of Pakistan, few world leaders could anticipate that it would be able to survive under the difficult circumstances created by India.

On the other hand, it was expected that the Quaid would provide strong leadership, which was badly needed, when he assumed the office of governor-general. He stood like a mighty oak in a storm following independence. His strength was essential for the infant country and no greater fortune could have come to the new country than Jinnah’s acceptance of being its first head of state.

Nevertheless, due to the inability of his successors to overcome their disagreements, jealousies, and personal rivalries, it took almost a decade to form the country’s first constitution in 1956, which was abrogated under martial law, imposed in 1958. General Ayub Khan gave a presidential constitution in 1962 and another martial law was imposed in 1969. Later, elections were held in 1970. However, Pakistan faced the tragic separation of East Pakistan. Eventually, after a huge lapse of time, a truly remarkable document — the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan 1973 — was finalised, which has been the basis of Pakistan’s government.

The country remained under martial law from 1977 to 1985, with most provisions of the 1973 Constitution held in abeyance. The Ziaul Haq regime (1977-1988) patronised religionisation of politics, created polarisation among various classes in society, encouraged sectarian divide and nurtured extremism.

Another authoritarian era — that of Pervez Musharraf (1999-2008) — offered numerous lessons for civilian and military ruling elites. However, the track record of political elites belonging to major political parties in the later decades of democracy indicates that they have not demonstrated a commitment to the rule of law and showed inability to respect the Constitution. Ruling elites remained entrenched in power in violation of the principles and spirit of the Constitution. Thus, the supremacy of the Constitution was compromised.

The lack of continuous dialogue among democratic forces to discuss economic and governance issues has caused disillusionment among the masses with the democratic system, which is exposed to vulnerable situation of terrorist insurgencies, socio-economic disparities, and volatile nature of geopolitics under changing dynamics of international politics. These challenges deserve attention of competent, honest, and efficient leadership to deal with the monumental issues confronting Pakistan today, including a fractured political system and economic chaos.

Pakistan’s leadership must follow the Quaid’s democratic vision and understand the primacy of Jinnah’s thoughts in tackling constitutional, political, economic and security challenges faced by Pakistan and to come up with a new solution to perennial problems.

Our leaders need to promote integration and unity in the country through societal transformation, which requires firm belief in democratic norms and values including liberty, equality, justice, and fair play.

There is no reason for anybody to fear democracy, equality of all citizens, inclusivity and cultural diversity. All we need is to be united and make Pakistan a strong nation which should lead the Muslim world towards a peaceful future.

The writer is an academic.

Pakistan finds itself at such a moment.

The country’s recent national debate on governance has generated sharply differing opinions, competing diagnoses and familiar political narratives. Yet its greatest value lies not in the arguments it has produced, but in the question it has revived. Beyond the headlines and the politics lies a more enduring challenge: are we shaping a state whose purpose is to expand opportunity for every citizen, or have we become too occupied with managing the pressures of the present?

The distinction is more profound than it first appears. Throughout history, nations have seldom struggled because they failed to recognise their problems. More often, they have struggled because they became increasingly proficient at managing those problems while postponing the institutional reforms required to solve them. Crisis management gradually acquires the appearance of governance. Short-term stability begins to replace long-term strategy. Resilience becomes a substitute for renewal. Yet the purpose of the state is not simply to preserve stability; it is to create conditions in which society can continually advance.

Are we shaping a state whose purpose is to expand opportunity for every citizen?

Pakistan has never suffered from a shortage of ideas. Across successive governments, universities, think tanks, public institutions and the private sector, thoughtful proposals for reform have accumulated for decades. The country’s recurring challenge has not been understanding what must change. It has been building institutions capable of sustaining change once it begins. Ideas illuminate the path forward, but institutions determine whether a nation is able to walk it.

That reality should fundamentally reshape the current national conversation. The defining question before Pakistan is no longer whether reform is necessary. That proposition commands broad agreement across political, institutional and professional circles. The more consequential question is whether we possess the institutional capability, policy continuity and collective discipline to translate reform into enduring public value. States ultimately justify their existence not by the policies they announce, but by the opportunities they create.

This is why the present debate deserves to be viewed as an opportunity rather than merely a controversy. Governments are temporary, institutions endure, policies evolve. National purpose must provide continuity. Countries that succeed over generations do so because their institutions preserve strategic direction even as governments, leaders and political priorities change. The true strength of the state lies not in its ability to manage today’s challenges, but in its capacity to expand opportunity for tomorrow.

History offers few lessons more consistent than this one. Nations blessed with abundant resources have often underperformed, while others with far fewer advantages have transformed themselves through capable institutions, disciplined governance and clarity of purpose. Leadership may inspire a generation, but institutions shape the destiny of nations. The enduring purpose of the state is fulfilled not through moments of exceptional leadership alone, but through institutions that continue serving long after leaders have departed. That is the lesson Pakistan now has an opportunity to embrace.

What, then, is the purpose of the state?

The state exists because no society can secure justice, opportunity and shared pro­g­ress through individual effort alone. Its highest responsibility is not simply to maintain order or administer public affairs, important as those responsibilities are; its fundamental purpose is to create conditions in which every citizen can live with dignity, realise his or her potential and contribute meaningfully to the nation’s future. Every institution, every public policy and every national priority ultimately derives its legitimacy from that larger purpose.

Viewed through this lens, development acquires a deeper meaning. It is not merely an economic objective, nor can it be measured solely through fiscal indicators or annual statistics. Development is the visible expression of a state fulfilling its purpose. It reflects institutions that educate rather than merely instruct, courts that inspire confidence rather than merely dispense judgments, public administration that delivers rather than merely regulates, and economic policies that reward enterprise, innovation and productivity. Prosperity is rarely an accident of history. More often, it is the natural consequence of institutions that consistently expand opportunity.

This is why state capacity matters. It should never be confused with the expansion of governmental power. The purpose of the state is not to control more; it is to serve better. State capacity is the ability of public institutions to formulate sound policy, implement it effectively, adapt intelligently to changing circumstances and earn public confidence through consistent performance. Strong states are distinguished not by the extent of their authority, but by the quality of the opportunities they create for their people.

History repeatedly confirms this principle. The decisive advantage enjoyed by the world’s most successful nations has seldom been geography, natural resources or even political systems. It has been their ability to build institutions that outlast governments, preserve national direction across political transitions and steadily improve the lives of successive generations. Leadership may initiate transformation, but only institutions can sustain it. The true inheritance of every successful generation is therefore not a collection of policies, but a stronger state capable of serving the next generation even better than it did the existing or the previous ones.

Pakistan’s own experience points to the same conclusion. The country has never lacked talent, resilience or ambition. Time and again, it has demonstrated the ability to overcome adversity. Yet resilience alone cannot fulfil the purpose of the state. Nations ultimately progress not because they repeatedly recover from crises, but because they patiently build institutions that reduce the need for crisis management altogether. The transition from resilience to institutional excellence is therefore more than an administrative reform. It is the means through which the state fulfils its highest purpose: expanding opportunity, strengthening justice and enabling every generation to inherit a stronger republic than the one before it.

What, then, should this mean for Pakistan?

It should mean that every significant national decision is judged not only by its immediate political or economic consequences, but by a more enduring test: does it enable the state to fulfil its purpose? Does it strengthen institutions, widen opportunity, reinforce the rule of law, reward enterprise, and prepare future generations for a more competitive world? If the answer is no, even the most well-intentioned initiatives are unlikely to produce lasting national progress. The legitimacy of the state is measured not by the promises it makes, but by the opportunities it consistently creates.

This understanding also reshapes how we define national strength. Defence remains indispensable, diplomacy remains essential, yet neither can fully achieve its purpose without development. A nation’s enduring influence rests upon the quality of its institutions, the education of its people, the competitiveness of its economy, the credibility of its justice system and the confidence inspired by its governance. Development is therefore not merely another public policy objective. It is the means through which the state fulfils its fundamental purpose and transforms national potential into national power.

The same principle applies to democratic governance. Elections confer legitimacy upon governments; institutions sustain legitimacy for the state. Governments formulate policies, but institutions preserve continuity, protect public confidence and carry the national mission beyond electoral cycles. Empowered local governments, a professional civil service, an independent judiciary, effective regulators, a dynamic private sector and an engaged civil society are not competing centres of influence. Together, they form the institutional foundation through which the state fulfils its purpose across generations.

This is why the significance of the present national debate extends far beyond the statements that initiated it. Its lasting value lies in reminding us that Pakistan’s future will be determined less by the arguments we win than by the institutions we build. Every generation inherits a state shaped by those who came before it. Every generation also bears the responsibility to strengthen that inheritance so that those who follow inherit greater opportunity, stronger institutions and deeper public confidence.

History seldom remembers nations for the crises they endured; it remembers them for the institutions they built, the opportunities they created and the confidence with which they prepared for the future. Pakistan possesses the human talent, entrepreneurial spirit, strategic __cpLocation and resilience to become one of those nations. The defining question before us is therefore no longer whether change is necessary. It is whether we possess the wisdom, discipline and collective resolve to build a state that remains faithful to its highest purpose. Governments will come and go. Policies will evolve. Political debates will fade. Institutions alone endure. The ultimate purpose of the state is not simply to govern society, but to expand opportunity, protect justice and enable every generation to build a better future than the one it inherited.

The writer is a public policy advocate, business strategist, and former minister for investment.

Naguib Mahfouz, Egypt’s Nobel Prize-winning chronicler of social change, captured this tension perfectly in his Cairo Trilogy where progress is not portrayed as a clean break from history, but as an ongoing struggle between tradition and modernity, continuity and change. Pakistan’s own journey reflects the same tensions. Since the country’s independence in 1947, successive generations have carried forward the aspirations, contradictions, and challenges inherited from those before them, making choices to shape a future firmly rooted in the country’s history and potential for progress.

Despite exceptions, these choices were made in an environment of relative predictability, underpinned by a multilateral order that valued cooperation over isolation and dialogue over confrontation. Today, the multilateral order that Pakistan joined with optimism and an outward-looking vision in 1947 has been profoundly shaken. This is happening at a time when the need for such a system has never been greater. The world is grappling with the highest number of active conflicts since the Second World War, even as the capacity for multilateral peacebuilding and the institutions designed to prevent and resolve conflict are under increasing strain. And, once sectoral issues, like climate change, now intersect with poverty, food insecurity, gender inequality, and health challenges, creating interconnected risks that transcend national borders and demand collective action.

This year, I celebrate my fourth Independence Day in Pakistan.

Today, Pakistan’s active participation in regional peacebuilding efforts echoes Jinnah’s vision of an outward-looking country committed to peace within its borders and goodwill towards the wider world.

The contrast between the world I encountered when I first arrived and the one we inhabit today could not be starker. Yet the future cannot be separated from the past, and Pakistan’s history offers a rich legacy of ideas, and ideals, that can help the country navigate an increasingly unsettling period. These include Jinnah’s vision of an inclusive, modern, and outward-looking nation-state; Iqbal’s concept of a society that prepares for the future while holding firmly to its ideals; Asma Jahangir’s unwavering belief that justice, human dignity, and equal rights are indispensable foundations of a peaceful and democratic society; and Mahbub ul Haq’s humane and people-centred paradigm for development, reimagining the collective good in terms of human potential rather than abstract theories of economic growth and trickle-down economics.

These ideas derive their strength from being both historically grounded and forward-looking. Conceived in response to the defining challenges of their time, they remain remarkably relevant because many of the issues confronting Pakistan today are continuations of those same historical challenges. Today, Pakistan’s active participation in regional peacebuilding efforts echoes Jinnah’s vision of an outward-looking country committed to peace within its borders and goodwill towards the wider world. Similarly, the country’s engagement with modernity and globalisation, and its continuing search for a home-grown path to progress and future readiness, are reminiscent of Iqbal’s vision. Mahbub ul Haq and Asma Jahangir, likewise, remain lasting sources of inspiration for generations seeking to advance a more humane model of development and protect the rights of the most vulnerable and marginalised.

These stories of hope, resilience, and renewal remain inspiring in times of deep and overlapping crises. They, indeed, should help us recognise the Pakistan that is ready to emerge and take off, as envisioned by Uraan Pakistan, but remains unseen because of limited economic opportunity for youth, education systems that still leave far too many behind, and persistent development discrepancies within and between provinces.

While the current global disorder is beyond Pakistan’s control, its impact can be mitigated through sustained investments in people, institutional leadership, equitable al__cpLocation of resources, and stronger systems of governance that are accountable and responsive to local needs — priorities echoed unequivocally by the highest leadership in the country. The next step is always the more difficult one — transforming this vision and its underpinning values into sustained, irreversible policy, law and practice.

History is rarely shaped by extraordinary individuals acting alone. The change that endures is cumulative: it grows through countless acts of initiative, responsibility and cooperation, sustained over time by a shared sense of purpose. The lesson for Pakistan is equally compelling. Its future will depend on strong institutions capable of bringing these efforts together and giving them the scale and continuity to shape national progress. The task is not simply to cultivate more leaders, but to create the conditions in which people at every level can lead, and lead together in concert.

Across Pakistan, the leaders these institutions must recognise and enable are already present. They can be found in vulnerable communities self-organising to respond to recurring climate-induced disasters, women heads of households acquiring new skills to support their families in the face of adversity, and young people building social enterprises that create opportunities for others. It is evident in communities working together to improve access to basic services, women in law enforcement and legal professions breaking gender barriers, and marginalised groups delivering lifesaving services to those who need them most. Leadership exists at every level of society.

The challenge is not the absence of leadership, but our ability to recognise it, nurture it, and create the conditions for it to flourish, especially as we move towards an increasingly uncertain world. Pakistan already possesses the historical foundations, constitutional and legal frameworks, and indigenous capacities upon which inclusive and resilient development can be built.

Since joining the United Nations on September 30, 1947, Pakistan has remained an active contributor to the multilateral system. From its service on the Security Council and its longstanding role as one of the world’s leading contributors to United Nations peacekeeping, to its engagement across the General Assembly and other multilateral forums, Pakistan has consistently demonstrated its commitment to the principles of the UN Charter and to the pursuit of peace, development, and international cooperation.

As Pakistan looks towards the next chapter of its development journey, the UN is likewise preparing for a new chapter in its institutional leadership. This year, a new secretary-general will be elected to succeed António Guterres, taking the helm of an organisation in the midst of deep governance and efficiency reforms, and heavily stressed due to the state of multilateralism. Both moments invite reflection on a shared question: how do we strengthen the institutions, partnerships, and capabilities needed to respond to the increasingly complex challenges of the 21st century? The stakes could not be higher, nor the ambition greater.

The present moment should not be viewed as a temporary disruption to an otherwise stable international order. Rather, it reminds us that uncertainty is not an exception to be managed, but a defining feature of our time. The resilience of our institutions will therefore depend not on their ability to preserve the status quo, but on their capacity to adapt, innovate, and prepare for the challenges that lie ahead. The leaders serving in these local, national, regional and global institutions face a daunting but sorely needed mission.

Aged 79 and 81 respectively, both Pakistan and the UN were born in a moment of hope: a belief in a future shaped by trust, cooperation, and the peaceful coexistence of nations. Today, the institutions established in that era face unprecedented pressures. Yet the values that inspired their creation remain as relevant as ever. In this regard, the future of multilateralism may lie in more agile, issues-based coalitions, united not only by shared interests but by a deeper commitment to human solidarity, human rights, and sustainable development.

Naguib Mahfouz observed that while human will may create more than one future, we have only one past from which there is no escape. For both Pakistan and the UN, that shared past is rooted in the ideals of human solidarity, multilateral cooperation, and peaceful coexistence. The challenge before us is not to leave that past behind, but to draw on its enduring values as we build what comes next. Mahfouz’s warning was that we cannot escape our past; his hope was that the future remains ours to make. For Pakistan, and for the institutions it helped shape, that is the truer measure of progress: not certainty about what lies ahead, but the resolve to shape it.

The writer is the Resident Representative of the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) in Pakistan.

IF I was writing this piece before Operation Epic Fury, then I would have taken a more conventional approach. However, the recent military attack by US and Israel on Iran, and targeted strikes on several OIC states have raised questions about the role of Pakistan as a state founded essentially on Muslim nationhood. Consequently, today one needs to examine the Pakistan Resolution of 1940 rather differently. The prime focus of this article is to examine the extent to which the vision in the said resolution, preceded by the 1930 address by Allama Iqbal at Allahabad, has been achieved in the 1973 Constitution. And whether the Constitution as a covenant amongst diverse federating units, can withstand the international challenges that confront us in this time of geopolitical upheavals.

The Lahore Resolution

There are two narratives pertaining to the All-India Muslim League’s resolution, which was passed in Lahore on March 23, 1940 (the Lahore or Pakistan Resolution). The popular and political version is that the Lahore Resolution was passed based on ideological and religious differences between the Hindus and the Muslims. It is contended that such differences were so deep that they could not be bridged merely through the goodwill of the parties concerned. However, the second narrative, which is more technical in nature, was the legal aspect. In order to grasp this narrative, the Lahore Resolution needs to be read in its proper context. It is the Quaid-i-Azam’s address on March 22, 1940, which forms the context and justification of the Lahore Resolution.

The Lahore Resolution emphasised the need for a Muslim political ideology to shield from the suppressive Hindu majority. The Muslims in this scenario could be considered as a minority. Living together under a democratic form of government, according to this view, amounted to a perpetual subjugation of the Muslim minority to the majoritarian Hindu rule. However, the Quaid-i-Azam’s view, without denying the religious character of the Lahore Resolution, was a different one. He considered the Muslims not merely a minority but a ‘nation’. In his address he said:

“The problem in India is not of an inter-communal character, but manifestly of an international one, and it must be treated as such. So long as this basic and fundamental truth is not realised, any constitution that may be built will result in disaster and will prove destructive and harmful not only to the Mussalmans, but to the British and Hindus also……the only course open to us all is to allow the major nations separate homelands by dividing India into autonomous national states.”

In the language of international law, the Quaid viewed the Hindu-Muslim problem as a matter relating to the self-determination of the Muslims as in his view the Hindus and the Muslims of India were not only religious communities but also two nations in the modern sense of the word.

The Lahore Resolution demanded “that geographically contiguous units are demarcated into regions which should be constituted, with such territorial readjustments as may be necessary that the areas in which the Muslims are numerically in a majority as in the North Western and Eastern Zones of India should be grouped to constitute ‘independent states’ in which the constituent units should be autonomous and sovereign.”

He said that the “Mussalmans are not a minority as it is commonly known and understood…. Mussalmans are a nation according to any definition of a nation, and they must have their homelands, their territory, and their state.”

This is a precise demand for self-determination and not a cry for separatism based merely on religious antagonism. The great leader put it clearly: “We wish to live in peace and harmony with our neighbours as a free and independent people.”

principle of self-determination that was being increasingly espoused internationally since the start of the twentieth century became formally a part of international law when it was incorporated in the Charter of the United Nations in 1945. Article 1 (2) UN Charter states that it is one of the purposes of the UN to “develop friendly relations among nations based on respect for the principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples, and to take other appropriate measures to strengthen universal peace”. The principle of self-determination is further mentioned in Articles 55, 73 and 76 of the United Nations Charter. In international law, self-determination is the right of “peoples” to freely determine their political status and pursue their economic, social, and cultural development.

The Lahore Resolution crystalised in constitutional language the right of national self-determination of the Muslims of India by refusing to live in a united India under the numerical hegemony of the Hindu majority. The Lahore Resolution demanded “that geographically contiguous units are demarcated into regions which should be constituted, with such territorial readjustments as may be necessary that the areas in which the Muslims are numerically in a majority as in the North Western and Eastern Zones of India should be grouped to constitute ‘independent states’ in which the constituent units should be autonomous and sovereign.”

The Allahabad address of 1930

The address was delivered by Allama Iqbal at the 25th session of the All India Muslim League on December 29, 1930 in Allahabad — a presidential address that puts an important context to the Pakistan Resolution that was adopted a decade later. What should matter to Pakistan’s present policymakers as they evaluate the crises of the Muslims in India, the situation in the Gulf countries, and most importantly in Iran, can be better understood by taking this address into account. By then, Iqbal had already achieved fame as a legal mind, an accomplished philosopher, and an ideologue who had a pragmatic and strategic approach towards all the issues of the Muslims that he referred to as the Ummah.

Iqbal explains in this address that “we (Muslims) are 70 million and far more homogeneous than any other people in India. Indeed, the Muslims of India are the only Indian people who can fitly be described as a nation in the modern sense of the word. The Hindus, though ahead of us in almost all respects, have yet to achieve the kind of homogeneity which is necessary for a nation, and which Islam has given you as a free gift… [which] in the case of Hindu India involves a complete overhauling of her social structure”.

Iqbal’s words are playing out today in India as we watch the BJP government shatter the idea of a secular and inclusive society. Instead of overhauling the social structure throughout the union territories, its bigoted rulers are bent on upper caste supremacy, making the social scenario more casteist and exclusionary even for the Hindus.

On the face of it, Iqbal’s thought of a Muslim nationhood was not bound by territories or regions. That we know well from his poetic expression yet he was not dismissive of the sanctity of boundaries either. As a lawyer, he was aware of the perils of pushing for a unitary caliphhood stretching across continents. His poetry may glorify the Ottomon Caliphate of Turkey, or the 600 year-reign of Muslims in Spain, but in his speech he refrained from insisting that Muslims across the globe form a single political government. The Lahore Resolution likewise offered a pragmatic two states solution within the subcontinent in areas with a Muslim majority.

It is his pragmatism on ground as a legal mind that appealed to modern day leaders like Ali Khamenei who leaned heavily on Iqbal Lahori’s vision and in the largest Shiite state, he remains the most revered figure both on the executive front and within the circle of their theological leaders. Last year, President Masoud Pezeshkian of Iran especially stopped over in Lahore to visit Iqbal’s tomb. Their consistent anti-USA and Israel stance is without doubt fueled by the religious ethos of Hazrat Ali and the spirit of Karbala. However, the Iranians also draw inspiration from Iqbal ‘Lahori’ as they fondly call him. It is common knowledge, and the conclusion of several studies on Iqbal’s life and works that the faith he followed inspired him.

Iqbal claimed in the Allahabad speech that “I have given the best part of my life to a careful study of Islam, its law and polity; its history and its literature”. He concluded that Muslim nationhood relies upon the values, social norms, and community ideals drawn from the faith that will always serve as a common bond.

Almost 90 years later, from an unexpected quarter came a similar view in the form of an advice. President Putin’s team searched for what could be suggested as a common historic or cultural feature to unite the Middle East, for his 2019 address to these countries in Turkey. In the presence of the Iranian and Turkish heads of state, President Putin surprised the Muslim audience when he quoted the verse 103 from Quran’s chapter Aal-e-Imran — “And hold firmly to the rope of Allah all together and do not become divided.”

He teasingly asked the delegates as to why the Gulf countries did not build an alliance relying on the common values of the scripture that they believe in. Obviously no one is suggesting forming a grand Muslim state of the Middle East, but certainly a framework of mutual cooperation and defence support can be built to benefit as well as protect each one of these countries. Or perhaps an effort may be made to make OIC a more effective regional arrangement under Chapter VIII of the UN Charter. But the hint from the Russian side was clear — evolve a responsible narrative rooted in your faith to counter extremist religious positions that are beginning to dominate foreign policies of certain international and regional powers.

The Delhi Resolution of 1946

It will not be amiss to mention here another resolution passed on April 9, 1946 by the All-India Muslim League’s Legislators Convention held in Delhi (the Delhi Resolution) under the chairmanship of the Quaid-i-Azam Mohammad Ali Jinnah. In the Delhi Resolution, the Lahore Resolution was amended and the name of Pakistan was specifically stated in this charter. Additionally, ‘independent states’ as mentioned in the Lahore Resolution was replaced with a ‘sovereign independent state’ in the Delhi Resolution. The reference to ‘constituent units (which) should be autonomous and sovereign’ in the Lahore Resolution was also omitted.

The Delhi Resolution declares “That the zones comprising Bengal and Assam in the north-east and the Punjab, North-West Frontier Province, Sindh and Baluchistan in the north-west of India, namely Pakistan zones, where the Muslims are in a dominant majority, be constituted into a sovereign independent state and that an unequivocal undertaking be given to implement the establishment of Pakistan without delay.”

The common factor in both the Lahore Resolution and the Delhi Resolution is the demand of self-determination for the Muslims of India where they can establish a homeland, and they can “develop to the fullest [their] spiritual, cultural, economic, social, and political life, in a way that [they] think best and in consonance with [their] own ideals and according to the genius of [their] people”.

The 1973 Constitution

Constitution making in Pakistan has been an arduous task. After the creation of Pakistan in 1947, the constitution that was adopted for the new state was the Government of India Act 1935. The first national constitution took some time to frame and it was promulgated and enforced in 1956. Unfortunately, this constitution could not work for long as it was abrogated in 1958 with the declaration of martial law. The next constitution that was framed was in 1962. It was presidential in form and was also abrogated in 1969. The third constitution was the Interim Constitution enforced in 1972. We are now working with the Constitution that was enforced in 1973. This Constitution was strictly parliamentary in nature. However, major amendments like the 8th constitutional amendment 1985, 17th constitutional amendment 2002 and 18th constitutional amendment 2010 changed the original form of the Constitution significantly. Recently, the 26th constitutional amendment in 2024, followed by the 27th constitutional amendment in 2025 have had a far-reaching impact on the legal process and structure.

It is well-known that there are competing narratives that are espoused regarding the objective that was behind the struggle for a separate state for the Muslims of India. While one party asserts that Pakistan was imagined purely as a theocratic state pointing to slogans such as ‘Pakistan ka matlab kya / La Ilaha il Allah’ that was raised by the populace in the processions and public meetings during the Pakistan movement, the other party uncompromisingly espouses the establishment of a secular polity in Pakistan, and points to the presidential speech by the Quaid-i-Azam in the Constituent Assembly on August 11, 1947. However, it appears that the majority of the population will support a modern Islamic democracy that is neither purely secular nor purely theocratic. In such a state, the government rather than an enforcer of the Islamic norms shall function as an enabler of Islamic values. In this kind of a modern state, there will be freedom of religion and the practice of religion will remain grounded in the covenant between the individual believer and God.

The country’s founding vision finds full articulation in this social contract (i.e. the 1973 Constitution). Article 2 of the Constitution of Pakistan 1973 declares that the religion of the state shall be Islam. In order to provide the way to achieve the aforesaid objectives, the Council of Islamic Ideology and the Federal Shariat Court of Pakistan are effective platforms.

Although it was viewed as a controversial step when both these bodies were brought in the main text of the Constitution by a dictator, but some believe that their presence serves as a useful argument against extremist elements. These exist as forums that will give an institutionalised evaluation that determines which one of the thousands of laws in Pakistan violates the injunctions of Islam.

The Constitution further ensures fundamental rights, inter alia, democracy, freedom, equality, tolerance and social justice as enunciated by Islam, and enables Muslims to exercise their own free will to either follow their personal covenant with God or to act differently; the state would not interfere. As far as minorities are concerned, Pakistan went on to ratify the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and several other human rights treaties. Though implementation has several gaps as of now yet the aforesaid legal commitments reflect the vision of Iqbal and Jinnah for a modern, moderate and tolerant Islamic state. It is neither a theocracy nor purely secular, but a balance between the two. It provides guidance for collective living and safeguards for individual liberty.

It needs to be admitted that the evolution of the Constitution of Pakistan was a journey marked by deviations and disruptions. Instead of being products of parliamentary debate, major constitutional amendments were framed and enforced through authoritarian regimes. In all democratic countries edicts derive their legitimacy and enforcement through consultative processes by the legitimate representatives of the citizens. The popular will is expressed through popular elections and through legislative assemblies. In Islamic political thought, the consensus generated from consultation or Shura has a covenantal status amongst those who participate in the said process. Decisions in disregard of the said principle remain controversial. Karbala is a classic case study of resistance when the covenantal consultations were overridden by an Individual’s arbitrary and unpopular decision; the raison d’etre being the supremacy of the collective will over the will of one person, no matter how wise or powerful that individual may be.

The new world order

The decade of 1940s saw the emergence of a new world order in which the United Nations was formed in 1945, and Pakistan was established two years later. Then Pakistan could afford to continue experimentation with its careless constitution making as it was in the United States’ camp. The only threat was from the Indian side, which was mostly hedged.

Today our government is interfacing with the Middle East, and two hostile neighbours. The world’s power centres are not necessarily backing us up fully so we have to juggle neutrality in a full blown war in the Middle East. The prevailing narratives are far more misleading and ruthless, such as the religious extremism of evangelical Christians, the promised land of the Jews, and the Akhand Bharat fantasy of the BJP — all divisive slogans to sustain conflict and control. Our representatives need to do serious internal consultations or Shura sessions with all political forces in order to have proper authorisation to take positions.

The Constitution being a social contract or covenant should be performed by those tasked to implement it in the machinery of the government. If its deadlines are missed, if it is made off-balanced, if there is a trend of institutional disregard rather than individual violations then the link between the federation and its subjects begins to weaken dangerously. When electoral systems are compromised and mandates are considered to be stolen, the government’s legitimacy to participate in the activities and alliances in the new world order that will now shape the world, is reduced.

The writer is ex-federal law minister & advocate Supreme Court.

ahmersoofi@absco.pk

PAKISTAN was born out of a constitutional and legal struggle led by Quaid-i-Azam Mohammad Ali Jinnah. H.V Hudson in The Great Divide described Jinnah as a “steadfast, idealist as well as a man of scrupulous honour.” Lawrence Ziring in Pakistan in the Twentieth century rightly believed that for many Muslims, “Jinnah was the model of deportment, an articulator of dreams, and a promise of a better future.” The Muslim League under Jinnah’s leadership eventually came to the conclusion that the Hindu majority was determined to deny the due rights of Muslims and thus passed the Lahore Resolution demanding territorial sovereignty to secure a separate homeland for the Muslims of British India. An understanding of why this resolution was passed is crucial to tackle the complexities of South Asian politics today.

The poet-philosopher Allama Iqbal in his address in 1930 at Allahabad said: “I would like to see the Punjab, North-West Frontier Province, Sindh and Baluchistan amalgamated into a single state. Self-government within the British Empire, or the formation of a consolidated North-West Indian Muslim state, appears to me to be the final destiny of the Muslims at least of North-West India.”

The great Iqbal proposed that Muslim majority provinces should be the part of a new Muslim state to secure linguistic, racial, cultural, and religious values of the community. Dr Iqbal’s speech contained striking and impactful ideas which inspired Muslim nationalism and generated a huge awareness among Muslims in the Punjab about their historical and cultural importance, giving them confidence and new hope through his poetic and philosophical thoughts. These thoughts significantly contributed to the rise in calls for freedom.

Iqbal, who firmly believed in the leadership and political wisdom of the Quaid, wrote an insightful letter to Jinnah on June 21, 1937 and said that Mohammad Ali Jinnah was “the only Muslim in India today to whom the community has a right to look up to for safe guidance through the storm which is coming to North-West India, and perhaps to the whole of India.”

The Lahore Resolution was not merely an ideological triumph. It brought the Muslim community to the cusp of a new era of independence and clarified ideological and strategic goals in a conclusive manner, with little room for alternative political outcomes.

Jinnah could read the situation accurately. He knew that the manner in which the Congress exploited its rule, its withdrawal from provincial governments, and its non-cooperation with the British were serious mistakes. These, however, were immensely favourable for the Muslim League. And it found ample space to advance the Muslim cause.

The Lahore Resolution was not merely an ideological triumph; it offered a clear and ambitious future roadmap for Muslims that was free of compromises. The resolution brought the Muslim community to the cusp of a new era of independence and clarified its ideological and strategic goals in a conclusive manner, leaving little room for alternative political outcomes. However, numerous challenges, hurdles, and risks stood in the way of achieving these objectives. The Muslims’ efforts to defeat political subordination gained momentum, and its leaders emerged as the principal driving force of Muslim nationalism.

The Muslim League passed the resolution at its annual session in Lahore on March 23, 1940, and resolved that no constitutional plan would be workable or acceptable to the Muslims unless “geographically contiguous units are demarcated into regions, which should be so constituted, with such territorial readjustments as may be necessary, that the areas in which Muslims are numerically in majority as in the North Western and Eastern zones of India should be grouped to constitute Independent States in which the constituent units should be autonomous and sovereign.”

I.H Qureshi in his book The struggle for Pakistan believed that for the first time it became clear that Muslims would not accept any other option except a nation of their own.

Through this resolution the Muslim League was able to protect nationhood and create statehood by setting a new path for Muslims dreaming of a free, new life. The resolution denounced the propaganda of the Congress and right-wing Hindu organisations against the resolution. Quaid-i-Azam Mohammad Ali Jinnah remained optimistic as well as determined about achieving the goals set by the resolution. The Lahore resolution helped our leaders turn the ripples of resistance to Congress’ oppression of Muslims into a wave of change that swept across the subcontinent. The most significant achievement of Jinnah was the change he was able to effect in the attitudes of Muslims through this resolution.

During his presidential address at the Muslim League session in Lahore, Jinnah asserted that Muslims were not a minority but a nation. He justified Muslim nationhood based on the contemporary political definition of a nation state and its elements, such as territorial sovereignty, population, nationalism, and citizenship. Jinnah argued that their demand for a separate state was in accordance with the international norms of self-determination. Thus, the logical and realistic solution of the Indian problem was to divide India into two autonomous states.

The resolution was a watershed moment in the quest for a Muslim political identity. It provided a way to resolve the fundamental problem of political identity, which is imperative for future citizenship. It also created new opportunities to address longstanding ambiguities in the expression of Muslim identity and culture. The resolution also embodied a pro-autonomy demand and specified the geographical boundaries of the proposed Muslim state in the northwestern and northeastern regions of India, where Muslims constituted a majority.

Between 1942 and 1946 much had happened that weakened the British rule. The Congress and its leaders, including Jawaharlal Nehru and Mahatma Gandhi, openly opposed the resolution because they considered it a threat to India. However, the Congress’ rejection of Crips offers, and the Quit India Movement in 1942 provided an opportunity for the Muslim league to push its demand with force. H.V Hudson also acknowledges that the demand for Pakistan and the unity among the Muslims were driven by one man and that was Jinnah. In 1944, Gandhi met Jinnah at his residence to discuss the future of India. Gandhi insisted on keeping India united, but he failed to persuade Jinnah. The Wavell papers indicate that “the Gandhi-Jinnah talks made the position clearer; that neither of these leaders have abandoned any of their former ideas; Jinnah emphasised the two-nation theory and Pakistan more strongly than before, and clearly wanted this be decided before the British leave.”

As a consummate statesman and a sagacious leader, Jinnah had an exceptional gift for understanding scenarios and forecasting possible opportunities. Thus, he was able to detect the flaws of the Cabinet Mission Plan in 1946. But, more importantly, he was able to assess the possibility for what seemed impossible to many — the creation of a separate nation for the Muslims. Eventually, Lord Louis Mountbatten was appointed as the last viceroy of India with the task to organise the transfer of power on June 3, 1947. Mountbatten himself acknowledged that he was unable to convince Jinnah despite deploying the best of his persuasion skills. Nevertheless, Jinnah’s prowess in legal and constitutional matters helped him persuade the British that the partition of India was the only solution for Muslims.

After Pakistan came into being, few world leaders could anticipate that it would survive the difficult circumstances created by India. On the other hand, the people of Pakistan were certain that the Quaid-i-Azam’s vision and strong leadership as Governor General can overcome all kinds of turbulent times. The founding fathers laid the foundation of citizenship and put emphasis on establishing justice, domestic cohesion, promoting the welfare of the people and securing liberty and freedom. Cut to the present, and the track record of our political elite indicates that they failed to derive any inspiration or lessons from past events, such as the Lahore Resolution. Our rulers have violated all moral and constitutional principles, compromising Pakistan’s key national interests. The policies of successive governments also failed to win the trust of the people who were consistently betrayed by false promises.

Influential elements hailing from aristocratic, business, and bureaucratic classes have long sought to establish their own positions, caring solely for their personal gains and doing little for the education and progress of the people of this country. Elite capture and the ruthless domination of domestic politics for the protection of individual interests have become the main hindrances to our democratic development. The parasitic role of bureaucracy, mired in the colonial mindset as well as the culture of sycophancy, has prevented institutional development and progression, created power imbalance, and increased the gap between the state and its citizens, which must be restored. This is only possible if the system of government frees itself from its colonial hangover, and implements comprehensive checks and balances.

These political elites seem to show little regard for the Quaid’s message in 1947: “We must sink individualism and petty jealousies and make up our minds to serve the people with honesty and faithfulness.”

Pakistan’s uninspiring leaders have an opportunity to learn from history about resilience and adaptability in changing circumstances. The Quaid’s transformational leadership has lessons for present leaders: commitment, dedication, and respect for the ideals of freedom, equality, justice, democracy, and rule of law. Pakistan today needs capable leaders who can reclaim Jinnah’s political heirship, move away from traditional thinking, and work for the cause of the common man. At present, leadership matters even more given the enormity and complexity of the challenges we face as a nation.

An effective and competent leadership is required to utilise the immense human capital and wealth in the country, which has so far been squandered. The country is rich in natural and human resources; it has a huge treasure of raw materials and minerals that can bring about an economic transformation. Building transport infrastructure and a network of trade routes can significantly increase the domestic and international business. Pakistan’s industrialisation can also be incentivised through fair and transparent policies for the sustainable growth of investment to improve the economy. An education system that is accessible for all, and free of gender, ethnic, linguistic, and parochial biases can make a society flourish as well as set it on a progressive and inclusive path, creating mutual understanding and respect that is so essential for peace and prosperity.

Only equitable social and economic justice can enable us to curb growing extremism, political intolerance, and disruptive tendencies in society. Moreover, our youth is the greatest strength we have. There is an abundance of talent, ideas and positive energy which can fuel the economic engine. There is also a need to create space, opportunities, direction, motivation, and policies to absorb the skills, knowledge, and intelligence of the young in the interest of Pakistan. For instance, our young can play a vital role in promoting Pakistan’s peace narrative through the digital space by encouraging young digital leadership, which is vital for sustainable progress. After all, information technology is the future. However, the youth must remember the Quaid’s guiding principles — unity, faith, discipline. In his speech at Islamia College in Peshawar, Jinnah said that the contribution of the youth towards bringing about harmony and unity was crucial. He advised that the youth should “think and act with sobriety and in all humility as selfless and true soldiers of the people, and with absolute loyalty to Pakistan.”

The writer is Director, Pakistan Study Centre, University of Sindh, Jamshoro.

SEVERAL historians, political analysts and scholars are of the view that the Lahore Resolution of March 23, 1940 gave meaning and purpose to the freedom struggle of the Muslims in India. This assessment carries substantial weight. After experiencing the harsh rule of the Indian National Congress, which ended in 1939, the Muslims realised that there will be limited opportunities for them to sustain themselves.

Thus began an organised and structured movement to force the rulers to acknowledge diversity. On October 10, 1938, Shaikh Abdul Majid tabled Resolution No.5 at the Sindh Muslim League Conference in Karachi. It was endorsed by Khan Bahadur Gurmani and championed by Sir Abdullah Haroon, Sayed Abdul Rauf Shah and Maulana Abdul Hamid Badayuni. G.M. Sayed had famously stated at this event that the Hindus and Muslims were two separate nations.

“This Conference considers it absolutely essential, in the interests of unhampered cultural development, the economic and social betterment and political self-determination of the two nations, known as Hindus and Muslims, to recommend to the All-India Muslim League to review and revise the entire conception of what should be the suitable constitution for India which will secure honourable and legitimate status to them.”

It may be remembered that the conversations related to the creation of a separate land for the Muslims of the subcontinent was taking place on several forums. Chaudhry Rehmat Ali, in his famous pamphlet Now or Never had provided a sketch of this homeland in 1933. Based in Cambridge, he reached out to many notable leaders, scholars and opinion makers linked to the political struggle in this region.

When various political forces and stakeholders of All India Muslim League agreed to adopt the proposal for a separate homeland for the Muslims and oppressed polities, the struggle gained traction. And under the principled leadership of Jinnah and his comrades, they eventually succeeded. It is another story that the dream turned sour for many in later years.

Jinnah devoted himself to evolving plans for every walk of life in the new nation, focusing on its future economic development and management. After the adoption of the Lahore Resolution in 1940, Jinnah and his comrades were mindful of the mammoth task of upgrading the lives of millions of impoverished people in what was to become the new state of Pakistan.

One of the significant attempts in achieving this goal was the formulation of the Economic Planning Committee. Scholars, including Professors Sharif-ul-Mujahid and Naureen Talha, maintain that Jinnah was very concerned about his downtrodden countrymen.

The visionary that he was, Jinnah applied a scientific approach to achieve reforms that the emerging state of Pakistan needed. The inauguration of State Bank of Pakistan in July 1948, less than a year after independence, was a remarkable achievement.

The Quaid had entrusted the task of formulating economic strategies to concerned professionals. His idea of economic and social reforms was clear. He intended to transform Pakistan into a functioning welfare state, capable of providing employment opportunities through private enterprises in agricultural and industrial sectors.

When one reviews the legacy of Jinnah — a lawyer by profession and a politician by choice — in terms of future planning, one sees a series of sincere efforts to put the economy of the new country on the right path. The visionary that he was, Jinnah applied a scientific approach to achieve reforms that the emerging state of Pakistan needed. The inauguration of State Bank of Pakistan in July 1948 – less than a year after independence – was a remarkable achievement.

But barring a few sincere efforts to run the economy in a scientific manner, the situation worsened drastically after Jinnah. As we stand today, nearly eight decades on, visible disparities can be observed in our economic development, access to opportunities and education.

While the advertisement campaigns showcase a country where each and every citizen has access to all the amenities of life and opportunities for progress, the reality remains grim. We have stark regional disparities. How can the fact that many tehsils in Balochistan are without a grid-based electricity system or safe drinking water be justified? This is a province that has produced natural gas and countless invaluable resources for more than seventy years, which fuel the prosperity of millions in other provinces.

Ever since Pakistan came into being, the overall status of smaller communities (read minorities) declined rapidly. In 1947, over 20 per cent of the people in both the eastern and western wings of Pakistan were non-Muslims. Now the number is down to about 3pc. Those who chose to live in Pakistan trusted the AIML leadership, and in the direction given by the Quaid in numerous speeches where he has mentioned the equal status of all people. It is ironic that the religious parties which were against the creation of Pakistan began exercising their influence on the state.

When the Objectives Resolution was passed in 1949, there was discontent among non-Muslim legislators. They feared that the ordinary non-Muslims will become vulnerable to bigotry. Prominent political leaders of East Pakistan, including Canteswar Barman, Peter Paul Gomez and Basanta Kumar Das — members of the second parliament of Pakistan — warned that such tendencies did not conform to the core ideas that the Quaid believed in.

But the legislative process continued, and the state and society tilted towards a more conservative version of nationhood. Many leaders and members of Pakistan National Congress, a political party that represented the rights of non-Muslims in East Pakistan – were disillusioned. Many political workers had initially opposed the idea of partition.

However, once it happened, they accepted it. But they struggled to achieve a respectable status for those who did not belong to the faith of the majority. Eventually, many leaders and workers of this party along with other political outfits faced the wrath of the state. Some were imprisoned while others were routinely harassed.

It is disappointing that such tendencies persist. Religion often becomes a political tool for the powers that be. Two ‘religiously-inspired’ entities have haunted Pakistan in recent times – Tehreek-e-Labbaik Pakistan (TLP) and Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan, which are now proscribed. But, unfortunately, TLP played a major role in unsettling an elected government about a decade ago. Besides, thousands of innocent Pakistanis, including the members of our security forces, lost their lives to violence. And yet another crackdown, Operation Ghazab lil Haq, is ongoing to eradicate the threat from across the border.

The existence of such radical groups violates Jinnah’s political path of inclusion. He stated that Islam is a way of life; a comprehensive code of democratic practice. He also cautioned that the imposition of one belief system should never be the intention. In his famous view about the future of Pakistan as a state, Jinnah emphatically rejected the idea of a theocracy. He did not subscribe to the possibility that Pakistan would ever become a place where clerics will call the shots.

Jinnah was a great admirer of the idealism and progressiveness that Islam brought to mankind. It was for this reason that he was hopeful that the Constituent Assembly in Pakistan would frame a constitution that shall embody the Islamic spirit of equality, justice and fair play.

As the Middle East, especially Gaza and Lebanon, face a most challenging time, an important political view that should be revisited is Jinnah’s position on the oppressed people of Palestine. One has observed that contemporary political narratives survive on a hypocrisy of sorts. While the modern world leadership continues to harp on about its commitment to economic freedom and access to equal opportunity enterprises, the opposite is practiced in reality.

Imperialism has always prospered through its cruel exploitation of local resources for the benefit of colonial masters. Professors S.M. Burke and Salim Quraishi in their seminal book The British Raj in India — A Historical Review record that the trading exploits from India alone in the year 1740 accounted for more than 10 per cent of Britain’s revenue.

This figure steadily grew over a period of time. But this trade imbalance, and later control of resources could only become possible because of the absolute political subordination of the local population.

While visualising the future course of action for Indian Muslims and India as a whole, Jinnah was categorical about ensuring free enterprising rights based on the principles of fair play and equality. In his speech on the inauguration ceremony of the State Bank on July 1, 1948, he objectively identified the shortcomings and limitations in the emerging capitalist inclinations, which were deeply rooted in, and promoted by, the west. Instead, he proposed espousing the principles of Islamic practices in transactions that focused on attaining welfare, happiness and prosperity of mankind.

Jinnah could foresee that artificially planted conflicts shall become the raison d’être for the arms and ammunition industries — a catalyst for next generation imperialism. It is not coincidental that he, without mincing his words, condemned the shoddy handling of the Palestinian issue by the United Kingdom, UN and later the US. The various resolutions adopted by All India Muslim League in support of a fair and just settlement of Palestinian matters during 1937-1947 are a testimony to this fact. Prolonged correspondence between Jinnah and Lord Linlithgow and other British officials informs us about the rigourous attempts by the Quaid to prevent Palestine from bleeding for decades.

Jinnah lost no opportunity to present the case of the Palestinian people to the powerful through his statements and letters to various concerned statesmen. His correspondence with President Harry Truman of the United States is a testimony to this. The worthy compilation of Jinnah’s documents on world affairs by Professor Mehrunnisa Ali clearly elucidates the fact that he was only concerned about establishing peace through principled solutions to festering regional problems.

Jinnah knew only too well that if seeds of conflict are allowed to germinate, vested interests under the influence of imperialistic powers shall be the ultimate beneficiaries. Sadly, though, his successors, that is successive governments in Pakistan, conveniently allowed themselves to be dragged into proxy wars, undesired conflicts and shortsighted adventurism. The time has come for a thorough appraisal of Jinnah’s worthy legacy to rescue his country from the quagmire it finds itself in due to a lack of foresight and vision.

Our founding fathers had envisioned a nation that upheld integrity and ethical conduct in every avenue of governance. The reverse has happened. Corruption is rampant in every institution, leaving the poor with nothing to turn to. Governments in Pakistan have been removed on unproven charges of corruption, only to be replaced by equally tainted rulers.

While new and innovative methods are devised to remove the curse of corruption from our lives, no one seems to talk about the elephant in the room — the outlandish lifestyles of our politicians, members of the judiciary and bureaucrats. Consider the fact that many of the BPS-18 officers, with a modest salary, have residential addresses in the most expensive neighbourhoods of Karachi South. Their families are able to enjoy their vacations in foreign lands, and their children have access to world class education.

The financial equation obviously does not balance out. According to Hector Bolitho, one of Jinnah’s biographers, the Quaid’s scrupulousness and uprightness were two of the several qualities that were acknowledged even by his adversaries. Jinnah was often referred to as ‘painfully honest’. He never deviated from prescribed rules and procedures. Countless anecdotes tell us that our leader spent from his own pocket for all the political activities that he conducted.

He was an extremely prudent administrator during his short stint as the Governor General. Besides, he left a sizable portion of his personal wealth in the service of several educational institutions as part of his will. He proposed the same path for the nation in his maiden speech to the Constituent Assembly in August 1947.

It is, therefore, painful to see that our regimes and other pillars of society have forgotten this most vital precept emphasised by the father of the nation. Our history is replete with examples where a completely opposite course of action was chosen by the powers that be for personal gains and for the benefit of various coteries.

The writer is an academic and researcher based in Karachi

THE Lahore Resolution, also known as the Pakistan Resolution, can be considered the first social contract among the Muslim community of the subcontinent, fostering political consciousness and ultimately leading to the creation of a homeland, Pakistan, on August 14, 1947. The enduring legacy of the resolution is the promotion of the autonomy and sovereignty of the Muslims in the subcontinent, which not only galvanised collective action towards creating a new nation but also helped shape Pakistan’s future. The essence of the resolution is enshrined in the constitutions and respective constitutional amendments since the inception of Pakistan. Hence, the Pakistan Resolution was a landmark triumph in the history of the Pakistan Movement, serving as a compass for the establishment of the state and its development.

Resolutions bind people together, and turn ideals into a realities. Significantly, the Pakistan Movement, led not by individuals but by a political party, All India Muslim League, under the enigmatic leadership of Quaid-i-Azam Mohammad Ali Jinnah, presented, debated and passed a resolution at Minto Park in Lahore (later known as the Greater Iqbal Park). In the three-day annual session held between March 22 to 24, 1940, our leaders put forward the demand for an autonomous and sovereign state to secure the rights of Muslims in the subcontinent.

The creation of Pakistan, as an intended result of the Pakistan resolution, was a singular moment. However, the abiding legacy of the Pakistan Resolution still requires a consistent collective commitment to the creation of an autonomous, sovereign, and democratic state. Despite myriad testing challenges over the past eight decades, Pakistan has the potential to flourish. There exists a rich human potential, but it needs a conducive political environment in which people can transform their potential into a powerful productive force that makes the country undefeatable. Thus, all citizens of Pakistan, regardless of their religions, sects, ethnicities, cultures, languages, castes, or political affiliations, have a moral and political obligation to play a constructive role to ensure that Pakistan is seen as a democratic republic for the welfare of our present and future generations.

After almost eight decades, some people continue to question the partition of India and the creation of Pakistan. Pakistan was a dire need of the time because the rights of the Muslims in British India were in peril. Considering the socio-political predicaments in British India, our ancestors made a political demand by passing a resolution for a separate homeland to protect the economic, legal, and political rights of Muslims in the subcontinent. Now, there is no reason to doubt Jinnah’s monumental achievement — Pakistan. This nation’s birth changed the map of the world. There is no other way to fortify our land other than respecting and upholding democratic values, improving the economic conditions, empowering state institutions, and enhancing human development through quality and accessible education together with progressive political decision-making so that Pakistanis can live anywhere in the world with dignity.

This day should inspire us to define a new direction — one that focuses on economic stability, institutional reforms, education for all, and technological innovation and expansion.

The resolution called for the autonomy and sovereignty of the people, which can have two meanings: first, Pakistan shall be an autonomous and sovereign state in which the people have the democratic right to make their own sociopolitical and economic decisions without coercion. Second, no internal or external forces shall dictate to the nation of Pakistan. Pakistan’s autonomy and sovereignty means that no power can prevent it from improving the welfare of its people. Like any progressive country, this too should be a state with a far higher level of human development, real democracy, a clean environment, a vibrant public sphere, a high literacy rate, efficient and competent public health services, good governance, and corruption-free institutions. In short, an ideal state with law and order, and peaceful coexistence.

Lessons from the Resolution

A senior member of the All India Muslim League, A. K. Fazlul Huq, presented the Pakistan Resolution in the session, which primarily rejected the idea of United India as envisaged in the federal structure of the Government of India Act 1935. Moreover, it demands the independent states in the Muslim dominated areas in the North Western and Eastern zones of British India. The independent states will be autonomous and sovereign, which shall safeguard the rights of the people. The resolution’s text was short and general.

In the book The Making of the Pakistan Resolution, Muhammad Aslam Malik argues that some scholars and critics have claimed that the resolution’s content is general and unclear. While the resolution’s content is general, it did play a historic role in shaping the path to Pakistan’s creation. The Pakistan resolution made a central claim that partition was the only alternative for the Muslims.

Can a general resolution be valuable? In his paper titled Incompletely Theorized Agreements, Cass R. Sunstein stated that, mostly in law and society, people rarely understand any subject completely. They often reach incomplete theorised agreements on a general principle, which does not mean that they may also agree on its particular cases. If they agree on a general principle, they may disagree on its particular cases and vice versa. For instance, people agree that murder is wrong, but they may disagree that abortion is murder. In light of Sunstein’s argument, even though the content of the Pakistan Resolution is general, people had developed an agreement that they wanted a separate, autonomous, and sovereign homeland where they could live in peace.

Making a republic and republic-making are two distinct incidents. The creation of Pakistan as a republic, on August 14, 1947, is a single political event. Yet, the development of Pakistan as a republic, in terms of drafting and passing the constitutions, building institutions, creating economic opportunities, implementing human rights, formulating educational and health policies, and cultivating democratic values, is a continuous process that needs collective resolve and action. Both processes are equally significant.

Undoubtedly, the leaders of the Pakistan Movement achieved a momentous victory, which is independence. The next goal was to build the republic under successive leaderships, and that is an ongoing process. At every stage of building the republic, new social contracts are required. Several interruptions in the democratic process weakened the development of state institutions. In Pakistan: The State in Crisis, Khaled Ahmed investigates whether Pakistan is a failed state or not. He argues that “the most obvious sign of failure is the breakdown of the state institutions”. Sadly, these institutions continue to decline.

Therefore, present decision-makers must act collectively to build state institutions for a strong country. There exists rich potential in Pakistan that requires political will to materialise. As a nation, it is our moral and political obligation to ensure that all citizens are able to participate in strengthening Pakistan.

Free minds

The institution of education is the cornerstone of a state’s development. It is education, not indoctrination, that is vital for independent minds in society. Brazilian philosopher Paulo Freire’s classic work, Pedagogy of the Oppressed, explains how authoritarian regimes use force to control people’s minds for their own interests. This approach is detrimental to the promotion of liberated and rational minds in the country. The strategy Freire mentions should not be applied to developing countries, including Pakistan. Education in Pakistan should nurture human potential so that people can develop critical and analytical minds to create new possibilities in life. So, critical thinking, not rote learning, is necessary for Pakistan’s bright future.

In Pakistan, about 60 per cent of the population is under 30 years old, which is an enormous asset for the country, and they need empowerment through genuine education. No government has earnestly provided proper education to Pakistanis. Every society has to make various disciplines, including science and technology, arts and humanities, languages, business studies, public health, and social sciences, available to citizens. To amplify technological power, we also need to promote natural sciences. For a nuclear state, in this conflict-ridden world, this is not a matter of choice but necessity. In the age of science and technology, and in the midst of advanced technological warfare, Pakistan needs to pursue science to protect itself.

To combat violence and terrorism, philosophy, history, literature, and liberal arts are essential subjects that not only enlighten minds but also promote critical thinking. In philosophy, logic and ethics are vital. Logic provides rational solutions to meet life’s challenges. In Groundwork for the Metaphysics of Morals, Immanuel Kant argues that only the rational mind has autonomy. According to Kant, an autonomous person has freedom. If one lacks freedom, one is not autonomous but heteronomous. Kant states that a rational person with freedom can create laws. For better legislation in Pakistan, people should hold on to rationality.

Ethics, on the other hand, distinguishes between right and wrong. Different forms of applied ethics, including ethics for AI, the environment, politics, health services, business and administration, media and research, are imperative. AI ethics, in particular, are being introduced worldwide to formulate a moral framework to apply the values of fairness, transparency, data privacy, digital security, and accountability in an increasingly AI dependent world. Moreover, modernising education in madressahs with science is pivotal to battle rising sectarianism. The value of science and technology cannot be underestimated. These fields contribute to medicine, automobiles, electronics, and strategic defence.

Back to democracy

The democratic process is political in nature and can resolve conflict through dialogue rather than war. Any category of conflict, domestic or global, can be solved through mediation if all parties are willing to engage. Since its independence, Pakistan has not been able to sustain a democratic process in governance, in parliament, or in other essential institutions. It was suspended many times in the past, which has created an undemocratic attitude in society. Politicians, economists, educationists, and decision-makers still need to learn the significance of a thriving democracy. It plays a central role in policymaking.

At present, Pakistan is facing a severe financial crisis, terrorism, a law and order situation, brain drain, as well as hostilities from neighbouring countries. The solution to these problems is also embedded in a robust political process.

A democracy can only function when people are able to develop informed and progressive minds. This system of governance respects all voices; not just the elected leaders but also the people are involved in making important decisions that impact social life. In Leadership for the New Millennium, Khaled Ahmed states that “the erosion of democratic institutions affects the quality of leaders in Pakistan.” Democratic institutions produce visionary leaders. He correctly argues that Pakistan’s survival depends upon the restoration of democratic institutions.

As Pakistan is a product of an extraordinary freedom struggle, it should strengthen institutions that promote public reasoning in society. A democratic society fosters diverse associations, clubs, and unions where people can debate and discuss national issues, and perhaps, even come up with solutions. These diverse fora can be in the shape of book clubs, sports associations, arts, humanities, and science societies where people engage in shared activities. Such platforms go a long way in building harmony and goodwill. People voice varied opinions, share knowledge, and present answers for social, political, or economic glitches.

The pursuit of growth

Sustainable progress depends on human development. The legacy of the Pakistan Resolution is autonomy, which essentially means the ability to think individualistically and impartially. The most valuable capital of a nation is its human capital. A country with a higher level of human development offers countless opportunities to explore new possibilities in knowledge, business, governance, and economics. There are certain essential conditions, such as freedom, integrity, justice, peace, art, culture, entertainment, political and economic stability, sports, and basic human rights, that can channel the massive potential of our youth.

The level of human development in Pakistan is far from satisfactory. Despite a large youth population, the prospects of sustainable growth are hardly encouraging. Policymakers, particularly in education and economics, should seriously consider the essential indicators of human development in the country. Due to a lower level of human development, the country has failed in producing creative and independent minds, which could have offered alternative ways to meet the many emerging challenges.

Despite two great Pakistani intellectuals insisting on human development, Pakistan did not embrace the concept of individual growth. Allama Iqbal’s idea of selfhood in the first quarter of the 20th century, particularly its aspect of evolution of the self, primarily refers to boosting people’s capabilities. Iqbal’s concept of personal refinement means fostering creativity to redefine realities. In the last quarter of the 20th century, Mahbub ul Haq framed an interpretation of a human development programme that tends to open up people’s choices. Mahbub ul Haq shifted the direction from the economy of nations to the economy of people’s lives. Thus, Iqbal and Mahbub ul Haq promote self-advancement for a creative and productive life.

Political, economic, and public policymakers in Pakistan should consider the centrality of human beings in their respective decision-making for better standards of living. Like advanced countries, where a productive and creative populace ensures that their countries are and remain progressive.

In the end, Pakistan is still a work in progress. The Pakistan Resolution’s lasting message lies in the fact that it lives on as an egalitarian social pact that should inspire us to bridge the many gaps that put our nation at risk. The creation of Pakistan is the intended consequence of the All-India Muslim League’s Lahore Resolution, which was a democratic decision.

It should compel us to revisit the founding values of Jinnah and his comrades — democratic spirit and even-handed social justice. A prosperous future depends upon the restoration of the political process, fortified state institutions, and pluralism. As we celebrate March 23, it is crucial to define a new direction — one that focuses on economic stability, institutional reforms, education for all and technological innovation and expansion. This nation must honour the dreams of its founding fathers for the benefit of the generations to come.

The writer holds a PhD from the University of Canterbury, New Zealand, and teaches Philosophy at the University of the Punjab, Lahore.

IN the current phase of our beautiful, beleaguered country’s history, institutional deviation and constitutional deformities have reached abysmal lows. This special report is being published on the birthday of an individual who had unshakable respect for institutional integrity and individual accountability in life, not immunity for life. The invitation to write encouraged one to consider anecdotal aspects to portray the Quaid’s life from inception to conclusion through fleeting glimpses, snatches of scenes, bits and pieces, which juxtaposed together, evoke his unlikely beginnings, unique persona, values and respect for institutions.

So much is already widely known about the pivotal role of M.A. Jinnah, especially between 1935 and 1948. One therefore decided to select relatively less known aspects. Herein are segments from the Quaid’s early years and then, with a deliberate leap over the next 40 years or so, random clips from the last 13 months.

A disconcerting birth

For data about his arrival on earth, and early years, one relied on the account recorded by his sister Fatima Jinnah.

She spent the most time with him. In addition to being one of his six siblings, she also spent a total of 28 years with him as his sole housekeeping custodian and sister, in two phases. Initially from about 1910 to 1918. Then, following Ruttie Jinnah’s death in February, 1929 (after about 10 years of a tumultuous marriage from 1919 to 1929), for a total of 26 years, living in close proximity, and frequent interaction. Her book My Brother presumed to have been written about 15 years after his demise during 1963-64, was published in 1967. Though the late eminent scholar Sharif ul Mujahid states in his preface that “… an extremely controversial passage…” had to be excluded, the published version comprises only three chapters which “…truthfully reproduce…” the contents of the original manuscript, now stored in the National Archives, Islamabad.

With the most reputed midwife of Karachi attending to a home-based delivery in 1876 by mother Mithibai, Fatima Jinnah writes; “… the baby boy was weak and tiny, having slim, long hands, and a long, elongated head. The parents were seriously worried about his health, this little baby that was underweight by quite a few pounds…” Despite the doctor’s assurance that the low weight factor should not cause worry, Mithibai insisted that her spouse Jinnah Poonja, herself and the baby travel soonest to Ganod in the small princely state of Gondal, Kathiawar where the venerated holy man Hasan Pir was buried, to seek his blessings for her frail first-born.

Braving a storm en route by sailing boat through the Arabian Sea, to the port of Verawal, thence by bullock cart through village Paneli to the destination of the great Sufi’s tomb, Mithibai and Jinnah Poonja fondly saw the tiny tot’s head shaved for the aqeeqa. With silent, saintly blessings absorbed, the return to Karachi commenced with a rich feast in Paneli where all villagers joined to celebrate the birth of the boy named Mohammad Ali.

There was a poignant contrast in the last stretch. Just as Pakistan’s genesis moved towards the triumph of reality, the great leader’s already frail body was being eroded from within. His fragility became increasingly apparent around, and onwards of 1940.

An unstudious boy

Yet even though he was already the apple – and the orange – of his mother’s eye, his early childhood years worried his father. The boy was far more interested in “…abandoning books for marbles, tops, gilli danda and cricket…”.

He had already joined, and soon left, a primary school close to his home in Kharadar because he spurned studies and classrooms. Prematurely, to please his father, he insisted on attending to office work. But soon, his virtual illiteracy prevented participation in conduct of transactions and business. In just two months, the light dawned.

He told his father: “… I would like to go back to school”. He then “…wanted to make up for lost time, as boys of his age and even younger than him had gone ahead of him. He took to his lessons with a vengeance, studying into the late hours of the night at home, determined to forge ahead….” But another disappointment came up. The teacher told his father that “…the boy is horrible in arithmetic….” was ominous news for a businessman who wanted his son to secure future financial bonanzas. He decided to take the boy to a school a long mile away from home, far enough from distracting local friends.

And so the ten-year-old gained admission in 1886 to the fourth standard Gujarati in the well-reputed Sind Madrassah. But, it soon seemed the boy was incorrigible. He “…continued to woo success and victory on the playfield, rather than at school….”

When the boy’s aunt, Manbai Poofivisited Karachi from her Bombay home to spend a few days with her brother Jinnah Poonja and his family, it was agreed that the unstudious boy would proceed with her to Bombay to be admitted to the Anjuman-i-Islam School where, fortuitously, he passed the fourth standard exam, “…enabling him to be admitted in first standard English….” Despite this success, a mother’s love prevailed over a father’s ambitions. The boy soon returned to Karachi, to be readmitted to Sind Madrassah on December 23, 1887. Some unease abided, to resurface four years later. For, on his son’s insistence, his father moved him out of the prestigious school on January 5, 1891 to be admitted to the Catholic Missionary High School on Lawrence Road where the boy became restless yet again. Just a month later, he was returned to Sind Madrassah on February 9, 1891 in fourth standard English.

Equestrian adventures

Meanwhile, back at the Kharadar ranch, the boy who would not settle into school found stallions far more exciting. Using his father’s fine stable of horses, accompanied by a friend named Karim Kassim, the two would make the other two whose reins they held, trot and gallop for long hours every day. Moving swiftly between horse-carriages on the streets of Karachi, the most visible means of transport for the well-off, or ‘aristocratic’ families, the errant son continued to cause concern to his doting parents. Mithibai would steadfastly declare that her Mohammad Ali would one day become a great man.

England beckons

As General Manager of Graham Trading and Shipping Company — an enterprise in close commercial contact with Jinnah Poonja’s firm – Frederick Croft should be credited for initiating a transformative phase in the life of a restless 16-year-old teenager. He suggested that the boy be sent to London to work at the head office of Croft’s firm for about three years where, among other skills, he could also gain high proficiency in English while learning to adjust to new challenges. Intense debate ensued between the parents. Mithibai most reluctantly agreed to allow her beloved firstborn to leave – provided he was first wed to prevent him from being entrapped by an English woman. The search led to 15-year-old Emibai in distant Paneli village, Kathiawar.

The family then proceeded again by boat from Karachi to Verawal, then by bullock cart to the bride’s home. After lavish festivities, the new couple returned to Karachi. Soon thereafter, with his mother’s tears and prayers blending for a heart-wrenching farewell, the son began the three-week journey to what became a four-year life-changing experience. The father had already remitted a large sum to London to pay for his expenses.

Sent to learn commerce, the youth soon learnt much more elsewhere. Mohammad Ali listened to debates in the House of Commons, to rhetoric at Hyde Park Speakers’ Corner, viewed Shakespeare’s plays, noted the names of Prophet Muhammad (peace be upon him) inscribed in Lincoln’s Inn as one of the world’s greatest law-givers, canvassed votes for Bombay Zoroastrian, and earlier, one of the four founders of the Congress Party, Dadabhai Naoroji’s narrow victory as the first non-Englishman elected from a London constituency to parliament.

In short, Jinnah rejected the very reason for being sent to England by his father. Instead, as recounted by him about half a century later in 1946 to Nasim Ahmed, Dawn’s correspondent in London, he even considered a career on the stage. His appetite for acting … possibly as Romeo … was whetted by brief experience with a touring company. Until his shocked father, who belatedly learnt of new plans, instantly and categorically ruled that out.

All the while, he preserved chastity.

When his Russell Street landlady’s pretty daughter reminded him that they happened to be “standing together chatting under a mistletoe on Christmas Eve and that custom required the man to kiss the woman”, Jinnah politely declined to do so because, as he told her, his faith and culture did not permit such indulgence. did fall head over heels in love with reading, and voraciously so.

From newspapers to law books to poetry to plays by Shakespeare. From the extreme of abandoning books in childhood to cherishing their infinite value as he grew into adulthood.

He was also recovering from the news of dual tragedies at home. First his childbride Emibai’s death who he barely knew, followed by the profound loss of one he knew from his very first breath, his adoring mother Mithibai who passed away giving birth to her seventh child.

Perhaps these two traumas instilled a new resolve — to fulfill his mother’s dreams and be the youngest ever law student to become a barrister from Lincoln’s Inn. Then return to Karachi, and Bombay, to help his father recover from the huge losses suffered in business.

From trials to new heights

Preferring law practice in larger Bombay to small-town Karachi from 1897 to about 1900 was like an anti-climax to the hopes nurtured by success in the London exams. His secretary in later years, M.H. Saiyid in his book Mohammad Ali Jinnah (A Political Study), in 1945 wrote: “The first three years were of great hardship and although he attended his office regularly every day, he wandered without a single brief. The long and crowded footpaths of Bombay may, if they could only speak, bear testimony to a young pedestrian pacing them every morning from his new abode in a humble locality in the city, to his office in the Fort, and every evening back again to his apartments after a weary, toilsome day spent in anxious expectation.”

Ironically, momentous change yet again began through the intervention of an Englishman, John Macpherson, the acting advocate-general of Bombay. Jinnah became the first-ever local practitioner to be invited to work in the advocate general’s chamber. Obviously, some hint of the intelligence and potential possessed by the young barrister must have come through to the senior luminary who was later knighted. Hearing about a vacancy for a temporary presidency magistrate, the freshly-recruited lawyer boldly initiated contact with his employer ‘s support, and Sir Charles Olivant, member in-charge of the judicial department, who then became the third Englishman to play a catalytic role in opening dramatic new vistas for Jinnah’s ascent to outstanding professional success.

Forty years later

Many articles by other writers published in Dawn have already done justice to crucial phases of the founder’s life between 1900 and 1940. In this rumination, while even excluding glimpses of his singular love for Ruttie Jinnah, arbitrary focus is on random segments between 1940 and 1948.

Age, frailty and fanaticism

Except for Mahatma Gandhi, born in 1869, who was seven years older than Jinnah, the Muslim League’s leader was the oldest among the three most important political figures who played decisive roles in the creation of Pakistan and India. Gandhi had an overarching influence but did not wield the operational Congress policy direction that Nehru did. The latter was born in 1889. He was thirteen years younger and was 58 years old at Independence while Mountbatten was 24 years younger and was only 47 years of age in 1947.

Jinnah, at 71, was the oldest of the three protagonists. But was also the one most notably becoming physically vulnerable to ill-health.

In 1953, A.R. Casey, the governor of Bengal in 1946, noted that “I have looked up my personal diary, and I find that I emphasised, in several references, the fact that he (M.A. Jinnah) looked very frail.” However, he could sustain long periods of active discussion without any sign of tiring …a couple of hours at a time…. My wife and I dined with him and his sister at Government House in Karachi … in March 1948. At this same dinner my wife made some comment about someone or other being “a fanatic.” Jinnah said, “Don’t decry fanatics. If I hadn’t been a fanatic, there would never have been Pakistan.”

August 7, 1947

As the Dakota aircraft afforded an aerial overview of New Delhi soon after taking off with the Quaid, Fatima Jinnah and his small staff on its way to Karachi, the first ADC to the founder, Mian Ata Rabbani was seated immediately behind his leader. He noticed how the Quaid looked intently down at the city and softly said to himself: “That is the end of it”.

Yet, in two respects at least, it was not the end of his ties with India. He did not change his will whereby Aligarh Muslim University remained one of the principal beneficiaries. Nor did he sell his favourite residence on Mount Pleasant Road in Bombay.

Later, the same day, after the boisterous welcome in Karachi, as the Quaid ascended the steps of the Governor-General’s House, he said to his military adviser and ADC Lt. S.M Ahsan: “Do you know, I never expected to see Pakistan in my lifetime. We have to be very grateful to God for what we have achieved. “ Later still, during the orientation walk through the premises of his new residence, and a meticulous inspection of the inventory, he noted that the library shelves were empty.

He was informed that the previous occupant, the Governor of Sind, had taken all the books with him. Visibly upset, Jinnah said to his military secretary, “Nonsense. The books belong here. Go and get them back”. Similarly, when he was shown game items, he was told that a croquet set had been taken away by Sir Francis Mudie, Governor of Punjab. On his visit to Lahore after some time, he had the set retrieved and returned to where it belonged as state property.

August 9, 1947

At a dinner hosted by Sir Ghulam Hussain Hidayatullah in Jinnah’s honour, Mrs Hidayatullah tied an imaam zaamin on the founder’s arm. Surprisingly, he did not know the meaning of the ritual. When told that it would protect him against evil, he turned to Altaf Hussain, the editor of Dawn, and said, “Now I can face you”, to loud laughter.

‘Unforgetting’ & unforgiving?

In his book I was ADC to the Quaid, which was written after his retirement, Group Captain Ata Rabbani recalls an unusual revelation of Jinnah’s traits.

He records that, while proceeding to the Sind Assembly on August 11, 1947 to deliver the address that became a historic landmark of secular vision, the Quaid-i-Azam deliberately ignored the presence of A.K.M Fazlul Haque, the East Bengal leader who had the honour of moving the Lahore Resolution on March 23, 1940 at the Muslim League meeting. Well in advance of coming abreast of the Quaid walking in his direction, Fazlul Haque greeted him several times and also bowed respectfully. Jinnah neither looked at him nor responded to the salutation.

Rabbani wrote: “…The only reason that comes to mind is that (Fazlul Haque, otherwise known for his integrity) had repeatedly acted against the categorical instructions of the League’s high command, at times even at the peril of causing damage to the overall Muslim cause. Disloyalty to the cause was one thing that the Quaid-iAzam would not forgive.”

The final stretch

There was a poignant contrast in the last stretch. Just as Pakistan’s genesis moved towards the triumph of reality, the leader’s already frail body was being eroded from within.

His fragility became increasingly apparent around, and onwards of 1940.

Now in Pakistan, the news poured in every day of ghastly massacres as refugees crossed new state frontiers in Punjab, of anti-Muslim slaughters in New Delhi and Bihar, Indian occupation of Srinagar on a forged Instrument of Accession, severe shortage of funds and resources to cope with enormous new numbers and pressures — all compounded the depressive impact on both mind and physique.

Yet he insisted on reviewing piles of files in detail, made notes, frequently met the prime minister and other senior individuals. And also travelled to Peshawar, Risalpur, Lahore.

Then, defying all advice, he flew from Quetta to Karachi to inaugurate the State Bank on July 1, 1948, his last public appearance.

Both Fatima Jinnah in her slim book and Lt. Colonel Dr Ilahi Bakhsh, who wrote With the Quaid-i-Azam during his last days as he attended to him in the last weeks, narrate moving accounts of how this giant of a man, despite valiant efforts, quickly weakened each day in August and early September 1948. Yet his sense of values survived. When a nurse repeatedly declined to tell him his temperature unless the doctor permitted her, and then left the room, he told his sister: “I like people like that… people who can be firm, who refuse to be cowed down….”

Towards the end of August, Fatima Jinnah recalled him saying: “I am no more interested in living…the sooner I go the better.” When she reassured him that the doctors were hopeful, he said, “No… I don ‘ t want to live.”

The bizarre episode of the ambulance breakdown on September 11, 1948 between Mauripur airfield and the Governor-General’s House is well known.

Frail at birth and in death

Weight count came a full circle.

From cradle to grave. Infected lungs and sheer fatigue had reduced him to only 70 pounds. Yet, when it mattered most, Jinnah punched way above his physical weight.

In every sense, the Quaid-i-Azam remained the unbeaten heavy-weight champion of history. He defeated three adversaries virtually single-handedly — the British, the Congress Party and allies, plus at least four Muslim entities that opposed the creation of Pakistan.

Though well-known, Stanley Wolpert’s distinctive tribute in his book, Jinnah of Pakistan bears repetition: “Few individuals significantly alter the course of history. Fewer still modify the map of the world. Hardly anyone can be credited with creating a nation-state.

Mohammad Ali Jinnah did all three.”

The writer is an author, a former senator and federal minister.

email: javedjabbar.2@gmail.com

EVERY generation inherits a story, and for the youth of Pakistan, one story shines brightest: the struggle and vision of Mohammad Ali Jinnah. His life, mission and foresight will remain forever relevant.

They are a compass for a generation navigating transformation, uncertainty, and possibility. Today, the youth stands at the intersection of technological acceleration, volatile geopolitical realignments, climate disruptions, cultural shifts, economic uncertainty, and a rising global consciousness that increasingly binds individual destinies into a shared human trajectory. The 21st century has not merely changed the world; it has rewired it. In this disorderly landscape, youth are tasked not only with survival but with ‘meaning-making’, which is to discover purpose, shape identity, and wield agency to craft a society that is equitable, resilient, and vibrant. As Jinnah once said to students in 1948, “You must devote yourself wholeheartedly to your studies, for that is your rst obligation to yourselves, your parents and to the State”.

Pakistan’s youth are acutely aware of the systemic challenges their country faces: entrenched inequalities, political volatility, and social injustice. Yet they carry both the responsibility and the capacity to act. The roof of Frere Hall in Karachi, immortalised in the brushstrokes of Sadequain, serves as a silent witness to these realities. A symbolic canvas capturing the lives, struggles, and resilience of millions. In its stillness, the artwork reects the persistent challenges of governance, social inequality, and the desperate need for ethical stewardship. It reminds the youth that leadership is both moral and practical. It requires courage, vision, and empathy.

The country’s young are breaking free from the shackles of saviour-centric leadership. They believe in their own ability to act, to create, and to chart the course for themselves and their communities. Leadership is not imposed through brute force. It is driven by compassion, and is collaborative in nature. It is more like horsemanship than command: a skilled rider does not force a horse but works in partnership, guiding with subtlety, awareness, and responsiveness. From the campaigns of Alexander the Great in Punjab to the Mughal emperors whose mastery of horses symbolised coordination, strategy, and grace, horsemanship has long been a part of Pakistan’s turbulent history. In Lahore, the annual Horse and Cattle Show continues to teach lessons of discipline, responsiveness, and balance, observed and absorbed by the country’s youngsters who are growing up amid these rich traditions. Just as horsemanship requires attunement to the horse, leadership requires awareness of environment, context, and community. It is a principle that extends naturally to Pakistan’s agrarian heritage.

Jinnah’s words in 1945 resonate across time: “With faith, unity and discipline … there is nothing worthwhile that you cannot achieve”. He reminds the youth that discipline, ethical action, and vision are foundational. Horizontal leadership, community engagement, and principled decision-making are the only ways to embody the founder’s philosophical insight in contemporary Pakistan.

Equally instructive is Pakistan’s connection to the soil. Agrarian life instills a sense of place, responsibility, and identity. Understanding the soil and the seasons, rivers and ecosystems cultivates both practical knowledge and moral stewardship. A youth that grows up in the fertile valleys of Punjab, the riverine plains of Sindh, the rugged landscape of Balochistan and the scenic, culturally-rich environs of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa inherit a lived understanding of interdependence, resilience, and collective responsibility. The Indus River, owing from the northern mountains through the plains into the Arabian Sea, embodies Pakistan’s identity as well as the Quaid’s progressive vision of unity and coexistence. It is both a lifeline and a symbol that unites diverse landscapes and equally varied communities into a shared national narrative. Similarly, the deserts of Thar, the highlands of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, and the majestic peaks of Gilgit-Baltistan teach lessons in adaptation, resourcefulness, and perseverance.

These landscapes shape worldviews and provide a profound sense of continuity and belonging. Ideally, they should reinforce the founding father’s lessons of collaboration, patience, equality, integrity and foresight.

The youth’s task is to navigate complexity with agency. This involves creating meaning in the age of disorder.

And the time is now to not just survive global climate shocks, heightened economic insecurity, and political volatility, but to also intervene, frame, and transform the world around them.

Young Pakistanis are positioned to recognise problems, design solutions, and seize policy windows that allow structural impact. Whether advocating for climate adaptation strategies across the country, creating digital innovation hubs in Islamabad, or devising systems for sustainable agriculture, the youth must act as architects of policy and society, and bridge local realities with global frameworks.

Opportunities for the youth have never been more expansive. Pakistan’s mountains, deserts, and mineral-rich regions invite exploration and mining initiatives.

The coastlines open doors for maritime trade, research, and renewable energy, while its urban centres provide a springboard into the digital economy. Articial intelligence, blockchain, and emerging global marketplaces are arenas where Pakistani youth can compete, innovate, and lead. The world is theirs to claim. Not waiting for permission, but seizing opportunities with initiative, creativity, and ethical responsibility.

Pakistan’s youth are also shaping identity and belonging in a horizontal and empathetic manner. They are redening leadership as one that is relational and rational as exemplied by Jinnah, and through the creation of networks of cooperation, mentorship, and mutual accountability. Authority is earned through skill, foresight, inclusivity and responsiveness — echoes of Quaid-i-Azam Mohammad Ali Jinnah’s thoughts. Our leader has given us a map that shows the way to earning trust through sensitivity, receptiveness, honesty and determination, much like an astute farmer who understands the rhythms of the land. Ethical action and collaboration will enable the youth to earn trust and credibility. However, they must not wait for a messiah to emerge. Instead, they should focus on transforming into their own saviours.

And without any doubt, the country’s future is theirs to claim.

This connection to land, culture, and history is not merely symbolic. It provides the moral foundation for leadership. Pakistan’s diverse landscapes, with its mountains, plains, deserts, and coasts teach us patience, adaptation, and resilience. Agrarian life connects action to consequence, discipline to outcome, and collective effort to shared benet. The youth are therefore equipped not only with agency but also with the moral lens required to guide communities, protect natural resources, and uphold identity and belonging.

Jinnah’s words in 1945 resonate across time: “With faith, unity and discipline … there is nothing worthwhile that you cannot achieve”. The Quaid’s immortal message serves as a reminder for the youth to embrace discipline, justice, and vision as foundational guidelines for success. Horizontal leadership, community engagement, and principled decision-making are the only ways to embody the founder’s philosophical insight in contemporary Pakistan. Our youth has to act as stewards of belonging, custodians of identity, and architects of possibilities. The power lies with the country’s young to build a nation that represents both historical wisdom and the promise of innovation.

As Pakistan celebrates Mohammad Ali Jinnah’s birthday, it is tting to honour not only his formidable legacy but the potential of today’s youth to carry it forward. The nation’s future depends on those who claim their agency, embrace horizontal leadership, and act with courage, empathy, and vision. The Quaid once told the youth in 1948 to “learn to obey, for only then you can learn to command”, reminding them that humility and discipline form the foundation of true leadership.

Today, his words echo louder than ever: the youth of Pakistan can and must shape the country’s destiny. The question is not whether Pakistan’s youth are capable. The question is whether they trust themselves to lead, innovate, and dene their own present and future.

In doing so, they honour Jinnah. The founding father, a most remarkable and determined leader, can never become a relic of history. He lives on as a compass for participation, achievement, and nation-building.

The writer holds a PhD, and teaches political economy and comparative politics at Brevard College.

AT present, Pakistan is confronting a state of unending turmoil and an immense democratic predicament primarily caused by its own inability as a nation to embrace the values of democracy, interfaith harmony and pluralism. The perpetual absence of political will to protect these principles has resulted in deepening injustice, sectarian discord and the marginalisation of our minorities. This not only damages the country’s global image, it also violates Quaid-i-Azam Mohammad Ali Jinnah’s vision of an egalitarian and democratic nation state where the rule of law would ensure justice and equality for every citizen.

The country’s frail democratic culture is also an outcome of failure on the part of our leaders to absorb the intrinsic worth of the Quaid’s inspirational leadership, vision, set of values and his aspirational insight.

Currently, Pakistan’s political structure appears incapable of initiating both a discourse as well as a deliberation on central problems that have come into play due to shifting global power dynamics, national politics, and security in the region. In fact, the political narratives have been inward looking and successive political leaderships largely dominated by unelected elements, which has kept the country from treading the democratic path. The most suitable way to settle political issues is through consistent dialogue in an accommodating and affable fashion. The undemocratic approach has only led to an unstable, deeply polarised political environment, negative economic progress, and persistent decline in Pakistan’s law and order situation. Every aspect of national life remains scarred by divisions and injustice as corruption reigns supreme. Political intolerance has jeopardised the democratic process, and left the people of the country significantly disillusioned. A crisis of identity and leadership, excessive centralisation of power, and increasing socioeconomic disparity, is fueled further by poor education along with an inadequate healthcare infrastructure.

Jinnah’s long road

The ruling elite has lost sight of the founding father’s challenges. Quaid-i-Azam Mohammad Ali Jinnah had envisioned Pakistan as a harmonious and inclusive society. After Jinnah became a member of Muslim League in 1913, he decided to build political awareness among Muslims. Realising the importance of cooperation between the two largest communities, he tried to unite Hindus and Muslims through the Lucknow Pact in 1916. Unfortunately, the communal nature of Congress politics did not favour the interests and rights of Muslims. This became clear as day during the movement for restoration of Khilafat (1919-1924). It is important to remember that at the time Muslims faced poverty, mistreatment, social injustice, and discrimination in an environment that lacked pluralistic values.

For the British, India was considered the “brightest jewel in the crown” due to its immense commercial potential and strategic importance. Britain’s Industrial Revolution accelerated trade between the two regions, enabling its textile industry to flourish at the expense of the Indian traditional textile sector. As the British pursued their own economic and political interests, socioeconomic inequality and poverty grew, triggering mass anger and frustration.

Jinnah’s 14-pointcharter espoused inclusiveness and the political participation of all communities. These points protected the political and economic freedoms of Muslims, along with their education, culture, language, religion, personal laws, and institutions to ensure unity in the community.

Christian missionaries expanded their efforts to convert Indians to Christianity as well as create a servile educated class shaped by Western values.

Thomas Macaulay advocated an English-based education system, leading the government to establish schools that promoted Western ideas. These reforms, however, did little to promote harmony. Instead, they marginalised local cultures and indigenous belief systems. Class divisions and British cruelty further contributed to social discord in a society far removed from democratic principles. British attitudes and oppression created an awakening among Indians who understood that their local traditions stood diminished and their talent exploited and unacknowledged.

The Simon Commission in 1927 caused widespread unrest and boycotts. Soon after, an all-India conference was organised to counter the British narrative that the Indian political leaders were incapable of shaping a constitution for their country. The Nehru Report proposed a unitary form of government and rejected a separate electorate system for Muslims. In doing so, it violated the Lucknow Pact, and became the turning point.

The path to Pakistan

The Quaid-i-Azam’s 14-points, unlike the Nehru Report, charted the legal structure of a true democracy and recommended a federal system with provincial autonomy. The charter is the culmination of Jinnah’s experiences and observations during the dark circumstances of British India. His 14-point agenda espoused inclusiveness and the political participation of all communities. These points protected the political and economic freedoms of Muslims, along with their education, culture, language, religion, personal laws, and institutions to ensure unity in the community. The seventh point established a pluralistic society with “full religious liberty, ie, liberty of belief, worship, observance, propaganda, association, and education for all communities of India.” Further, the Quaid’s fourteen points laid the foundation of a multicultural society and interfaith harmony, illustrating his firm belief in pluralism, inclusivity, and equal rights. The contract safeguarded the adequate representation of minorities in all legislatures and governing bodies. He viewed minority safeguards as a fundamental political necessity rather than a privilege for Muslims. The eighth point stated that “No bill or resolution or any part thereof shall be passed in any legislature or any other elected body if three-fourths of the members of any community in that particular body oppose such a bill, resolution or part thereof on the ground that it would be injurious to the interests of that community.” The third point structured the rights of minorities and provided that “in all legislatures in the country and other than elected bodies shall be constituted on the definite principle of adequate and effective representation of minorities in every province without reducing the majority in any province to a minority or even equality.” In his presidential address at the All-India Muslim League session in 1934 in Delhi, Jinnah declared that “in the name of humanity, I care more for them (the untouchables) than for Muslims.” M. C. Rajah, a prominent leader of the Hindu Untouchables had deep admiration and gratitude for Jinnah. He appreciated the fact that while advocating Muslim rights, Jinnah did not sideline the interests of other marginalised groups who would otherwise be “crushed under the steamroller of a caste Hindu majority acting under the influence and direction of Mr. Gandhi.” Eventually, following a string of constitutional plans, Jinnah’s key points were included in the Government of India Act of 1935. After the elections in 1937, it became abundantly clear that the Hindudominated character of the Congress will not protect Muslim interests and progress. Hence, Muslims moved towards the All India Muslim League which, restructured by Jinnah, passed a resolution in 1940.

With this, not only did the Muslim League’s popularity rise but so did the call for a separate homeland.

The AIML soon turned into a movement led by the great leader. The Quaid’s idea of nationhood was rooted in secularism, and a strong faith in democracy. Today, his words at the time of independence hold immense value: “Islam and its idealism has taught us democracy. It has taught us equality of men, justice, and fair play to everyone. In any case, Pakistan is not going to be a theocratic state.” Jinnah emphasised that both Muslims and non-Muslim communities will have equal rights and freedoms, that equal citizenship and protection of minorities would strengthen Pakistan.

“Without any distinction of caste and creed” Quaid-i-Azam Mohammad Ali Jinnah was fired by the intense belief that Muslims, with their distinct culture, territory, and demographic identity belonged to a separate nation – an idea that is enshrined in the Lahore Resolution of March 23, 1940. SM Burke argues that given the policy of His Majesty’s Government regarding the gradual development of self-governing institutions in India, a government in India was possible without Gandhi but without Jinnah, there would never have been a Pakistan.

The Quaid’s leadership was transformational because it was receptive to ideas grounded in reason.

He underlined the need for unity in conflict.

Impressive and charismatic, Jinnah was of an exceptional temperament: patient, resilient, and composed even in crises. Sir Aga Khan III, a contemporary of Quaid -e-Azam, stated that “Of all the statesmen that I have known in my life — Clemenceau, Lloyds George, Churchill, Curzon, Mussolini, Mahatma Gandhi — Jinnah is the most remarkable.

None of these in my view outshone him in strength of character, and in that almost uncanny combination of prescience and resolution which is statecraft.” Jinnah envisioned Pakistan as a democratic and inclusive nation state where the rule of law would ensure equality for all citizens. During a press conference in Delhi on July 14, 1947, before assuming the office of Governor-General of Pakistan, Quaid-i-Azam was clear that “minorities to whichever community they may belong, will be safeguarded. Their religion or faith or belief will be secure.” He also assured that “minorities will be, in all respects, the citizens of Pakistan without any distinction of caste and creed.” On August 11, 1947, in his historic address to the Constituent Assembly, Jinnah outlined the future direction of the new state. He stressed the importance of maintaining law and order, elimination of bribery, corruption and nepotism, and the necessity of equal citizenship, regardless of caste or creed, as defining values of Pakistan. In February 1948, our leader reaffirmed that Hindus, Christians and Parsis in Pakistan were equal citizens — a principle he viewed as an essential corollary of democratic responsibility.

Pakistanis were thus empowered by the father of the nation to revive democratic ideals and strengthen their belief in constitutionalism, equality, justice, and the rule of law. Jinnah changed the map of the world with Pakistan. But after him, his land has been caught in the cycle of leadership and constitutional crises.

The moral decay set in early. In the 1950s, the centralisation of power and the denial of provincial autonomy gave rise to conflict over language and identity — issues that were mishandled by the ruling elite. In the following decade, bureaucratic insensitivity towards ethnic nationalism and rising provincialism increased intolerance and inculcated a sense of deprivation. These tensions ultimately contributed to the disintegration of Pakistan in 1971, following the failure of political dialogue among top elites.

Pakistan also failed to uphold the principles of pluralism, democracy, and genuine interfaith harmony.

Instead, it enabled radicalisation, and now faces a formidable challenge in the form of terrorism. This is driven by the misconception that different cultures cannot coexist and must merge into a single dominant culture. Extreme ideologies suppress both freedom of conscience and cultural diversity, which are essential for societal progress.

Jinnah’s vision of a pluralistic society was at the heart of Pakistan’s creation – a response to the marginalisation of Muslims in India. The idea of freedom and equality was central to the Quaid’s thoughts. In his speeches, Jinnah asserted that discrimination based on religion, caste, or creed would prove disastrous for Pakistan. He also said that the creation of Pakistan as a sovereign state is “unprecedented and there was no parallel in the history of the world.” The Constitution of 1973 renewed hope for the values of democracy, tolerance, and peace as it provides the framework for a pluralistic society: Article 25 guarantees equality of all citizens; Article 37 ensures social justice; Article 36 safeguards the rights of minorities. Proper implementation of these constitutional guarantees will strengthen federalism, freedom, and social justice.

Pakistan’s electoral system also provides space for women and minorities — groups often marginalised in majoritarian political systems. By rebalancing constitutional safeguards, decentralising power, and empowering minority communities, Pakistan must strive for pluralism, cultural diversity, and democratic resilience.

As a multiethnic society, Pakistan must transform into a bastion of religious tolerance and enlightenment. These values will forge a strong bond between the state and its citizens. SM Burke rightly acknowledges that if Pakistanis learnt to govern themselves efficiently, their country would be an impressively thriving land. This alone promises to be the greatest tribute this nation can pay to its founding father.

Freedom and democracy are essentials of a flourishing political culture. Democracy withers without freedom. And freedom has no meaning without democratic values. The current tumultuous situation in the country has damaged freedoms. Thus Pakistan’s political leadership must return to the Quaid’s principles, demonstrate ideological resilience, celebrate cultural diversity, and resolve to sustain peace, tolerance, and democratic stability.

Complex challenges require political solutions. The pluralistic vision of Quaid-i-Azam Mohammad Ali Jinnah provides the blueprint for progress, unity, fairness and national dignity.

The writer is professor and director, Pakistan Study Centre, University of Sindh, Jamshoro.

shuja.mahesar@usindh.edu.pk

QUAID-I-AZAM Mohammad Ali Jinnah, a charismatic statesman, laid the foundation for a modern democratic state, Pakistan, to safeguard the fundamental rights of Muslims who were a minority in pre-Partition India. Pakistan was born as a secular democratic state, but its welfare and prosperity will always depend upon the restoration of Jinnah’s democratic legacy. Despite cultural, religious, or ethnic distinctions, Jinnah steadfastly believed that each Pakistani is an equal citizen; justice, honesty, and impartiality are the guiding principles that protect the right to life, property, and religious beliefs. Hence, for Jinnah, democracy ensures justice for all.

Pakistan’s great founder wanted neither a theocratic state nor a feudal one.

For Jinnah, democracy was a matter of conviction. ‘Democracy’ means people-centred decision-making, which enables individuals not only to elect their representatives but also to devise public policies, enact laws and amend constitutions through public reasoning for the common good. Democracy treats all citizens as equal members of the state.

“Let us lay the foundations of our democracy”

Democracy is one of the cardinal attributes of a modern state. The new independent states in the subcontinent, Pakistan and India, adopted the British democratic political structure in their respective countries. The constitutional approach was the only political solution for this region, and it was more than necessary for the two neighbours to develop democratic systems to preserve the principles of equal citizenship, justice and freedom of expression. The rule of law is essential for democracy. In The Legacy of Quaid-i-Azam, Dr Javid Iqbal states that Mohammad Ali Jinnah, being a celebrated lawyer, had a firm belief in the rule of law rather than the rule of individuals. The rule of law strengthens institutions, not individuals. He writes: “Quaid-i-Azam obviously stood for a strong, independent and irreproachable judiciary because human rights could not be protected and enforced without such a judiciary”. Jinnah has repeatedly asserted that only an independent judiciary can protect the democratic rights of all people in a state.

Democracy is the foundation of Pakistan. In a speech at Sibi Durbar on February 14, 1948, the Quaid declared: “Let us lay the foundations of our democracy based on truly Islamic ideals and principles. Our Almighty has taught us that our decisions in the affairs of the State shall be guided by discussions and consultations”.

In The Legacy of Quaid-i-Azam, Dr Javid Iqbal states that Mohammad Ali Jinnah, being a celebrated lawyer, had a firm belief in the rule of law rather than the rule of individuals. The rule of law strengthens institutions, not individuals.

Jinnah also announced, forcefully so, that the affairs of the state should be decided through debate and dialogue to serve the people of his great nation.

Jinnah, time and again, professed that the constitution of Pakistan must be democratic. In a broadcast to the people of the USA in February 1948, he said: “The constitution of Pakistan has yet to be framed by the Pakistan Constituent Assembly. I do not know what the ultimate shape of this constitution is going to be, but I am sure that it will be a democratic type, embodying the essential principles of Islam…. It has taught equality of man, justice, and fair play to everyone.

We are the inheritors of these glorious traditions and are fully alive to our responsibilities and obligations as framers of the future constitution of Pakistan”.

Surely, this statement affirms Jinnah’s pristine vision for a democratic constitution of Pakistan.

Did Jinnah want a theocratic state? This question seeks a distinction between an Islamic state and a Muslim state. An Islamic state means adopting a particular sect or religion as its constitution, which imposes a single ideology on all in the country. In contrast, a Muslim state provides religious freedom to all citizens. Hence, the father of the nation’s is a Muslim state grounded in the key principles of Islam. In a broadcast to the people of Australia on February 19, 1948, he insisted that “Pakistan is not a theocracy or anything like it.” So, our visionary founder’s Muslim state is a democratic state in which people can practice their beliefs, are free, equal and united; they cannot be subjected to any coercion, fear, exploitation or exclusion.

When Mohammad Ali Jinnah was elected as the first president of the Constituent Assembly of Pakistan, he presented a broad vision for a Muslim democratic state in his historic speech on August 11, 1947. He elaborated on the government’s primary duty, identified social evils, determined the role of the state, and the obligations of citizens for a progressive Pakistan. “The first duty of a government is to maintain law and order so that the life, property, and religious beliefs of its subjects are fully protected by the state”. Jinnah insisted on the provision of the right to life, property, and liberty, including the right to religious practice, in Pakistan.

A man of tremendous foresight, Jinnah also identified bribery, corruption, nepotism, and black-marketing as the major social evils that damage institutions, and urged the Assembly to eradicate these ills from society. He added: “Now, if we want to make this great State of Pakistan happy and prosperous, we should wholly and solely concentrate on the well-being of the people, and especially of the masses and the poor”. The Quaid’s was an unwavering conviction— without the well-being of the people, no state can prosper.

The sense of a nation

The founder stated that the progress of a state relied on the recognition of citizenship as a primary shared identity among its members. “If you … work together in a spirit that every one of you, no matter to what community he belongs, no matter what relations he had with you in the past, no matter what his colour, caste or creed, is first, second and last a citizen of this state with equal rights, privileges and obligations, there will be no end to the progress you will make”. It is the shared identity of being citizens of Pakistan, and not anything else, that can foster a sense of a nation among people despite their many differences.

“You are free; you are free to go to your temples; you are free to go to your mosques or to any other places of worship in this State of Pakistan. You may belong to any religion or caste or creed – that has nothing to do with the business of the State…We are starting in the days when there is no discrimination between one community and another, no discrimination between one caste or creed and another. We are starting with this fundamental principle that we are all citizens and equal citizens of one State…. Now, I think we should keep that in front of us as our ideal, and you will find that in the course of time Hindus would cease to be Hindus and Muslims would cease to be Muslims, not in the religious sense, because that is the personal faith of each individual, but in the political sense as citizens of the State”.

These words serve as evidence of Jinnah’s immaculate vision for Pakistan.

Jinnah’s democratic legacy is one of equal rights. For instance, he entrusted Jogendra Nath Mandal to be the first law minister of the Constituent Assembly of Pakistan, paving the way for the participation of minorities in governance. “I shall always be guided by the principles of justice and fair play without any.… prejudice or ill-will, in other words, partiality or favouritism. My guiding principle will be justice and complete impartiality, and I am sure that with your support and cooperation, I can look forward to Pakistan becoming one of the greatest nations of the world.” Our democratic inheritance from the founding father cannot be squandered.

In his essay, What if Mr Jinnah returned? Khaled Ahmed wondered whether the founder would prefer a constitution that keeps the judiciary independent of the executive? Alternatively, what if the father of the nation appeared in the parliament, public offices, courts, and police stations as an impartial spectator to see whether his citizens are being treated fairly and have access to justice? Would the Quaid not be happier to witness his own vision of fair play, merit, impartiality, freedom, and the rule of law being practiced in the public offices of Pakistan? Pakistan has moved away from Jinnah’s progressive idea of it. Soon after independence, the country stood trapped between neocolonial authoritarianism and theocracy. In The Sole Statesman, Ardeshir Cowasjee says “Jinnah intended Pakistan to be a democratic, forward-looking, modern, secular state. The bigots and the uneducated will always preach otherwise–and it will remain their privilege to do so”. He added that “Jinnah’s Pakistan died with him”. Later, Cowasjee also stated, “In a way, it was fortunate that Jinnah did not live long enough to see the negation of his principles, the perversion of his vision”.

Pakistan’s imperfect present

Now, Pakistan stands at the brink of an existential crisis due to numerous crucial challenges: theocracy, neocolonialism, overpopulation, violation of human rights, poor human development, extremism, political uncertainty, economic instability, corruption, poverty, brain drain, and a compromised educational system. All these challenges are manmade and therefore resolvable. Democracy is key as only opening dialogue and arriving at a political reconciliation will assuage discontent, mistrust and socioeconomic distress for a peaceful Pakistan.

Democracy in Pakistan is hostage to the theocracy, a neocolonial mindset, egoistical authoritarianism and fascist tendencies. The theocratic mind always tends to control freedom and egalitarianism in the country. In Pakistan: Behind the Ideological Mask, Khaled Ahmed argues that dogmatic ideology is taking the state away from democracy toward fascism worldwide. In Pakistan, he believes, “The state has indoctrinated the masses in favour of a revival of the medieval state rather than a ‘modern’ state”. By doing so, the state refuses to meet modern challenges because indoctrination closes all doors to realistic solutions. There is a dire need to liberate the Pakistani mind from the theocratic mind to develop a rational and critical mind through quality education, which is integral for a Pakistan that is modern and truly democratic.

The colonial legacy of governance has diminished the democratic culture of the country. In Confronting Empire, Eqbal Ahmad argued that Pakistan has never been able to decolonise since its independence. He stated that the situation remained the same after independence because “A British-trained army, a British-trained bureaucracy, and the same feudal landlords who had collaborated with the British, constitute the triangle of power…Nothing else has changed. So, the economic reality has not changed, and the political reality has not changed”. Eqbal Ahmad’s claim of neocolonialism is not easy to refute. So, it is undeniable that both theocracy and neocolonialism continue to derail Pakistan’s democratic process.

Despite all these challenges, democracy still holds significant meaning, and promise, in Pakistan. For instance, its vibrant youth and cultural diversity are two major catalysts for reform and change. The youth forms a large part of Pakistan’s population. And it has, to some extent, attained political consciousness, which is mandatory for the advancement of democracy in the country.

Cultural diversity is a blessing for any democracy; each culture has its own language, art, way of life and cuisine, which should be seen as a valuable opportunity to learn and integrate. Cultural diversity nurtures innovation, creativity and knowledge, while democracy cultivates reasoning in the public sphere.

The Quaid categorically declared that no power on earth can undo Pakistan.

However, a bright future for Pakistan depends on the extent to which it embraces Jinnah’s democratic ideals and principles in letter and spirit. The restoration of his values can make Pakistan invincible. Democracy is the sole cure for extremism, neocolonialism, the disease of corruption, poverty, and political instability. Jinnah believed in fostering the rule of law, independence of the judiciary, autonomy of institutions, decision-making through public reasoning, and the moral values of equality, freedom, fraternity, justice, fairness, and impartiality in the country. Pakistan, indeed, is Jinnah’s precious gift of freedom. But a future that is grounded in solidarity depends upon intellectual decolonisation through quality education to resolve contemporary sociopolitical, and economic problems. To conclude, Pakistan needs a paradigm shift from present policies for a progressive future.

The writer holds a PhD from the University of Canterbury, New Zealand, and teaches philosophy at the University of the Punjab, Lahore.

First, the torment. Embedded in genesis. Because with cheers for freedom came tears. In torrents. Rivers of blood, when about 800,000 humans crossed borders created overnight. Ten million persons migrated within months to seek refuge in severely strained infrastructure. A hugely botched, arbitrarily advanced transition arrogantly imposed by the departing British. Grossly disadvantaged areas that became Pakistani territory given only 10 weeks to become part of the new state.

Callous withholding by India of Pakistan’s pre-agreed share of the undivided region’s resources. Unrivalled crises in binding two halves of a population 1,000 miles distant from each other with a hostile neighbour in between. And two neighbours — India and Afghanistan — wishing us ill. Forced to attempt fair play for the people of Kashmir within weeks of August 14 when India and Mountbatten fabricated a fake accession. The far too early demise — only 13 months after its birth — of the giant who crafted the new nation-state. Just three years later, his valiant deputy also departed, through an assassin’s bullet.

Civil politicians and bureaucrats invited the armed forces to participate in political decision-making — PM Bogra’s disastrous error in 1954 appointing a serving army chief, General Ayub Khan, to become his own boss as defence minister. Incursion of the military into the political domain expanded in successive decades. Torment intensified up to the trauma of 1971, largely due to our own missteps, but also covertly promoted by India in East Pakistan.

The creation of Pakistan represents the first-ever realisation of Muslim nationalism achieving independent statehood anywhere, not just in South Asia.

The Hydra-headed monster

The attempted cure becoming worse than the malady brings to mind the multi-headed monster of Greek myth— the Lernaean Hydra that Hercules challenged. Each of the serpent’s nine heads would regenerate into even more heads whenever cut off.

In 2025, our own Pakistani version of the Hydra legend shows how trumpeted relief for workers and farmers actually spurs rocketing inequality. Disconnect is starkly evident when shares owned by a few thousand in the stock exchange reach spectacular heights of billions of rupees, just as mass poverty of millions rises to 44.7 per cent, or about 120 million people, almost half the total population.

Engineered elections

Engineered February 2024 elections deprived those securing the largest number of votes from office at the federal level and in the largest province — with KP a diversionary façade. The collusion between state institutions and political parties creating a crude new scenario enacted every day. Mass arrests, prolonged imprisonments, rejection of bail for the PTI leader, frenetically fast disqualifications even before legal appeals are completed, manipulated parliamentary proceedings in which lack of quorum occurs frequently — except when certain bills are adopted post-haste. The 26th Constitutional Amendment, rushed like an express train through both Houses, inflicted grievous havoc. Moreover, there has been a deliberately mixed approach to coercion of news media permitting some candour, preventing much else.

Small coteries, big effects

Persistence of savage practices against women and girl-children on the pretext of family honour are reported almost every day. Though the numerosity of such incidents in 250m is relatively low, the very fact of recurrence is appalling. Especially so in the very same country that, 37 years ago, produced the world’s first Muslim woman prime minister. Fortunately, no person convicted of blasphemy has ever been executed, thanks to superior judicial review. But dozens have been lynched by mobs. Many others suffer long jail terms pending review hearings. Small, vociferous coteries of extremists are permitted to intimidate lawyers, judges, citizens and to influence laws, policies and actions.

Criminalisation of society & state

Criminalisation of large segments of both society and the state proceeds apace. Officials appearing before a parliamentary committee recently investigating the sugar sector committed contempt of parliament by declining to reveal the names of sugar mills’ owners — far too many are in power. Transparency becomes foggier. The Benazir Income Support Programme was obliged in recent months to remind a provincial government that, in one department alone, reportedly hundreds of government employees were detected for making false claims for compensation — and received plentiful sums.

Painful perceptions

Perhaps the unkindest cut is a recent global index of passports’ ranking placing my favourite travel document among the three least-respected at overseas entry points. Governments make no long-term investment to correct the unjust negative global image. A second painful cut is for the state to be a perennial borrower, a perpetual seeker of aid and grants. Bloated bureaucracies, ravenous elites, and long-sterile state-owned enterprises suck billions from the public exchequer every year. Meanwhile, illegal transfer of big money to overseas caches carries on.

Though the PM belatedly presided over a meeting on imbalanced population growth, cross-sectoral, sustained, practically visible actions still remain inadequate to reduce the ominous 2.5pc annual growth rate. Instead of basic change in Balochistan and KP that would prevent poll rigging and end enforced disappearances, futile arrests of activists and the use of force instead of dialogue exacerbate alienation.

Over 23m children are already out-of-school — projected to grow to 40m in a few years. Grim prospects in a new era driven by artificial intelligence and radical change.

First-ever Muslim nation-state

Just as genesis was marked by torment, so too was triumph present with birth. The first element is a hard fact: the creation of Pakistan represents the first-ever realisation of Muslim nationalism achieving independent statehood anywhere, not just in South Asia. Everywhere else, Asia and Africa, when Muslim-majority communities secured independence from colonialism, formative factors were ethnic, or linguistic, or other affinities. The remarkable facet of Pakistan’s formation was the recognition that religion-based factors alone could also become the foundation for an entirely new nation-state.

That, while ethnic, linguistic, cultural factors are potent, by its own pristine self, Muslim nationalism is an inescapable reality. Muslims were not just a large religious minority alongside a large Hindu majority: Muslims constitute a nation, as enunciated by Iqbal, Rahmat Ali, and finally M.A. Jinnah, endorsed on a mass level through the Muslim League. Pre-1947 Muslim religious political parties, several of which strongly opposed the creation of Pakistan — till its actual creation — were all roundly rejected by the Muslim masses of South Asia who, while being motivated by their religious faith, were equally determined not to create a theocratic state but a moderate, balanced Muslim-majority state. Which is why in 11 general elections since 1970, religious parties never received a real majority vote.

Two-Nation reality alive & well

The separation of East Pakistan in 1971 was a rejection of the original state structure: undue influence of the western wing on the eastern wing. But it was not a rejection of Muslim nationalism. Indeed, the very opposite. Bangladesh 1971-72 and today in 2025 remains irrevocably committed to being a Bangladeshi Muslim-majority nation-state which, laudably, acknowledges the sanctity of other faiths but has no wish to merge with Indian West Bengal or India — where Muslims today, though themselves a nation comprising enormous diversity, are nevertheless willing to remain loyal citizens of India as a religious minority — now facing daily persecution by Hindutva.

Fusion of history with today

The second triumph is the fusion of bringing together ancient heritage with contemporary sensibility. The 8,000-year-old Mehrgarh site in Balochistan and the 5,000-year-old Indus Valley civilisation in KP, Sindh, Punjab, as also the influences of Greece, Buddhism, Jainism, Hinduism, Christianity, culminating in the advent of Islam 1,300 years ago — which brought the impact of Turkic, Persian, Central Asian and Arab characteristics: the new nation-state blends pioneering stages of humanity’s history with regional cultures, and with numerous successive centuries of advancement as well as regression, of unequalled egalitarianism and inherent, irrepressible preference for participatory and democratic practices, notwithstanding the feudalism, tribalism and despotism that have ruled these past decades.

Mohenjodaro provides a stellar instance of Pakistan’s unique proletarian heritage. Whereas other concurrent civilisations like the Egyptian and Mesopotamian, in which individual rulers deployed thousands to build giant statues and pyramids for self-glorification, there are virtually no signs yet in Harappa or Mohenjodaro of similar ruler-centric monumental obsessions. Instead, open architectural layouts without huge edifices signal that the way of life was notably equitable.

Renewal, rebuilding post-1971

The third triumph is the way, after 1971, the residual Pakistan renewed, rebuilt, reaffirmed itself from 1972 to 2025. Despite all the many setbacks and blunders of both civil and military leaders over the past five decades, innate resilience demonstrated so readily in the first two decades (1947-1965) helped sustain the country through many travails.

A fourth triumph came when the state was obliged to develop nuclear weapons in response to India’s ill-considered introduction of the menace into South Asia. Pakistan showed extraordinary technological capability, both in acquiring nuclear weapons and missile delivery systems — apart from little-publicised yet invaluable applications of nuclear power for peaceful, productive purposes.

Though their leadership’s appetite for political control distracts from fair appraisal, the rank and file of the armed forces embody features of a merit-based system, unflinching courage, selfless sacrifice of life and, in the war on terrorism and the May 2025 conflict with India, grit, phenomenal dexterity, and technical ability to make this a fifth triumph.

The people’s ingenuity & creativity

The people’s ingenuity with mastering technology and innovating new sources of income are apparent in differing fields. Be it a semi-literate motor mechanic who fixes a sophisticated but malfunctioning Mercedes-Benz or the myriad ways by which men and women, in cities or small towns do freelance work to make Pakistan’s gig economy (estimated at about $500m) one of the five largest in the world — basic ingenuity makes for a fine sixth triumph.

Aptly juxtaposed are the seventh and eighth shining seals: abundant talent in vocal and instrumental music, painting, traditional crafts, modern design, performing arts, poetry, literature, film-making. And a passion for bold adventure inspires women to climb the highest mountains of the world. Or in recent decades, produces world champions in the most challenging mental game of bridge, and the most strenuous sport of squash.

Generous, hospitable, friendly

The ninth triumph is almost as heart-warming as the tenth. Pakistan ranks 17th in 101 countries in “Giving” — generously, frequently sharing wealth with the poorest and those in most need. Even the poor give more frequently than the rich who, of course, give more. When cognisance is taken of the fulsome contribution of voluntary time, skills and money by thousands of citizens to public service institutions like hospitals, free food centres, orphanages, educational institutions, etc Pakistani philanthropy deserves a rank higher than no. 17. India makes it to only no. 26.

Pakistanis are possibly the friendliest, most hospitable people on earth. They open hearts and homes — even to strangers just met — to serve food and fraternity in unrivalled measure. Overseas visitors make special mention of this trait.

Pakistani women

The eleventh triumph is the dignity and beauty, devotion and love with which women in particular, be they in remote villages or in big cities, work to care for their families, combining household labour increasingly with jobs in fields, factories, offices, as nurses, petrol pump attendants, doctors, bankers, engineers, aeroplane pilots.

The identity of Pakistan

The World Happiness Index ranks Pakistanis happier than Bangladeshis, Sri Lankans, and Indians. Most fittingly, over the previous 78 years there has evolved a distinct sense of Pakistaniat in which coexist multiple positive features as well as some negative traits: the crystallisation of an exclusive identity that never existed in history before 1947.

To amend the adage which states “Life begins at 40”: for Pakistan, the best is yet to come — because now, “Life begins at 80”. Coming soon.

The writer is an author, recipient of the Hilal-i-Imtiaz for literature, and a former senator and federal minister.

javedjabbar.2@gmail.com

The ideological, constitutional, political, and democratic movement led by Quaid-i-Azam Muhammad Ali Jinnah with courage, commitment and wisdom created a new state for the marginalised Muslim nation. His foresight and democratic resolve, reflected in his famous 14 points, revolutionised Muslim politics in the subcontinent. Unlike the Nehru Report, Jinnah’s 14-points (1929) charter was a comprehensive future constitutional framework which provided for federal form of governance and uniform measure of autonomy for the provinces.

It protected the legal rights of Muslims and demanded reforms in the Northwest Frontier Province and Balochistan. Further, the separation of Sindh from Bombay was emphasised in the points. The Quaid also emphasised protection of Muslim culture for strengthening social connections among scattered members of the community. Sharing common values, norms and customs contributed to the development of geographic and cultural harmony as unifying factors for Muslim nationalism. Jinnah’s 14 points formed a complete code for protection of distinctive Muslim culture and civilisation and formed the basis for Muslims’ legal battles for achieving independence.

In 1930 Allama Dr Muhammad Iqbal conceived the idea of a separate homeland for Muslims and his clear conception was based on geographical and ideological factors, which became indispensable for launching the movement for a separate country from the platform of the All-India Muslim League (AIML).

Nevertheless, the British unveiled their plans and later passed the Government of India Act 1935, which contemplated a constitution with central government and provincial assemblies which were granted autonomy. More Indians were to be given the right to vote. Muslims were disappointed with this act because it provided insufficient autonomy to them in provincial assemblies. The Indian National Congress (INC) also rejected the act on the grounds that it will further divide people of India. However, despite their serious concerns over the British’s constitutional move, both INC and AIML agreed to participate in the 1937 elections based on this act. In these elections Congress achieved success and emerged as the dominant party winning 706 seats out of 1,585. Thus, the Congress successfully formed the ministries in various provinces, including Muslim-majority provinces. It introduced Wardha Scheme which downgraded Muslims. Anti-Muslim initiatives of Congress exposed its real face and Muslims became aware of Congress politics aimed at securing the rights of Hindus.

The Muslim League was able to present the best strategy for securing first nationhood, then statehood. The Lahore Resolution was the practical solution of problems faced by India’s Muslims.

Considering the AIML’s unsatisfactory performance in the 1937 elections, the Quaid reorganised the party and created unity among its discordant factions to create a mass movement. The Lahore Resolution of 1940 marked a significant milestone in the Muslims’ pursuit of a separate homeland. Thus, Muslim League cooperated with the British due to assurance it received from them for their support for the creation of Pakistan.

It was after the Lahore Resolution that the name ‘Pakistan’ became widespread despite being coined by Chaudhary Rahmat Ali in 1933. The resolution proposed the creation of independent states for Muslims in regions where they were in the majority. The Congress strongly opposed the Lahore Resolution, because it considered this would divide India.

The Muslim League was able to present the best strategy for securing first nationhood, then statehood. The resolution was the practical solution of problems faced by the Muslim community. However, the Quaid remained cautiously optimistic as well as determined about the road ahead.

During his presidential address at the Muslim League’s session at Lahore he asserted that India’s 90m Muslims were not a minority but a nation. He based his concept of Muslim nationhood on the contemporary political discourse of nation-state and its elements such as territorial sovereignty, nationalism, and citizenship.

The resolution specified the geographical boundaries of the Muslim state it wanted to establish in north-western and north-eastern India where Muslims were in the majority. The resolution provided legal foundation of the Muslim nation-state by emphasising territorial sovereignty.

Lahore Resolution was not just an ideological triumph; it was a glimpse into the vision for Muslims which was no more blurred by power-sharing compromises. The resolution brought the Muslim community on the cusp of a new era of emancipation and made its ideological goals clear, leaving no room for alternative destinations. There was a swarm of challenges in the way of realising these goals.

Two years later the Cripps Proposal (1942) was conceived as a British plan offering India full dominion status and the right to frame its own constitution after World War II. It allowed princely states to have the same status as provinces and gave provinces the choice to opt out of the Indian Union. The proposal failed because Congress rejected it, as they demanded an immediate transfer of power rather than waiting until after the war. The Muslim League also opposed the idea, as it did not explicitly promise a separate Muslim state (Pakistan). The British insisted on retaining control over defence and communication, which Indian leaders found unacceptable.

In order to divert attention of the masses towards the Muslim demand, Congress started Quit India Movement (1942), which was a mass civil disobedience movement demanding an immediate end to British rule in India. The common Indian was motivated to support the movement boycotting British goods and businesses, withdrawing money from government banks, refusing to cooperate with British officials and leaving cities for villages. The Quit India Movement began because the British failed to offer an immediate and satisfactory solution for India’s independence. The Cripps Proposal had been rejected, and frustration grew among Indian leaders. The movement was also fuelled by the hardships of World War II and the increasing desire for self-rule.

Protesting and participating in civil disobedience activities during the Gandhi-Jinnah Talks (1944), Gandhi remained unsuccessful in convincing Jinnah to abandon his demand for the partition of India and the creation of Pakistan. The talks reinforced the Two-Nation Theory and shaped future negotiations, ultimately leading to the partition of India.

In 1945, the Simla Conference was called by Lord Wavell after World War II to discuss India’s future governance. He offered complete power to the Indian government, with the viceroy as only a ceremonial head. However, the conference failed because the Congress and the Muslim League had conflicting demands — Congress opposed separate Muslim representation, while the Muslim League insisted on its demand for Pakistan. The failure of the conference highlighted the deep divisions between the two parties.

However, in the General Elections of 1945-46, the Congress won over 80 per cent of non-Muslim seats, while the Muslim League secured all 30 Muslim seats in the Central Legislature. In the provincial elections (1946), the Congress dominated non-Muslim seats, and the Muslim League won around 95pc of Muslim seats, proving itself as the sole representative of Indian Muslims. Thus the Cabinet Mission (1946) was sent by the British government to resolve the political deadlock between Congress and the Muslim League. It proposed an Indian union, a constitution-making body, provincial autonomy, and an interim government supported by major political parties.

The Muslim League initially accepted the plan because it allowed grouping of Muslim-majority provinces and gave them the option to opt out after the first general elections, aligning with their demand for Pakistan. The Muslim League withdrew from the plan when the Congress rejected key provisions and agreed to join the constituent assembly with amendments, which threatened the League’s demand for a separate Muslim state.

Thus, Direct Action Day (Aug 16, 1946) was a nationwide protest called by the Muslim League to press for the demand for Pakistan after the failure of the Cabinet Mission. It led to violent riots, particularly in Calcutta, causing thousands of deaths. In December 1946, the London Conference was convened to discuss the critical situation that had emerged since the Direct Action Day. Nevertheless, acceptance of the British government’s decision regarding grouping of provinces paved the way to partition.

Lord Louis Mountbatten was appointed as the last viceroy of India with a task to oversee the British withdrawal from the subcontinent and to build relationships with prominent leaders. His attempts to convince Mr Jinnah to agree to united India were unsuccessful. The British Parliament passed the Indian Independence Act on July 18, 1947 and formally legislative authority was granted to respective constituent assemblies of the newly formed states. The Muslim League finally won its political battle against all odds. Muslims entered their promised land and secured their national home.

The Quaid had genuinely desired for friendly relations between India and Pakistan. But partition was painful, and the territory Pakistan received was moth-eaten due to unfair distribution of areas and vivisection of two historic Muslim dominions of Bengal and Punjab. For demarcating the borders between India and Pakistan a commission was formed under Cyril Radcliffe — a man who had never visited India. Consequently, the decisions of the commission caused significant problems, including mass migration, disputes, and communal violence.

The bloodbath that ensued between Muslims and Hindus originated in the British partition policies, which were directly responsible for deadly breakdown in intra-community relations. Displacement and tensions caused the death of around one million people from both sides. The boundary division was unjustified and unfair because it favoured India and caused territorial losses to Pakistan. It was deprived of many Muslim-majority areas; consequently territorial disputes between India and Pakistan arose. Soon after independence both countries engaged in their first armed conflict in 1947 marking the beginning of long-standing tension between both nations over Kashmir.

The legacy of partition has remained the major factor in the Indo-Pakistan relationship to the extent that even after several decades, both countries are unable to improve ties. The post-partition wars over Kashmir intensified the sense of Pakistan’s vulnerability, and this gave impetus to development of Pakistan’s nuclear weapons as a reactive move to the Indian nuclear programme.

Keeping in view Narendra Modi’s anti-Pakistan rhetoric during his election campaign for his third consecutive term, it was not expected from India to improve its relations with its neighbour, which nosedived in 2019 with India’s revocation of Articles 370 and 35A of its constitution, annulling held Kashmir’s limited autonomy.

Thus, Modi’s hubristic hold over power using Hindutva as a tool continued to undermine Pakistan by spreading social media lies and false propaganda against the country. Nevertheless, India has failed spectacularly in its mission.

Pakistan’s deepening strategic partnership with China and the recent upswing in relations with the United States have opened a rare diplomatic window. Pakistan needs to pursue diplomatic efforts to remove insuperable obstacles, turn the long-cherished dream of Kashmir’s accession to Pakistan into a historic reality and accomplish the unfinished task of partition.

The writer is Professor of History and Pakistan Studies & Chairman, Board of Intermediate & Secondary Education Hyderabad.

shuja.mahesar@usindh.edu.pk

SIR Muhammad Iqbal is celebrated as the intellectual architect of Pakistan, whose philosophical ideas, imparted in prose and poetry, directly or indirectly, transformed, undergirded, and galvanised the Pakistan Movement. Although Iqbal does not posit any particular theory of leadership, his theory of selfhood holds ideals of good leadership. Iqbal’s theory of selfhood asserts that all individuals have human worth because they are endowed with distinctive potentials, such as rationality and creativity.

Pakistan has been in a transition from colonial independence to intellectual independence. Accordingly, Pakistan’s bright future depends upon intellectual decolonisation through quality education for resolving contemporary social, political, and economic existential challenges.

Iqbal’s political thought emphasises that developing these human potentials requires a polity, based on cardinal Islamic values of freedom, equality, and solidarity, in which people are not subject to coercion, discrimination, exploitation, humiliation, or exclusion despite their divergent socio-political disparities of caste, creed, colour, or culture. For this end, Iqbal envisions a Muslim state in which people develop their human potentials to be creative and productive individuals to make a better, livable society.

Being a philosopher-poet, Eqbal Ahmad claimed, “He [Iqbal] imagined Pakistan before Jinnah thought of it”. At the dawn of the 20th century, Quaid-i-Azam emerged as a charismatic Muslim leader in the subcontinent. Eqbal Ahmad called Quaid-i-Azam “atn enigma of modern history”, and Saad R. Khairi declared him a person who “altered geography” of the world.

Iqbal asks the youth to learn the values of truth, valour, and justice, which are indispensable for real leadership.

In the preface to Islam and Open Society, Charles Taylor, a Canadian political philosopher, emphasises the significance of Iqbal’s philosophy, particularly to Pakistan. Taylor states about Iqbal: “It is the voice of a man who has left behind all identitarian rigidity, who has ‘broken all the idols of tribe and caste’ to address himself to all human beings. But an unhappy accident has meant that this voice was buried, both in the general forgetting of Islamic modernism and in the very country that he named before its existence, Pakistan, whose multiple rigidities — political, religious, military — constitute a continual refutation of the very essence of his thought”.

Iqbal, being a cosmopolitan philosopher, strives for human development beyond the identity of tribe and caste. Taylor’s view is correct that Iqbal’s philosophy could not be adopted in letter and spirit in Pakistan. Similarly, in ‘Jinnah, in a Class of His Own’, Eqbal Ahmad declared that Pakistan followed the direction that its founding father had not envisioned. Iqbal and the Quaid envisioned a progressive Pakistan: a country for all citizens.

What is Iqbal’s vision of leadership, and how can it help make Pakistan a progressive state? Iqbal’s philosophy of selfhood cultivates human potential to be creative individuals, citizens, and leaders. Iqbal’s philosophy of leadership bears implications that extend beyond politics to all arenas of social life, including family, education, business, law, economics, science, philanthropy, and media. A good leader inspires people to bring about positive change for the common good. A good leader transforms team members for victory, while a bad leader leads them to failure. A team, group, or a nation without a leader is just like a ship without a captain. Iqbal envisions that a good leader is endowed with the attributes of rationality, audacity, vision, justice, creativity, knowledge, integrity, honesty, fairness, civility, love, resilience, and reverence.

Iqbal asks the youth to learn the values of truth, valour, and justice, which are indispensable for real leadership. You will be called upon once again to lead the nations of the world.

Truth creates trust; valour breaks the status quo and opens new opportunities, and justice creates a just society. Iqbal appeals to the youth to acquire these essential virtues of leadership because they are to lead the world. A leader without truth, valour, and justice cannot inspire others. For instance, Nelson Mandela and Martin Luther King Jr inspired people in their respective countries with their leadership qualities.

Iqbal articulates that broad vision, civility, and a passionate soul are valuable attributes for the journey of benign leadership.

Narrow vision, arrogance, and selfishness are the crucial characteristics of despots rather than leaders. Iqbal writes, “vision without power does bring moral elevation, but cannot give a lasting culture. Power without vision tends to become destructive and inhuman. Both must combine for the spiritual expansion of humanity”. So, vision is vital for a great leader.

Iqbal declares that faith, action, and love are the cardinal values to win the game of life in this competitive world.

In ‘The Failure of Third World Nationalism”, Algerian philosopher Lahouari Addi argues that the birth of a nation and its nation-building are two distinct things. The creation of a nation is a single-time event, while its development is a continuous process. The event of the creation of Pakistan occurred on Aug 14, 1947, while the process of nation-building requires a conscious and continuous collective effort. Addi holds that the creation of a public sphere and civil peace are necessary for nation-building. It is the need of the time to develop a public sphere to develop a ‘common mind’ through social discourse with all stakeholders and find the best solutions to existing challenges.

Clergy and neocolonialism are two factors controlling the ‘mind’ of Pakistan. Since the birth of Pakistan, the strong clergy has been dominating the mind of the state. In Pakistan: Behind the Ideological Mask, Khaled Ahmed says that dogmatic ideology takes the state away from democracy toward fascism all over the world. Any dogmatic ideology undermines the thought process in a society. That is why Immanuel Kant, in his classic essay ‘What is Enlightenment’, states that enlightenment is the ability to understand the truth using one’s own mental faculties and without any external help. Khaled Ahmed reiterates, “the state has indoctrinated the masses in favour of a revival of the medieval state rather than a ‘modern’ state”. If Pakistan intends to meet global challenges, it must shift to a modern state.

Iqbal strives for a modern Islamic state. In The Reconstruction of Religious Thought in Islam, he defended ijtehad to reconstruct Islamic thought, incorporating contemporary advanced knowledge. Like Iqbal, Quaid-i-Azam also wanted a modern Muslim state. In a speech on Feb 14, 1948 at Sibi Darbar he said: “Let us lay the foundations of our democracy on the basis of truly Islamic ideals and principles. Our Almighty has taught us that our decisions in the affairs of the state shall be guided by discussion and consultation … Islam and its ideals have taught us democracy. It has taught equality of man, justice, and fairplay to everybody”. No society can exist without adopting cardinal moral values of equality, freedom, solidarity, and fair play.

New forms of colonial legacy shape the style of governance. In Confronting Empire, Eqbal Ahmad argues that Pakistan has never become a decolonised country over the last 50 years. He stated that the situation is the same even after partition because “A British-trained army, a British-trained bureaucracy, and the same feudal landlords who had collaborated with the British, constitute the triangle of power … Nothing else has changed. So, the economic reality has not changed, and the political reality has not changed”. Certainly, due to the persistent neocolonial structure of governance, we have not produced even a handful of genuine leaders in the country.

Since physical independence, we have not been able to get rid of intellectual colonialism to create an independent thought process. The source of intellectual independence is universities, and political intervention in any form in the process of intellectual independence mars its core objectives. It rather disfigures this process.

The Human Development Index 2025 ranks Pakistan at 168 out of 193 countries. In Reflections on Human Development, Mahbub ul Haq stated that “human destiny is a choice, not a chance”. According to Haq, ‘Human development’ refers to enlarging people’s choices — by developing human capabilities — through financial security, quality education, better nourishment, healthcare, crime-free society, amusement, political and cultural freedoms, and a sense of participation in community activities. Like Iqbal’s philosophy of self-development, Haq’s account of human development refers to enriching the lives of people in an enabling environment to enjoy long, healthy, and creative lives. Without human development, there is no chance of the production of genuine leaders in the country.

The route to a progressive Pakistan is genuine education, which is indispensable for human development. Education in science and technology is vital for survival in the globalised world. Social sciences, including philosophy, literature, history, sociology, and politics, are necessary for combating extremism. Lack of pure education in all these fields leads to pseudo-intellectuality and polarisation, which ultimately causes social disintegration. There is thus a dire need for the leadership envisaged by the philosopher-poet.

To sum up, Pakistan needs a paradigm shift from the existing policies to improve the quality of education, independence of institutions, rule of law, human rights, equal distribution of resources, social justice, and security of life and property, for it to thrive in the world. Particularly, the institution of education, which can provide intellectual independence, must be safeguarded, to produce the nursery of genuine leaders — the real custodians of a progressive Pakistan in the future.

The writer holds a PhD from the University of Canterbury, New Zealand, and teaches philosophy at the University of the Punjab, Lahore.

AS Pakistan begins its 79th year of existence, new promises echo once again through official corridors. Economic roadmaps are unveiled, foreign direct investment is courted, and reforms are pledged. Yet beneath the surface, the foundation is unstable, riddled with cracks in governance, institutional decay, and a system that continues to fail its most vulnerable: its youth.

A robust economy cannot rise on the shifting sands of compromised institutions. It must be rooted like the orchards of Swat: firm, nurtured, and protected. Otherwise, it withers.

From the windswept deserts of Thar to the lush green fields of Punjab; from the towering mountains of Gilgit-Baltistan to the fishing villages that dot the Makran coast, the land tells stories of resilience. The people do too. But they are growing tired. The young farmer in Dadu, the coder in Karachi, the textile worker in Faisalabad, and the aspiring civil servant in Multan all dream of progress, but live within a system that asks them to survive rather than thrive.

At the heart of the issue lies the integrity of institutions. The civil service, the judiciary, tax authorities, law enforcement, and regulators. These are the rivers that irrigate economic life. But when those rivers are clogged with corruption, favouritism, and inefficiency, the economy becomes a drought-stricken plain, no matter how heavy the policy rains may fall.

New policies layered over old decay will not save Pakistan’s economy. Only structural, institutional reform will.

This is not just a metaphor. Look, for instance, at Bahawalpur, where centuries-old irrigation channels once brought life to entire regions. Today, those canals run silted and broken, much like the governance that oversees them. Infrastructure without maintenance. Laws without enforcement. Youth without pathways. These are the silent crises that accumulate when institutions fail.

And yet, every year, fresh policy is painted across the cracked ceiling, much like the fading mural of Sadequain in Karachi’s Frere Hall: a masterpiece weathered by time, dust, and neglect. Still standing, but barely. New policies layered over old decay will not save Pakistan’s economy. Only structural, institutional reform will.

Pakistan does not exist in a vacuum. It holds a unique position on the geopolitical chessboard bridging South Asia, Central Asia, and the Middle East. It is a nuclear power with a military that garners respect and strategic partnerships far beyond its borders. This recognition, often leveraged to gain international security cooperation and development aid, must now be matched by an internal strategy that fortifies civilian institutions with the same intent and seriousness used in external defence policy.

Diplomatic capital and military stature may open doors in Washington, Riyadh, and Beijing; but lasting stability and prosperity depend on whether those gains are translated into institutional strength at home. The same focus that earns Pakistan a seat at global forums should be directed toward reforming the very systems that affect daily life for its citizens. Recognition abroad must become a lever for renewal within.

Equally vital is the strength of Pakistan’s diaspora: millions of Pakistanis living and working across North America, the Gulf, Europe, and beyond. They contribute billions in remittances and serve as informal ambassadors of culture, community, and potential. Yet many remain disconnected from the idea of Pakistan as a place of opportunity, rather than nostalgia or obligation. This disconnection is not due to distance alone; it stems from a fractured sense of national identity, weakened by the very dysfunction they fled.

When institutions at home are weak, the identity projected abroad is defensive, fragmented, and often burdened by political baggage. But when governance is principled and opportunity is genuine, a common civic identity can begin to emerge: one that unites the diaspora not only through sentiment, but through participation and pride. Strengthening institutions will not only bring investment from abroad, it will rebuild the cultural and emotional contract between Pakistan and its global citizens.

Consider the reality faced by Pakistan’s youth, who make up 65 per cent of the population. These are not just numbers on a chart. They are real lives and aspirations scattered across this vast, diverse land. A girl in Khuzdar with top marks in science cannot find a university with working labs. A boy in Peshawar trains in IT but faces extortion when trying to start his own business. The entrepreneur in Lahore sees his innovation stifled, not by market forces, but by inconsistent regulatory enforcement and rent-seeking officials.

And across the country, women continue to be underrepresented in nearly every sector that shapes national direction. From boardrooms to ballots, their exclusion is both a symptom and cause of institutional weakness. Gender equity is not a social side issue. It is central to economic resilience. Empowering women to participate fully in civic and economic life isn’t just about fairness; it’s about unleashing half the nation’s talent and potential.

Women are often the first to bear the brunt of institutional failure, yet they are also among the first to organise, resist, and rebuild; from rural educators in Sindh to start-up founders in Islamabad. The future will not be built unless it includes their voices, protects their rights, and clears the barriers that keep them out of decision-making spaces.

This is not an economy that is failing by chance. It is a system designed to protect the powerful and disorient the rest. Foreign investors know this, too. They are less concerned with Pakistan’s potential (of which there is plenty) and more with the rules of the game. Can contracts be enforced? Are taxes predictable? Will courts intervene fairly or politically? Until the answers are clear, capital will continue to hesitate, and so will hope.

There are glimpses of what could be. Along Multan Road, soybean processing plants hint at what an agricultural-industrial link might become with proper support. The runways of Karachi’s airport, constructed with global standards, show that when competence is prioritised, Pakistan can meet any benchmark. But these are outliers. Not norms.

To truly move forward, Pakistan must invest not just in infrastructure, but in the scaffolding of governance: independent appointments in regulatory bodies; transparent digitisation of tax and judicial systems; police reforms that prioritise citizen trust; and educational institutions that reward merit over connections. These are not abstract ideals. They are the load-bearing walls of economic resilience.

Pakistan’s young people are like the mighty River Sindhu. Originating in the icy vastness of the north, full of energy, direction, and promise. But like the river itself, they face dams, diversions, and blockages: systems that slow their flow, dull their momentum, and reroute their course. And the question for this generation is no longer if they have the strength to move forward, it is whether the nation will clear a path for them to do so.

Sindhu is no ordinary river. It once cradled one of the earliest urban civilisations in human history, the Indus Valley Civilisation. A society defined not by kings or wars, but by urban planning, civic infrastructure, and economic organisation. This heritage is not just archaeological. It is aspirational. The roots of rule-based systems, trade networks, and public works stretch back to that river. For Pakistan, honouring that legacy means reviving the spirit of civic responsibility, collective progress, and institutional strength that once defined this land.

Will Sindhu be allowed to run freely, from Hunza to Hyderabad, from Swat to the shores of Karachi? Will the country allow its youth to follow their current, to find their sea, to shape the land they pass through? And will it finally make space for its women not just as passengers on this journey, but as navigators, engineers, and architects of the course ahead?

If Pakistan dares to clear that course; to unlock its talent, listen to its people, and build for the many, not the few, it will find that the river does not just flow to the ocean. It nourishes everything in its path.

The world is watching. But more importantly, its young people are rising and ready to flow forward.

The writer teaches political science at Brevard College, North Carolina. Her recent book, Representation: A Study of Gender Quotas in the National Assembly of Pakistan (Folio Books, 2025), is a longitudinal study of women’s representation in parliament.

However, rather than cultivating a cordial relationship and resolving issues, today, the two countries have institutionalised rivalry, which is evident in media and military doctrines, and national narratives. Today, balanced views and peace advocacy are considered a ‘cultural crime’ in both countries. Hence, voices of peace constituencies have either been muted or sidelined.

From better past to bleak future

It seems that the first-generation leaders as well as public of India and Pakistan had greater appetite for peace and bilateral engagement. For instance, from December 1947 to January 1957 — prior to the first military coup in Pakistan — the two countries signed 12 landmark agreements related to economic cooperation and promotion of socio-cultural activities. These agreements largely helped to enhance connectivity and ease cross-border communication for both sides.

For example, an agreement in 1948 established air services for the people of both sides. Similarly, the landmark agreement on banking between India and Pakistan in 1949 helped Muslims to transfer their accounts from Indian to Pakistani banks.

The two sides need to work on resumption of backchannel diplomacy, which could help in mitigating mistrust.

The most significant agreement in the early years was the Nehru-Liaquat Agreement, which was signed in 1950, which not only ensured greater rights for minorities in both countries but also eased tensions between both states. From 1951 to 1957, four trade agreements and two agreements related to connectivity not only boosted trade activities between the two countries, but also eased cross-border travel.

From 1958 to 1978, the two countries signed 20 additional agreements, pacts and protocols. While some of those agreements were cooperative in nature such as the landmark Indus Waters Treaty (IWT) of 1960, the majority of the agreements were meant to repair the bilateral relationship, damaged due to the 1965 and 1971 wars.

Islamabad and New Delhi signed 35 out of 47 agreements, protocols, or pacts, during democratic tenures in Pakistan. In fact, Delhi signed several agreements with Pakistani democratic regimes to repair the already damaged relationship during military rule.

These include resumption of rail and air connectivity, ease of visa issuance of 1974, normalisation of trade activities of 1974, resumption of shipping activities of 1975, etc. Similarly, during the 1990s — a troubled but democratic decade in Pakistan — Islamabad and Delhi signed six significant agreements, including the Lahore Declaration of 1999.

However, the 25 years of the 21st century turned the already fragile and complicated relationship into one of perpetual hostility, with no light at the end of the tunnel. During this period, the two sides only reduced bilateral engagements. During this period, the frequency of armed clashes and cross-border firing has substantially increased.

Today, the consistent refusal of Delhi to engage in dialogue with Pakistan and limited armed conflicts in 2019 and 2025 have not only minimised space for dialogue, but also redefined priorities of the two states. The two sides, apparently, are preparing for an eventual ‘South Asian Armageddon’.

The latest ‘Modi Doctrine’ might bring this ‘South Asian Armageddon’ more quickly than expected. The ‘Modi Doctrine’ outlines three broader parameters, ie, a) if there is a terrorist attack in India, a befitting reply will be given; b) India will not tolerate any ‘nuclear blackmail’; c) India will not differentiate between the government of Pakistan and the ‘masterminds’ of terrorism. This doctrine has brought the threshold of conflict to the lowest point in history between the two countries.

Similarly, Pakistan has a rare consensus at the civil and military leadership level that any attempt to divert the water flow will be considered an act of war. Moreover, the ‘surgical strikes strategy’ of 2019 and ‘Modi Doctrine’ of 2025 have forced Islamabad to shift its strategic posture from ‘defensive defence’ to ‘offensive defence’, where pre-emptive strikes could be one of the options to minimise the Indian threat at times of conflict. This is why both states are eagerly buying arms, improving defence capabilities and trying to technologically maintain a strategic edge.

Missed opportunities

While there is a long list of attempts by the international community, as well as the Pakistani and Indian leadership to ease tensions between 1948 to 1998, two opportunities might have changed the fate of the people of the subcontinent: in 1999 and 2015 — both opportunities coming when the BJP and former PM Nawaz Sharif were in power.

There are two important factors that made these two peace gestures significant. First, A.B. Vajpayee and Narendra Modi were both leaders of BJP — a political party with a reputation for hard-line politics. Endorsement of any peace plan by these two leaders would have gained legitimacy in India.

Second, in 1999 Nawaz Sharif had two-thirds majority and in 2015 he was enjoying simple majority. Therefore, there were less chances of obstructions by other political forces in Pakistan.

The first historic opportunity emerged in 1999 when Vajpayee, an ideologue and seasoned politician, travelled by bus to Lahore and signed the Lahore Declaration. As per several accounts, Islamabad and Delhi could have changed the course of history from hostility to cooperation, but the Kargil crisis disrupted the process.

The second historic opportunity, which is often either ignored or overlooked in Pakistan, was Modi’s surprise visit to Lahore in 2015. Today Islamabad views Mr Modi’s entire tenure from 2014 to 2025 negatively.

However, the fact is that during Modi’s first two years in office, from 2014 to 2016, the Indian PM had a conciliatory approach towards Pakistan. He not only invited then-PM Nawaz Sharif to his oath-taking ceremony but also extended frequent pleasantries during that period. Pakistan could have built on the surprise visit of Modi but the Pathankot attack disrupted the entire process. While Pakistan denied any linkages to the attack, the pressure of Indian media, public sentiment and Modi’s altered perceptions changed Delhi’s posture towards Pakistan.

End of bilateralism

The India-Pakistan relationship is primarily heading towards the end of bilateralism. New Delhi has initiated a process to undo what was achieved through difficult negotiations in the 1950s, ’60s and ’70s. In 2019, Delhi not only ended cross-LoC trade but also revoked Most Favoured Nation (MFN) status of Pakistan. A few months later, in August 2019, it abrogated the special status of held Jammu and Kashmir, which Islamabad believed might lead to change in demographics in the disputed territory. Lately, Delhi has not only put the IWT in ‘abeyance’, but also expelled Pakistani citizens.

In response to India’s unilateral actions of August 2019, Pakistan suspended bilateral trade and downgraded diplomatic relations without a clear strategy on the objectives it sought to achieve.

Islamabad has repeatedly indicated revoking the Simla Agreement of 1972. Resultantly, the bilateral trade agreements, socio-cultural pacts, political and security arrangements are practically either suspended or ineffective.

Way forward

Soon after the fragile ceasefire in 2025 and in the presence of aggressive competing military doctrines, there should be no expectation of a major breakthrough between the two hostile neighbours.

At best, the two countries need to prioritise stability over peace, which could be achieved through a few baby steps. Steps such as resumption of visa services for patients and family reunions could lower hostilities, while easing the miseries of those whose families were divided by the border. The civil society of India and Pakistan needs to play an active role in developing peace constituencies on both sides.

In presence of fiery rhetoric, peace overtures by both governments will not be an easy task. Therefore, the two sides also need to work on resumption of backchannel diplomacy, which could help in mitigating mistrust.

The most recent successful example of backchannel diplomacy was in 2021, when India and Pakistan agreed to strictly implement the ceasefire understanding of 2003 on the LoC.

Perhaps Islamabad can appoint former PM Nawaz Sharif as an ‘ambassador of peace’. His goodwill and past experiences could create positive impact on India-Pakistan relationship.

Revival of Saarc could also open a channel of communication between the two countries. In 2004, the famous handshake between then-president Musharraf and Indian PM Vajpayee on the sidelines of the Saarc meeting resumed the process of composite dialogue. There is an utmost need for a joint counterterrorism framework between India and Pakistan to address concerns related to militancy.

From 1800 to 1945, European countries fought eight major wars and countless battles, yet eventually learned to coexist. Will India and Pakistan draw lessons from Europe’s model of coexistence without enduring eight major wars of their own, or are they destined to repeat that history?

Today, the challenge for Islamabad and Delhi is not improving ties but preventing further decline. Small steps toward normalisation could help the region achieve stability, if not peace. Are the leaders of both countries ready to take those steps?

The writer is an analyst of South Asian affairs. The views expressed are his own.

X: @itskhurramabbas

When seen through the chronology of the solar calendar, the Saturday of March 23, 1940, was the beginning of yet another balmy weekend. However, what transpired after March 23 was, per se, a phenomenal occurrence: an abrupt transition of a decades-long political journey from a slow-paced rights movement to a fast-moving liberation drive zeroed in on nothing less than full freedom.

A day that represents an era

Freedom cannot be won in a day or two, but some days attain historical significance because they symbolise the protracted, blood-ridden struggle for freedom spanning generations and serve as a yearly, yet necessary reminder that no sovereign nation can lay claim to glory without revisiting its tragic past, time and again.

Though a lot has been written about the creation of Pakistan as an independent state, scant attention has been paid to the decisive moments when the far-fetched idea of a separate homeland for the Muslims of British India culminated in a near-term goal all of a sudden, and those who had once categorically dismissed any likelihood of an independent Muslim state to be carved out of British India were able to see it coming as an inevitable reality with their eyes wide open.

March 23, a day that represents an era, can frankly be referred to as the moment a half-baked conceptual fantasy incubated through poetic immersion turned into a full-blown reality, to be soon accomplished through blood, sweat, and tears. And the reality on the horizon was stark not only for Muslims, India’s largest minority counting in millions, but also for the country’s formidable Hindu majority, along with the seemingly civilised, ostensibly cultured, yet practically the most ruthless colonists: the British empire, on which the sun would never set.

Pakistan Day is a moment to reflect on the numerous sacrifices made by our founding fathers and look back on generations after generations who were lost in the hope of a better future.

Setting the course of Muslim political thought

Seven years later, as propagated in the enemy’s discourse, the making of Pakistan as an independent nation-state was largely attributed to the hasty retreat of the British rulers from the Indian subcontinent. However, if history is anything to go by, the making of an independent Muslim-majority state in the north-west and north-east of the defunct British-Indian Empire, that too through entirely political means, was the product of a centuries-long historical process that suddenly saw itself at the forefront of a paradigm shift in the last decade of the mid-twentieth century. At that point in time, nobody would have believed that it would take merely a period of seven years for India’s largest yet most deprived minority to finally secure themselves a country they could call home.

The dawn of March 23, 1940, heralded the imminent end of the 150-year colonial rule in the subcontinent, and, at the same time, it set the rectifying course of the Muslim political thought that was intrinsically divided into two major groups: one that perceived the making of a separate country as the ultimate division of the Muslims and Hindus of India, and the second that welcomed the idea of a separate Muslim state.

Dawn of a new era

The 27th three-day Working Committee Session of the All-India Muslim League was held at Minto Park in Lahore from March 22 to March 24, 1940. It is pertinent to note that the session was not planned earlier than expected as it was neither an emergency session nor a crisis meeting, but rather a yearly political convention attended by nearly 100,000 people other than the top Muslim League leadership. Oddly enough, the number of attendees of the annual session was considerably lower than that of those gathered every week for Friday prayers in the Badshahi Mosque of Lahore or the Jama Masjid of New Delhi. As strange as it may seem, United India had seen much more dense gatherings and powerful political shows than the one held by the Muslim League in March 1940.

Lahore Resolution or Pakistan Resolution?

When the Muslim League passed the Lahore Resolution calling for a separate Muslim-majority homeland, the word ‘Pakistan’ was not used in the statement prepared by a subcommittee of the All-India Muslim League, which was headed by none other than Quaid-i-Azam Muhammad Ali Jinnah himself. Other members of the subcommittee included prominent figures such as Khawaja Nazimuddin, Nawab Ismail Khan, Sir Abdullah Haroon, and Khan Liaquat Ali Khan.

Drafted by the then-undivided Punjab’s chief minister, Sikandar Hayat Khan, the resolution was presented by the then-prime minister of Bengal, A.K. Fazlul Haq. On this historic occasion, Amjadi Bano Begum, the wife of Maulana Muhammad Ali Jauhar, Maulana Zafar Ali Khan, Maulana Abdul Hamid Qadri Badayuni, Sardar Aurangzeb Khan, Qazi Muhammad Isa, and I.I. Chundrigar were also present.

Some scholars interpret the Lahore Resolution as mainly calling for “independent sovereign states,” as, according to them, the text reflected not more than a unified call to accommodate the political aspirations of Indian Muslims, who desired a loosely federated state structure in a United India, not a divided one. Relatedly, a coterie of liberal and secular opinion leaders argue that the Lahore Resolution had nothing to do with Islam since the word ‘Islam’ was not used in the 343-word resolution, which featured only the words ‘Muslim’, ‘Muslims,’ and ‘Mussalmans.’ However, such interpretations go against the fact that even a layman’s analysis of the speeches delivered at the Lahore conference, along with the approved text of the Lahore Resolution, proves the contrary.

Begum Maulana Muhammad Ali Jauhar, for instance, used the word ‘Pakistan’ in her speech on the occasion, according to Pakistan was Inevitable by Syed Hassan Riaz. Although Choudhary Rahmat Ali coined the name ‘Pakistan’ when he published Now or Never; Are We to Live or Perish Forever? in 1933, it was not until after the Lahore Resolution that the word ‘Pakistan’ began to be used throughout the Indian subcontinent by those supporting the creation of a single and sovereign Muslim nation as well as by those opposing the idea with all might and main.

Presidential address by Quaid-i-Azam

A complete silence swept the audience when Quaid-Azam Muhammad Ali Jinnah, the President of the All-India Muslim League, emerged on the podium. Not only was his address to the Lahore conference lengthier than his previous addresses in his by-then 37-year-long political career, but his keynote speech on the occasion exuded a profound political wisdom and showed his utmost concern for the future of Indian Muslims after the exit of the British empire from India and the ensuing rise of Hindu hegemony in particular.

The Quaid’s presidential address teemed with words and phrases like ‘freedom,’ ‘Islam,’ ‘Muslim,’ ‘Mussalmans,’ ‘slavery of Mussalmans,’ ‘the value, the importance, the significance of organising ourselves,’ ‘defend yourselves,’ ‘depend upon yourselves,’ ‘We have no right to disagree,’ ‘can we trust them anymore?’ ‘our right of self-determination,’ ‘Congress regards separate electorates as an evil,’ ‘what better guarantees can the minorities have?’, ‘we must depend on our own inherent strength,’ ‘the Mussalmans of India will resist it,’ ‘Mussalmans are not a minority,’ ‘the Mussalmans are a nation by any definition,’ ‘come forward as servants of Islam,’ and many more words and phrases imbued with a desire for all-inclusive freedom.

According to Stanley Wolpert, American historian and an authority on Pakistan and India’s political history, even though Quaid-i-Azam Muhammad Ali Jinnah’s rise to the Indian political scene portrayed him as a steadfast proponent of Muslim-Hindu unity in the initial phase of his political career, his presidential address to the Lahore session of the All India Muslim League, as reflected in his words below, was the watershed when “Jinnah irrevocably committed to forcing the creation of an independent Pakistan.”

“If the British government are really in earnest and sincere to secure [the] peace and happiness of the people of this subcontinent, the only course open to us all is to allow the major nations separate homelands by dividing India into autonomous national states. There is no reason why these states should be antagonistic to each other. On the other hand, the rivalry and the natural desire and efforts on the part of one to dominate the social order and establish political supremacy over the other in the government of the country will disappear. It will lead more towards natural goodwill by international pacts between them, and they can live in complete harmony with their neighbours. This will lead further to a friendly settlement all the more easily with regard to minorities, by reciprocal arrangements and adjustments between Muslim India and Hindu India, which will far more adequately and effectively safeguard the rights and interests of Muslim and various other minorities.”

The second-last paragraph of his detailed speech can be termed as a vision statement — concise to the core, yet setting the course to the ultimate objective that Muslims, being a single nation, must follow:

“Mussalmans are a nation according to any definition of a nation, and they must have their homelands, their territory, and their state. We wish to live in peace and harmony with our neighbours as a free and independent people. We wish our people to develop to the fullest our spiritual, cultural, economic, social, and political life in a way that we think best and in consonance with our own ideals and according to the genius of our people.” “……But at the same time, we cannot be moved or diverted from our purpose and objective by threats or intimidations. We must be prepared to face all difficulties and consequences, make all the sacrifices that may be required of us, to achieve the goal we have set in front of us.”

As mentioned below, the concluding part of the Quaid’s address to the Lahore conference spoke volumes of the ultimate motif, which was nothing but freedom:

“I have placed before you the task that lies ahead of us. Do you realise how big and stupendous it is? Do you realise that you cannot get freedom or independence by mere arguments? I should appeal to the intelligentsia. The intelligentsia in all countries in the world have been the pioneers of any movements for freedom. What does the Muslim intelligentsia propose to do? I may tell you that unless you get this into your blood; unless you are prepared to take off your coats and are willing to sacrifice all that you can and work selflessly, earnestly, and sincerely for your people, you will never realise your aim. Friends, I, therefore, want you to make up your mind definitely and then think of devices and organise your people, strengthen your organisation, and consolidate the Mussalmans all over India. I think that the masses are wide awake. They only want your guidance and your lead. Come forward as servants of Islam. Organise the people economically, socially, educationally, and politically, and I am sure that you will be a power that will be accepted by everybody.”

The die was cast

On March 25, the Hindu-dominated English press, in a sarcastic tone, rechristened the move as the ‘Pakistan Resolution’ merely to downplay the resolution as a flight of fancy, an improbable task against the prevailing ground realities that were predominantly in favour of those forces working to safeguard their political interests within the framework of a federation of India as a single entity.

But once the clock strikes, nobody can stop the making of history. What lay seven years down the line was simply more than phenomenal, as the resolution was a call to action unanimously endorsed by the representatives of the most deprived minority of India, enjoying no military support or any backing of global powers other than their self-belief and determination. The making of a country is no joke. However, the emergence of Pakistan, with its flesh-and-blood existence emerging out of non-existence against all odds — that too in the name of Islam — made it more than just another country.

Over and above a day to observe patriotic commemoration rituals, Pakistan Day is a moment to reflect on the numerous sacrifices made by our founding fathers and look back on generations after generations who were lost in the hope of a better future. Above all else, the day affords us yet another opportunity for course correction.

The writer is associated with a political journal and engaged at an IT firm as a senior editor.

The question of when Pakistan emerged as a distinct nation has elicited diverse opinions. Those aligned with the official narrative argue that Pakistan’s origins trace back to when Muhammad bin Qasim set foot in Sindh, overthrowing a tyrant who oppressed Muslims in the region. Others claim that the foundation of Pakistan was laid during the reign of the great Muslim emperors of Hindustan.

Some highlight the contributions of Sir Syed Ahmed Khan and his contemporaries, who spearheaded intellectual and social reforms, paving the way for a separate homeland for Indian Muslims. More serious scholars, however, contend that Pakistan evolved as a political response to the complex challenges faced by Muslims under British rule and during the Indian National Congress’s tenure (1937–39).

The emergence of political parties in the subcontinent was a result of the granting of limited political space by the British rulers. Within this landscape, parties presented competing manifestos, and among them, the demand for Pakistan resonated most strongly with Muslims. The movement gained unprecedented momentum when the All-India Muslim League formally articulated its vision through the Lahore Resolution on March 23, 1940.

Politics is often described as the art of the possible. Astute politicians assess situations to explore available options, political space, and strategies to achieve their objectives.

Pakistan cannot survive on outdated rhetoric; it needs a redefined vision of nationhood that is well-grounded in contemporary realities.

For Pakistan’s founding leaders, it became evident nearly a century ago that autonomy for Muslim-majority regions was the answer to the political and social challenges of the subcontinent. This marked a fundamental shift, driven by evolving strategic, political, and communal dynamics.

Factors such as Viceroy Lord Linlithgow’s decision to involve India in the Second World War, escalating Hindu-Muslim tensions, the Indian National Congress’s attempts at political dominance in the mid-1930s, and the diminishing prospects of Muslim political survival in a nationalist India all contributed to the demand for a separate homeland. These concerns formed the foundation of the Muslim League’s political manifesto, guiding the struggle for Pakistan.

Muhammad Ali Jinnah and his colleagues recognised that the Muslim community required constitutional safeguards. Jinnah candidly presented this reality to Muslims, incorporating it into an electoral manifesto. A key lesson from this history is that shifting political circumstances often necessitate the redefinition of legal and constitutional frameworks.

When political institutions are prevented from functioning within constitutional norms, chaos ensues, with political parties and their followers falling into disarray. Open political discourse is replaced by clandestine manoeuvrings that harm the state. Unfortunately, this pattern has repeated itself throughout Pakistan’s history, especially during periods of military rule. State institutions are strengthened only when all political voices are heard without restriction.

A nation in search of unity

Pakistan today grapples with a disoriented citizenry caught between economic survival, consumerism, and competing religious narratives. The sense of nationhood is weak at best. While moments of crisis temporarily unite people, as seen during the 2022 floods, lasting national cohesion remains elusive. The ongoing security operations in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (KPK) and Balochistan have received some political and public backing, but the lack of a unanimous national consensus is concerning. Beyond such instances, society remains deeply divided along lines of resource allocation, provincialism, and religious sectarianism.

The Pakistan Movement was characterised by a pragmatic approach to difficult political realities. Jinnah, despite the League’s vulnerabilities, never shied away from addressing challenges directly. In a statement on March 31, 1944, regarding the League’s stance against the Unionist Party, he asserted that one could not owe allegiance to two parties simultaneously. The vulnerable position of the League did not prevent him from boldly speaking the truth. Such clarity and resolve are lacking today. Unless a similar spirit is revived — where national issues are tackled with fairness and objectivity — meaningful social cohesion will remain a distant dream.

The role of Islam

The role of Islam in governance remains a contentious issue. No constitutional framework can be effectively implemented until the existing ambiguities in this regard are addressed with precision and honesty. These contradictions are evident in all spheres — from the declaration of Islam as the state religion to the attempt to align constitutional laws with Quranic and Sunnah principles. Even in sectors like banking and finance, such inconsistencies create persistent legal and ideological challenges.

The state’s failure to present a cohesive Islamic governance model has allowed sectarianism and religious orthodoxy to hold the population hostage. Society is fragmented between militant, pseudo-puritanical, festive, and mystic interpretations of Islam. Consequently, self-styled zealots periodically emerge, mobilising street power and disrupting public life with little resistance from the government.

This lack of control has led to deadly consequences, such as the ongoing unrest in Kurram and the tragic assassination of Maulana Hamidul Haq Haqqani. It has been observed that religious scholars who support rationality, progressive views on life and the virtues of scientific learning are the most unsafe. Unless these religious fault lines are addressed, Pakistan will remain vulnerable to further instability.

The crisis of federation

Pakistan’s federation is marked by stark inequalities. The relationship between Punjab and the smaller provinces is a central issue in governance. No federation can thrive when physical and social disparities fuel centrifugal forces. The path of least resistance lies in renegotiating resource allocation formulas within the existing provincial framework. For instance, the distribution of the Indus waters should be based on scientific data and consensus agreements, ensuring that one province’s gain is not another’s loss.

The 18th Amendment has granted provinces greater autonomy, but unresolved disputes — such as over National Finance Commission (NFC) awards, mineral royalties, and energy revenues — demand urgent resolution. The controversy surrounding the six canals diverting water from the Sutlej to irrigate Punjab’s deserts has recently sparked significant resentment in Sindh. Farmers fear that water will ultimately be drawn from the Indus via link canals, jeopardising their livelihoods. The federal government and Punjab have made little effort to engage Sindh in meaningful dialogue, further deepening interprovincial mistrust.

A nation of lost potential

Pakistan’s founding fathers envisioned a country of opportunity and progress. Jinnah and his comrades spoke of a state where equal growth opportunities would be available to all. However, this vision was soon eclipsed by harsh realities. Millions of talented Pakistanis have migrated abroad in search of better prospects, as domestic opportunities remain scarce.

Economic development cannot be achieved without enabling personal progress on a large scale. Pakistan’s youth — the future custodians of the state — have a pragmatic outlook on life. They seek tangible incentives to stay and contribute.

If Pakistan is to retain its best minds, it must offer them not just economic stability but also social, cultural, and emotional fulfilment. Hollow nationalist rhetoric will not suffice; the youth demand a clear and actionable vision for the nation’s future.

A disturbing trend is the government’s withdrawal of funding for higher education. The federal government has shifted this burden onto the provinces, and barring Sindh, public investment in universities has dwindled across the country.

If Pakistan is serious about combatting extremism and fostering progress, sustained investment in education is the only viable path. Lessons can be drawn from India and China, both of which prioritised human resource development and are now reaping the benefits of their educational investments.

A state in disarray

One of the primary duties of a state, as Jinnah asserted, is to protect the life and liberty of its citizens. Pakistan has failed on this front. The country is engulfed in social unrest, with rising terror attacks, protests, and agitation across Balochistan, Punjab, KPK, and Sindh. Weak governance has exacerbated the crisis, forcing citizens to take to the streets for even the most basic services, such as registering an FIR or securing access to municipal utilities. The lack of functional local governments has made street protests the only means of gaining administrative attention.

Repeated calls for reform have gone unanswered. It is time for Pakistan’s intellectuals to push for a redefined vision of nationhood — one rooted in present realities, not outdated slogans. A nation cannot survive on pretence and the political machinations of vested interests. It needs a core group of enlightened individuals with a well-articulated agenda for national renewal.

The writer is an academic and researcher based in Karachi.

The Lahore Resolution was no sudden decision. Its story began in Karachi. On October 10, 1938, Shaikh Abdul Majid moved Resolution No.5 at the Sindh Muslim League Conference. The resolution was seconded by Khan Bahadur Gurmani and supported by Sir Abdullah Haroon, Sayed Abdul Rauf Shah and Maulana Abdul Hamid Badayuni. It was on this occasion that G.M. Sayed articulated that the Hindus and Muslims were two separate nations.

“This Conference considers it absolutely essential, in the interests of unhampered cultural development, the economic and social betterment and political self-determination of the two nations, known as Hindus and Muslims, to recommend to the All-India Muslim League to review and revise the entire conception of what should be the suitable constitution for India which will secure honourable and legitimate status to them.”

There were two other steps before the Lahore Session. On March 25, 1939, speaking at Meerut, Liaquat Ali Khan said: “If Hindus and Muslims cannot live together, then they should divide the country on the basis of religion and culture.” The next development was at Muhammad Ali Park, Calcutta. On April 17, 1939, presiding over a meeting to observe the first death anniversary of Allama Iqbal, the Raja of Mahmudabad, referring to the Allama’s Allahabad address in 1930, said:

The Lahore Resolution was not a sudden decision; nor was it some British ploy to divide the subcontinent.

“The main purpose of this proposal was a single autonomous, independent Muslim Government, or, if you want to phrase it in constitutional terms, then understand that a separate federation of autonomous Muslim provinces is brought into being.” (Shaiq Ahmad Usmani (ed.), Asr-i-Jadeed, Calcutta, April 18, 1939)

Thus, the road to Lahore was opened, but before we come to its text, let us deal with the accusation that the Lahore Resolution was inspired by the British and drafted by Sir Zafarullah Khan. We have two writers who cite the actual views of Sir Zafarullah Khan on the matter. Hasan Ja’far Zaidi cites the actual opinion of Sir Zafarullah Khan:

“There is, for instance, the Pakistan scheme which broadly speaking seeks to divide India into Muslim and non-Muslim parts, the Muslim part being described as Pakistan … one has only to contemplate the expense, misery, suffering and horror involved in any such attempt … the scheme is utterly impractical.” (Dawn, July 16, 2017)

Khan Abdul Wali Khan cites the Viceroy Lord Linlithgow’s letter dated March 12, 1940, to Lord Zetland, the Secretary of State, as below:

“Under my instruction, Zafarullah wrote a memorandum on the subject: Two Dominion States: I have already sent it to your attention. I have also asked him for further clarification, which he says is forthcoming. He is anxious, however, that no one should find out that he had prepared the plan. He has, however, given me the right to do with it what I like, including sending a copy to you. Copies have been passed on to Jinnah and, I think, to Sir Akbar Hydari. While he, Zafarullah, cannot admit its authorship, his document has been prepared for adoption by the Muslim League with a view to giving it the fullest publicity.” (Facts are Facts, New Delhi, Vikas, 1987, p29)

Note that the last part is open to two interpretations. The first is that the idea of demanding two dominions should be formulated and popularized. This interpretation would have been valid had All-India Muslim League leaders like Shaikh Abdul Majid, Nawabzada Liaquat Ali Khan and the Raja of Mahmudabad had not, as detailed above, already been demanding two federations since 1938.

The second interpretation is that it was a document drawn up to dissuade the Muslim League from demanding Partition; otherwise, why would Sir Zafarullah Khan be anxious that he should not be known as the author of a solution repeatedly and publicly demanded by the leaders of the Muslim League? Sir Zafarullah’s anxiety, that he should not be known as the author, could be that he was going counter to the Muslim League. This ties in with Zafarullah Khan’s note, as cited by Hasan Ja’far Zaidi.

Ashique Husain Batalvi, who was present when the Lahore Resolution was being drafted, cited the correspondence between the Viceroy, Lord Linlithgow, and the Secretary of State, Lord Zetland. The Viceroy wrote on March 25, 1940:

“I do not attach too much importance to Jinnah’s demand for the carving out of India into an indefinite number of so-called ‘Dominions’, and I would judge myself his attitude at the present moment is that, as Congress are putting forward a preposterous claim which they know is incapable of acceptance, he equally will put forward just as extreme a claim the impracticality of which he is just as well aware.”

Wali Khan cites the above letter on pages 30 and 31 of his book; he, however, omits the reply that the secretary of state gave on April 5, 1940, which was:

“I think that in the course of the forthcoming debate, I shall be bound to express my dissent from the proposals which have recently been put forward by the All-India Muslim League in the course of their recent Conference at Lahore. I would very much doubt whether they have been properly thought out.” (Jang, August 25, 1987)

Since the secretary of state for India thought that the Lahore Resolution had not been “properly thought out,” this disposes of the notion that the British had thought it out. The operative portion of the Resolution reads:

“No constitutional plan would be workable in this country or acceptable to the Muslims unless it is designed on the following basic principles, viz, that geographically contiguous units are demarcated into regions with such territorial adjustments as may be necessary, that the areas in which the Muslims are numerically in a majority, as in the north-western and eastern zones of India, should be grouped to constitute ‘Independent states’ in which the constituent units shall be autonomous and sovereign.”

Ashique Husain Batalvi made the criticism that the Resolution was imprecisely expressed. The areas which were demanded should have been named. This criticism was valid, as it allowed the partition of Punjab and Bengal. The more intriguing ambiguity was the use of two discordant terms, “autonomous” and “sovereign”. What is autonomous cannot be sovereign; what is sovereign does not need to be autonomous. B.R. Ambedkar lost no time in pointing out this discrepancy. The question of why these phrases were used was to provide a cover for the separation of Bengal from Pakistan.

Awami League leaders, from 1948 to 1966, demanded autonomy for the eastern wing on the basis of the Lahore Resolution. In 1947, Mr. Jinnah and the All-India Muslim League were quite willing to let a united and independent Bengal emerge on August 15, 1947, but then, Jawaharlal Nehru and Vallabhbhai Patel blocked the move, censuring Mahatma Gandhi and insulting Sarat Chandra Bose in the process. All this has been attested to by Sheikh Mujibur Rahman in his Unfinished Memoirs. Could the Congress have been acting under the guidance of Sir Zafarullah Khan?

Even the British could not have been behind the denial of independence to Bengal, as PM Clement Atlee’s letter to President Harry Truman shows. Atlee alerted Truman of the possibility that three independent nations would emerge on the map of South Asia. Dawn carried this correspondence on December 28, 2018. This denial of independence, that is, the ‘third option’, had its repercussions in the referendum in the North-West Frontier Province, when the two options given were joining either India or Pakistan, but the third option of independence was omitted because it had been denied to Bengal. On this point, Wali Khan, in his book, unjustly chastises the British:

“The British were clever manipulators! They were able to utilize different and opposing forces to their advantage. The Viceroy approached Hindu Mahasabha for the unity of India. They approached the Muslim League and Jinnah for partitioning the country. This was an excellent method to set these two forces on a collision course.” (p45)

The fact was that when the Independent Bengal proposal was put to Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru, he invoked the Two-Nation Theory to turn it down: “There was no chance of Hindus there agreeing to live under permanent Muslim domination” (Transfer of Power Papers, Vol X, 1013). Why Nehru blocked the independence of Bengal, he did not hide. “East Bengal is going to be a source of embarrassment for Pakistan.” (Transfer of Power Papers, Vol XI, 03). Thus, to blame the British is not fair. Khan Abdul Wali Khan seems to have realized this. He was to admit that the, “Withdrawal of the British from South Asia was a mistake.” (The News, April 15, 1995).

This was a mere 18 years after the Soviet Union had invaded Afghanistan.

The writer is the editor, Quarterly Journal of the Pakistan Historical Society and author of A Concise History of Pakistan, Oxford University Press, 2009, Second Edition 2024.

The British imperialists’ biased attitude toward their subjects tarnished their image as rulers who showed little regard for human dignity in India. Ayesha Jalal, in her book Muslim Enlightened Thoughts in South Asia, argues that colonial rulers reframed history to serve their empire, suppressing indigenous narratives. The British failure to respect Indian sentiments ultimately led to the War of Independence in 1857. Sir Syed Ahmed Khan emphasised that Muslims should draw lessons from their past and cultivate adaptability in changing circumstances. For him, the empowerment of Muslims through both historical awareness and modern education was the key to their transformation.

One of Sir Syed Ahmed Khan’s key ideas was to make Muslims conscious of their distinct identity, laying the groundwork for the Two-Nation Theory. This theory unified Muslims across classes and castes, fostering cultural and linguistic bonds. These connections strengthened the Muslim community, creating a religio-cultural homogeneity that solidified the idea of a separate identity. Over time, this unity bolstered the demand for separate electorates, a demand that was eventually accepted by the British under the Morley-Minto Reforms of 1909.

The Indian National Congress (INC) acknowledged Muslims as a separate community for the first time, largely due to Quaid-i-Azam Muhammad Ali Jinnah’s efforts. As an INC member, Jinnah ardently championed Muslim rights. However, as Hindu antagonism grew, Jinnah parted ways with the INC in 1920. Events like the Khilafat and Hijrat Movements reinforced the belief among Muslims that the Two-Nation Theory was valid. These experiences demonstrated that a long-term coalition with Hindus was not feasible.

As Pakistan approaches its centenary, the need to reflect on its founding ideals has never been more urgent. Can the nation realign itself with the principles of sovereignty, autonomy, and inclusion that once inspired its creation?

In response to political upheaval and communal tensions, the British formed the Simon Commission in 1927 to assess the implementation of the Government of India Act of 1919. However, the commission failed to gain cooperation from the INC and the All-India Muslim League (AIML). Meanwhile, the British imposed the Rowlatt Act, curtailing civil liberties and fueling resentment. Discontent escalated with the Amritsar massacre, a brutal act that became a focal point of national unrest.

The Nehru Report (1928) opposed separate electorates for Muslims and called for Hindi to be the official language. In response, Jinnah’s 14 Points (1929) advocated a federal system with uniform autonomy for provinces and safeguards for Muslim culture. These points laid the foundation for the legal and political struggle of Muslims in the subcontinent.

Dr Allama Muhammad Iqbal’s 1930 presidential address at the AIML’s annual meeting played a pivotal role in shaping Muslim political consciousness. His vision gained clarity in the 1933 pamphlet Now or Never, which introduced the term ‘Pakistan’. The Government of India Act of 1935 proposed a constitutional framework granting the provinces autonomy. However, both the AIML and INC had reservations about the Act.

Despite concerns, both parties contested the 1937 elections. Congress emerged dominant, forming ministries even in Muslim-majority provinces. Congress introduced the Wardha Scheme, marginalising Muslims. This experience underscored the perils of a Congress-led government. H.V. Hudson cites Jinnah as stating that “Congress leaders were so obsessed with smashing the Muslim League that they left no stone unturned to do so.”

World War II altered the political landscape. The Viceroy unilaterally declared India at war with Germany, and the British promised India full dominion status post-war. However, the INC refused to cooperate and resigned from ministries, marking December 22, 1939, as the Day of Deliverance for Muslims. The Lahore Resolution of 1940 transformed the Muslim League into a mass movement. Congress dismissed it, labelling it the Pakistan Resolution.

The resolution declared that no constitutional plan would be acceptable unless it was designed to group Muslim-majority regions into independent states. This resolution solidified the Two-Nation Theory and provided Muslims with a clear political direction. Jinnah asserted that India’s 90 million Muslims were a nation, not a minority, demanding a separate homeland.

The Lahore Resolution underscored Muslims’ distinctiveness from Hindus and provided a roadmap for resolving political identity issues. By emphasising territorial sovereignty, it laid the legal foundation for a Muslim nation-state. The resolution transformed the AIML’s strategy, shifting focus from securing rights within a united India to demanding full independence.

The creation of Pakistan on August 14, 1947, was a monumental success but came with challenges, including securing economic and military resources, managing large-scale migration, and handling disputes with India. Security threats led Pakistan to join US-led alliances under the Eisenhower Doctrine amid Cold War tensions.

Post-independence, Pakistan faced a leadership crisis that exacerbated security concerns, delayed constitution-making, and deepened regional and ethnic divisions. Political and bureaucratic elites’ policies fostered disharmony, intolerance, and extremism. Internal rivalries among provinces hindered national unity, as political discourse fluctuated between resource exploitation and regional grievances.

During the 1950s and 1960s, politics in Pakistan was shaped by evolving identity consciousness. The One Unit scheme, aimed at enforcing integration, fueled resentment among smaller provinces. The Civil Service of Pakistan (CSP) consolidated power under General Ayub Khan’s military regime, curtailing democracy and intensifying political conflicts. The failure to uphold the Lahore Resolution’s principles contributed to the traumatic dismemberment of Pakistan in 1971.

The post-1973 political landscape saw successive military regimes fostering extremism and intolerance. Political polarisation deepened, leading to institutional imbalances. Electoral processes lost credibility, with rigging allegations undermining democracy. General Ziaul Haq’s excessive religionisation of politics destabilised Pakistan’s democratic framework. His era ended abruptly in 1988, but its effects lingered.

From 1988 to 1996, four general elections resulted in alternating PPP and PML-N governments. Political instability persisted until 1999, when the military seized power under General Pervez Musharraf. His tenure saw Pakistan embroiled in the US-led war in Afghanistan, further compromising national sovereignty.

The 2008–2018 period saw two successive civilian governments, but political instability continued. The 2013 elections marked PTI’s emergence as a political force. In 2018, PTI formed the federal government but was unable to complete its tenure, exacerbating instability. The current government faces economic challenges and political compromises, with unrest in Sindh over Indus River canal projects being a major concern.

To realign governance with the Lahore Resolution’s spirit, the government must ensure provincial autonomy, strengthen institutions, and promote transparency. Matters between the federation and provinces should be deliberated within the Council of Common Interests (CCI), as mandated by Article 154 of the 1973 Constitution. An independent judiciary must be safeguarded to ensure the fair administration of justice.

Pakistan’s legal framework must be reformed to address contemporary security challenges. A robust judicial system is crucial for maintaining law and order. Furthermore, digital transformation must be gender-inclusive and accessible nationwide to preserve history and culture. Encouraging youth to study history can help counter falsehoods and misinformation against Pakistan.

Unless the government prioritises national interests over political expediency, there is little hope for sustainable development. As we celebrate March 23, it is imperative to chart a new course — one that fosters economic growth, institutional reforms, and technological advancements. Only by doing so can we create a country brimming with opportunities for future generations.

The writer is a professor and director of the Pakistan Study Centre, University of Sindh, Jamshoro.

For now, let’s return to March 2025, when terrorist attacks have increased to alarming levels in two out of four provinces; when scores of security personnel, militants and innocent persons are being killed or injured almost daily; even among many in the non-violent, non-terrorist parts of the population in Balochistan, alienation is evident; when deficient governance and economic pressures on the vast majority are severe.

Is it tenable, in such circumstances, to speculate on the possible role of citizen leadership in turning things around? Well, the worst of times can also be the best of times to ponder because the solution may be waiting where the problem exists — at the grassroots!

Who is responsible?:

Grim current data and grimmer future prospects raise the subject of responsibility. How did we get here? And why are we headed to bleak conditions? Before we search for and find answers, we need to remember that Pakistan’s historical record, be it from 1947 to 1971 or from 1972 to 2025, shows us as a nation-state capable of achievements which are admirable, as well as failures which can be abysmal.

And if we are to look for reasons why and to affix responsibility, one is tempted to paraphrase Cassius from Shakespeare’s Julius Caesar: “The fault lies not in our leaders, but in ourselves”. After all, leaders come from citizens, either through an election (free and fair or manipulated) or forced imposition. Leaders assimilate the mass subconscious and also articulate the expressed views and demands of their people. At the same time, they innovate, identify new possibilities which the public may not have previously voiced, and set new directions.

From earth to sky:

In 2025, and looking ahead to the next 15 years, perhaps there is a need to explore the scope for a new, collective approach to concept formulation, policy-making and decision-making. Instead of a top-down perspective, would it be viable to examine a bottom-up process? Whereby, not just through attending public meetings and voting every few years, the people at large, or at least significant segments of the people, begin to generate new ideas and initiatives — to inject new energy and creativity into the public policy and implementation domain?

At a silent level, in conditions generally adverse for women, females demonstrate an extraordinary capacity for toil, for versatility, and for savings even when earnings are meagre. This is particularly evident among the millions of women who migrate from villages to cities to earn livelihoods. Though on a limited scale, the DHA areas in Karachi, Lahore and other metros witness such women handling multiple part-time jobs, using public transport, or simply walking long distances.

The worst of times can also be the best of times to ponder because the solution may be waiting where the problem exists — at the grassroots. Instead of a top-down approach, can a bottom-up process empower citizens to inject new energy and creativity into public policy and governance?

At this, and at slightly higher levels of income, in both urban areas and peri-urban areas, women manage the rotational money-saving, money-lending micro-community “committee” system. In this, they are their own leaders. In dozens of communities sharing ethnic, linguistic or cultural features, there is solidarity and cohesion, as well as shared support for individuals or families in distress. There are hundreds of community-based healthcare and welfare services that also meet non-community needs for aid, unaffected by unshared ethnic features.

Citizen-led welfare & development:

In formal, registered, organisational terms, some public service, not-for-profit entities are or were led by charismatic individual leaders — Sattar Edhi being the most obvious example. Many others are led and managed by collectives of low-profile or no-profile citizens who provide voluntary services.

This assortment includes LRBT, TCF, Indus Hospitals, Patients’ Aid Foundations at JPMC and NICVD, SOS Children’s Villages, Burns Centres, Koohi Goth Hospital and several others. Then, there are distinctive individuals who lead organisations such as SIUT, Shaukat Khanum Cancer Hospitals, Akhuwat, Kaarvan-i-Hayat, Cancer Aid Foundation, and others.

Representing hundreds of citizens who contribute invaluable voluntary time, skills and funds, tens of thousands who support related outreach services, and millions who are their beneficiaries, these citizen-led organisations mirror both the virtually unrivalled generosity of the Pakistani people as donors and philanthropists, as well as their ability to cooperate purposefully, over sustained periods, for the public good. While it is now being acknowledged, this facet of our people is underestimated for the potential it signifies for harnessing citizen engagement in political action for national progress.

There is a view that the reason why citizens are so deeply involved in charity-giving, philanthropy and public service is that these are mostly non-political and non-partisan causes. The theme of this essay, however, is the dire need to enhance citizens’ direct association with political action and change, which can also be divisively partisan. Does that present us with a conundrum? Even if it does, the humble contention is that it is worth trying out.

Unlike the state’s addictive, abominable dependence on foreign aid, foreign loans and grants, the unofficial, privately-led, not-for-profit welfare and development sector draws funding and huge donations from within the country; from the public, rich or middle class or even the poor, as well as spontaneous, continuous giving by overseas Pakistanis. The people have proved their ability to be self-reliant and self-sustaining over many years and decades.

Empathy and engagement:

Another expression of caring for others, of going beyond individual or own-community-centred concerns, is the abundant sharing of food, beverages, water, articles of daily use; cash sums given out during religious festivals and special days such as the Eids, particularly Eid-ul-Azha; mass breaking of the fast during Ramazan with hundreds and thousands being welcomed without discrimination; water sabeels and food during Muharram; and the multi-faith celebration of non-Muslim events such as during Holi, Diwali, Easter, and Christmas.

Though brought together by grievance and anger, protests, marches and rallies — for causes as varied as the forced conversion of non-Muslims to plans to construct canals in Punjab that could imperil water supply to Sindh, or for long overdue salaries, or against state excesses — demonstrate that citizens have the will to come together and risk violence, injury, arrest, and discomfort for shared causes.

While leaders organise many such protests, and some are contrived by them to promote their own interests, by and large people are willing to take to the streets to express their outrage and forcefully register their views and their presence.

Rise of social media:

Instant connectivity through social media, through WhatsApp and other platforms, has introduced an entirely unprecedented instrument for mobilising millions of citizens for a specific purpose or for a precise course of suggested action, without a single or more leaders necessarily taking the initiative or leading the charge.

Every individual with a device is a content creator with instant access to a viewership that can span a few dozen to millions. Disinformation, fake news and misinformation have simultaneously proliferated and complicated this dimension of new, large-scale affiliation. Nevertheless, this avenue offers low- to no-cost means for including citizens in campaigns for advancement.

In the official, reported, regulated economy, Pakistan in 2025 ranks low in the global measure of middle-income and low-income countries. Yet, in the gig economy, ie, the online, freelance, non-9am-to-5pm work regimen, wherein individual talent and a sense of enterprise are key drivers, Pakistan is often estimated to be among the top five in the whole world. This capability is made all the more novel because of erratic, unpredictable access to the internet, especially in recent months, caused mostly by the state’s crude attempts to prevent the spread of critical comments through social media, particularly from sources in the diaspora overseas.

This gig economy, along with the parallel ‘black’ economy, sustains millions of middle- and low-income families. This reflects inherent qualities of innovation, imagination, willingness to work hard, meet deadlines, overcome obstacles and build private resources.

As the state — notwithstanding some remarkable exceptions in almost every province — remains slow in fulfilling its basic duties of delivering social services and infrastructure, the reliance on public-private partnerships in fields such as education, health care, vocational training, etc, manifests the tangible, measurable ways in which citizen involvement in efficient channelling of programmes for mass benefit is already visible and effective.

A treasure-trove of human resources:

Our citizens possess an extensive range of professional skills, experience and competence in diverse disciplines. These include management, production, construction, communication, information technology, mechanisation, air, sea and land transportation, with the additional bonus of exuding a friendly, compassionate, helpful attitude to those in need.

Even illiterate or non-formally educated individuals display intriguing ingenuity and insight. Educated or otherwise, the people are an inexhaustible reservoir of talent, intelligence and creativity — both in conventional spheres of work and in the arts, as in instrumental music and vocal rendition, in folk, contemporary or pop, in writing poetry or fiction, in performing arts of acting on stage and on screen, in painting and sculpture, in shaping intricate textures and patterns, in advertising, and in comedic portrayals that are satirical and humorous.

… And blemishes, too:

Concurrent with such virtues, people’s behaviour also sometimes — not always — shows a moral, ethical decline. There is widespread acceptance of corruption, bribe-giving and bribe-taking, sloth and squalor in public places, traffic indiscipline, showy piety and religiosity, repression of women’s autonomy and rights, extremism and bigotry.

Yet, in this mixed bag of strengths and weaknesses, enormous resources exist that can shape the public good.

The bonanza of youth:

The potential is perhaps most visible in youth, both numerically — with the 18-40 segment being more than half the total population — and productively, as in the constructive ways in which student societies function in various fields in schools, colleges and universities.

Despite the distractions of attention-shrivelling social media, youth often surprise one with the diligence and focus with which they can organise and produce science exhibits, pageants, plays and programmes. Given even limited facilities for training, they excel in activities as varied as football and micro-electronics to elocution. Girls and women often outpace boys and men, with questions and comments made during interactions that can express refreshing scepticism and unexpected deliberation.

Participation in political parties:

Political parties are the most relevant entry points for the future development of citizen leadership. Most of the large parties are family-centred and controlled. Or, as in one case, dominated totally by a persecuted, presently imprisoned leader whose wife seems to play a disconcertingly active role behind the scenes and even in public sight. Parties desperately need — a desperation that they themselves will not acknowledge — larger and more intensive participation of citizens beyond public meetings. If parties are unwilling to enrol new members who want to be members while also questioning the lack of genuine internal party democracy, then youth need to establish new parties which actually practice internal democracy. Equally, existing and new parties should form regular, active research units and internal think tanks.

Such party wings should periodically publish studies and papers on vital issues in society, the economy, and the electoral, judicial, legislative, executive, and military spheres, including defence and geopolitical and geostrategic challenges. There is a tendency to publish manifestos for elections only to fulfil formalities: rarely do parties reflect continuous, scholarship-based scrutiny of dynamic, ongoing changes that require policy adaptation.

Individual leaders are indispensable because they can articulate the views and demands of thousands and millions, but it is high time for such individual leaders to emerge from truly proletarian, collective, participative processes rather than from families — or from cliques alone, or from ominous reliance on the charisma of a single personality. Making voting compulsory, as in over 20 other countries, may be one way forward.

It would also be instructive to study in depth the history of Switzerland to learn some helpful truths about how, in that country, collective, non-charismatic, non-family-centred leadership has evolved and continued for decades to impart stability and strength to a linguistically diverse nation-state that overcame deep poverty. In times when disparities in income, access to education and opportunity for betterment are rife; when outward migration in the recent 2 years has reportedly taken away a million of our educated youth; and when conditions are made worse by a mass-level cynicism about politics and politicians; the question arises as to which socio-economic class of citizen-youth is capable of producing catalytic citizen-led change?

A clue in the last elections:

Perhaps part of the answer lies in the maturity, unfazed determination and cool-headedness with which voters, many of them young, rich, middle class and poor, across all four provinces, came out to vote on February 8, 2024.

Faced with a situation wherein one particular political party had been judicially deprived of its universally-known symbol and unable to use its own name to sponsor candidates, it was the voter who searched for the particular candidate in her/his constituency whose affiliation, known via social media, or word-of-mouth, or otherwise, was with the party that had been discriminated against by powerful state and governmental institutions.

The vote was silently yet eloquently cast for this unfairly victimised party, whatever its many flaws during its rule or after. It was an incredible demonstration of the courage, commitment and character of the Pakistani people. Independent candidates aligned with the de facto ‘banned’ party, forced to use a bizarre variety of election symbols instead of the cricket bat, nevertheless secured more votes than two major parties whose candidates had the advantage of using their long-established symbols.

It is this aspect of the February 8, 2024 general election — the citizenry’s relentless desire to overcome the odds — that most embodies the promise and the prospects for citizen leadership in the future of Pakistan.

The writer is an author and a former senator and federal minister.

Header image: Young Pakistani children wave national flags as they watch the Pakistan Day military parade in Islamabad on March 23, 2016. — AFP/File

Triumph, rather than tragedy, is the first word that comes to mind when an ordinary Pakistani thinks of Quaid-i-Azam Mohammad Ali Jinnah. Striving against formidable odds, he gifted us, through his extraordinary leadership, an independent, Muslim-majority nation-state.

Yet his life, from his birth in 1876 to his demise in 1948, was also marked by much tragedy. He repeatedly suffered setbacks to his equanimity at different points in time. Though his capacity to absorb sudden shocks helped him overcome them all, these events merged, by gradual accretion over the decades, into a singular, tragic dimension of his legend towards the end of his life. This is an aspect of Mr Jinnah’s life that contrasts starkly with the public acclaim he is usually associated with and one that has not been explored enough.

13 months, not 13 years

Possibly the greatest tragedy suffered by Mr Jinnah was the extremely short period he got to build on his greatest achievement: Pakistan. After Independence, Mr Jinnah only had 13 months to savour victory, or a little over one year. That, too, in severely impaired health and at an incredibly tumultuous time.

In comparison, the founding fathers of an assortment of countries across the world were able to continue their nation-building exercises for many years after their countries emerged as independent nation-states. Though Mohandas Gandhi was assassinated within seven months of India’s independence and he never held public office, Jawaharlal Nehru served as the first prime minister of India for a good 17 years, ensuring continuity and stability post-independence. Shaikh Mujibur Rahman retained his office for over three and a half years before his assassination in August 1975. D.S. Senanayake in Sri Lanka steered his island nation as its first prime minister from 1947 to 1952. Decades earlier, Vladimir Lenin led the Russian Revolution and established and ruled the giant USSR for seven years, from 1917 to 1924. About a century and a quarter earlier, George Washington pioneered America’s history for 23 years, from 1776 to 1799.

In Latin America, the phenomenal Simon Bolivar, regarded as the founder of six independent states — Venezuela (his birthplace), Colombia (where he passed away), Ecuador, Bolivia, Peru and Panama — lived on for about 19 years after the formation of Venezuela in 1811. In Africa, Jomo Kenyatta, the first president of Kenya, held office for about 14 years from 1964 to 1978. Further north, in Egypt, Gamal Nasser became president in 1956, just four years after its independence, and continued as president for 14 years till his demise in 1970.

In Eurasia, Turkey was transformed from “the sick man of Europe” into a dynamic new force under Mustafa Ataturk’s leadership from 1923 to 1938. In Europe, West Germany gained from the leadership of Chancellor Konrad Adenauer for 14 years, from 1949 to 1963. Shaikh Zayed guided the UAE for 33 years from 1971 to 2004. Almost for the same length of time, Lee Kuan Yew changed a micro-state into a global force, leading Singapore for 31 years between 1959 and 1990.

Next door, even though for less than half that tenure, Tunku Abdur Rahman, Malaysia’s first prime minister from 1957 to 1970, set his country in a fine, steady direction. As Indonesia’s first president, Sukarno welded 15,000 islands together over 22 years from 1945 to 1967. In China, Mao Tse Tung overcame upturns and upheavals for 27 years from 1949 to 1976.

The many setbacks the Quaid-i-Azam faced over the course of his life merged, by gradual accretion over the decades, into a singular, tragic dimension of his legend that does not seem to be discussed as much.

How would any one of the above nations have fared if these illustrious figures had been given only 13 months? As to what M.A. Jinnah achieved even before his untimely demise, let the concluding paragraph of this reflection express the truth. For now, let us go back to his early years of personal struggle.

Arranged marriage, new freedoms

Married to Emi Bai at only 16 years of age in 1893, as a precondition for his passage to London — where he was to learn about finance and accounting before returning to help grow his father’s business — the young M.A. Jinnah must surely have departed with more than a twinge of regret. He was to leave his bride for what would be a prolonged, three-year absence without getting to know her even cursorily.

Once in the capital of the British Empire, the law and the stage attracted him far more than the ledger, and even after he was called to the bar at Lincoln’s Inn, it seems that theatre remained his actual passion. He even signed a contract with a company to serve as an actor. Shakespeare, and Romeo in particular, reportedly fascinated him. But when his father received a letter informing him of his son’s radical new plans, a quick, angry remonstration compelled a reversal. It was fortuitous that the theatre company was understanding and relieved him of the agreement he had signed requiring a three-month notice period.

Surely, this triple turn-around pricked him with a sharp pain: from dull but profit-promising accounts to a fascination for make-believe, for the theatre — and then to the obfuscations of legalese. The only consolation may have been the scope for dramatic, captivating interludes in court arguments.

Two more blows followed: messages about the loss of both his doting mother and his wife within weeks of each other. One, a woman who loved him so dearly; the other, a young woman he knew little, but one he must have looked forward to knowing, and perhaps even to love?

So bleak was the news from Karachi that M.A. Jinnah seems to have decided to turn away from the city of his birth. His self-imposed exile would last for at least the next four decades. The ability to suffer without visible upset must have matured in him at this relatively early stage. The acquisition of Saville Row suits as standard wear and the cultivation of a deliberate, unruffled calm to imitate that quintessentially English trait of impassivity must have helped conceal, but not entirely delete the distress or abjure it from memory.

Before leaving London in 1896, he opened a bank account in Bombay and, soon after arrival there, began a new, uncertain legal practice with a scarce clientele. The struggle continued until his almost chance appointment to a junior magistracy. This opportunity enabled him to learn how to justly render a solemn public responsibility. It also gradually led to success in the legal sphere as a private practitioner.

Swift exposure to political heat

From active membership of the Home Rule League to his resignation and a parting of ways with its avid leader, Annie Besant, to the awkward position of opposing the Khilafat Movement — which had curiously united both the fervently Muslim Mohammad Ali brothers and the proudly Hindu Mohandas Gandhi, under the unrealistic aim of sustaining a decaying Muslim Ottoman Caliphate, theoretically for the entire Islamic Ummah — these contrary positions taken and arduously advocated could only have stirred inner discomfort and distraction.

The unsettling recurrence of disagreements with Gandhi in particular, a foreboding that the negative — not the positive — facets of religion were being introduced into political discourse via the call for a civil disobedience movement (which ultimately proved to be a failure, as he correctly foresaw), aggravated Mr Jinnah’s apprehensions. Participation in the end-1920 session of the Congress in Nagpur, where about 14,000-plus delegates loudly booed him for his refusal to address Gandhi as “Mahatma”, surely cut him to the bone, a wound that the passage of time alone could not heal.

Ten years of tumult, 1918-1928

From the public to the personal realm, both euphoria and angst were to follow — initially in consecutive sequence, and then simultaneously.

Mr Jinnah had fallen head over heels for a girl seen as ‘the most beautiful’ in most people’s eyes, including his own. Ruttie Petit, a Zoroastrian, was almost half his age, and he had to wait for her to turn eighteen before being able to wed her. Their union inspired Ruttie to break with her loving father and mother, her sacred religion, her close community and her fond friends. The ten-year span of Mr Jinnah’s married life with Ruttie featured, at one extreme, the fearless, thrill-filled breaking of taboos, and at the other, only relatively brief times actually shared with her after long weeks of separation and forlorn yearning.

Though Mr Jinnah was engaged in a worthy public cause — pursuing self-rule, autonomy, and eventual freedom from colonial reign, while also continuing his lucrative legal practice — could his inability to spend more time with her, to reciprocate the abundant adoration she bestowed on him, have turned into guilt which he preferred to ignore, or set aside too often? There was also the knowledge that it was she who had made enormous, excruciating sacrifices for him, whereas he barely had to make any sacrifice for her. This made it a grossly unequal, unfair pairing. Her growing dependence on pills, drugs and spiritual searches to numb her nerves dragged her down into the abyss — even as he strove to reach new summits of public support. Because he maintained the visage of imperturbability and never wrote or spoke candidly about their relationship, are the true answers forever lost?

The torment must have gone deep — except, and alas, too late, when he helped place Ruttie in her last resting place in February 1929. This was certainly a burden of profound remorse he bore in silence for the next twenty years of his own life. Ruttie’s loss created a vacuum that was never again to be filled by another woman — an abiding, fearsome emptiness which even the adoring companionship of his sister, Fatima, up to the very end, could never fulfil.

Conjoined almost cruelly with the grievous shock of Ruttie’s demise was the irony that eventually came years later: his refusal to accept the decision of their only child, Dina, to marry a Zoroastrian — though this is exactly what he himself had done — only to belatedly realise that it may be easier to be a father to a whole nation than to be one to his own daughter and only child.

A new horizon

After the fruitless outcomes of the Round Table conferences in London, followed by his self-exile to that same city in the early/mid-1930s, he was obliged to make a fateful choice by 1937. He had to choose between continued pursuit of a singular new entity in South Asia that could merge British-ruled Hindu-majority and Muslim-majority provinces with 565 princely states, or adopt a path which may eventually lead to a separate, sovereign, Muslim-majority homeland.

In finally accepting in his own mind that all his earnest wishes to preserve Muslim-Hindu unity had become delusional in the face of the Congress Party’s intransigence on the recognition of the reality of Muslims embodying a distinct national status and not just a religious minority, M.A. Jinnah must have experienced intense internal turmoil. He was forced to banish once and for all the notion of peaceful co-existence of two starkly different communities, which nevertheless practised mutual respect for respective rights and responsibilities — a notion that he had propagated vigorously for over thirty years.

The well-considered transition of personal attire in 1937 at the Lucknow session of the Muslim League was quite likely to have been more than a change of garments alone. To bring his aloof, western-looking persona closer to the ideal public visage of indigenous Muslim wear, he changed his wardrobe of elegant, tailored English-style suits and bow-ties to add equally elegant, but thoroughly eastern Muslim sherwanis/achkans and shalwars — to be topped off with a cap that came to be called after his own name.

An unresolved dilemma

In the next ten years, as he steered the so-far elitist Muslim League towards a more grass-roots, proletarian ethos with more penetrative organisation at the district levels — a move which would culminate in the sweeping electoral victories of the 1946 elections — Mr Jinnah began to confront the bedevilling question of how the creation of Pakistan in Muslim-majority provinces would address the future security of fellow Muslim religionists in Hindu-majority provinces and princely states.

The thesis was advanced that non-Muslims in the Pakistan-bound provinces would serve as counterweights and guarantees of security for Muslims in Hindu-majority areas. But, as communal riots and violence even before mid-August 1947 began to show, the thesis first began to be questioned and then was outright rejected. The extent of Mr Jinnah’s disquiet, even beyond what he publicly stated, can be well-imagined — and the worst was yet to come.

Vitriol and violence

Despite being accustomed to declaring a viewpoint that went against populist narratives being pushed by others, the Quaid could not possibly have taken the derogatory, almost abusive label of being termed “Kaafir-e-Azam” without feeling anguish. The pain must have been made all the sharper by it being bandied by fellow Muslims who opposed the creation of Pakistan. Though he handled with aplomb and courage the fortunately unsuccessful attempt on his life in Bombay in 1943 by a knife-wielding Muslim assassin from the Khaksar Tehreek, it must have seriously troubled him to glimpse the hatred his political position could arouse.

With ecstasy, agony

With his reluctant acceptance of the shoddily prepared, irrationally hasty plans imposed by Viceroy Mountbatten who, on June 3, 1947, gave the absurdly short notice of ten weeks for the establishment of two new states, targeting independence by mid-August 1947, any qualms the Quaid had were concealed under a cloak of calm essential for the sole supreme leader. Meanwhile, the bloody carnage accompanying panicked transfers of population had already commenced.

The viceroy’s refusal to accept his own Supreme Commander Auchinleck’s recommendation to effectively deploy British troops for security duties tested M.A. Jinnah’s patience to the nth degree, in a phase when his health was deteriorating by the day. This was a race against time.

With freedom, fatigue and fury

Eventually, so evident had the frailty of his physical aspect become that, during the latter part of a reception hosted at the Governor-General’s residence in Karachi on the evening of August 14, 1947, the Quaid asked his ADC to quietly convey to the viceroy that His Excellency should depart from the event at the earliest. Mountbatten appeared to be enjoying himself so much that he was testing his host’s patience and, more importantly, his health. Mountbatten promptly took his leave and later emplaned for New Delhi to preside over India’s birth as a state the next day.

The photograph of the Quaid with Fatima Jinnah that evening reveals a disturbingly emaciated figure who was quietly bearing the agony of his dwindling energy while taking receipt of reports of rapidly increasing violence in Punjab.

After the glory of the first few days of Independence came the sour, stringent poison of the Radcliffe Award, almost perversely delayed by Mountbatten, ostensibly to prevent controversy and strife before mid-August. The outrageous allotment of the Ferozepur headworks to India, the blatant disregard of the Muslim majority in Gurdaspur — to enable Indian access by land to Srinagar — obviously aggravated the Quaid’s condition, made all the more enervating because all parties had agreed in June to accept the Boundary Award without challenge, to prevent the eruption of new conflicts post-Independence.

The terrible trio

Between August 14, 1947, and September 11, 1948, in almost simultaneous lock-step, unfolded upon his being the terrible trio of tragedies that defined the final thirteen months of his life.

First: the frenetic proliferation of pressures — excesses of bloodshed; shortage of shelter for millions of refugees; the sadistic refusal of India to remit Pakistan’s due shares of funds, equipment and armaments already agreed upon; the fraud of the Kashmiri maharajah’s accession to India and the eruption of armed conflict in the Valley. Second: the inability of his colleagues in the cabinet and in the Muslim League, notwithstanding their sincerity and devotion, to provide the extraordinary efficiency, imagination and innovation needed in unprecedented conditions. Third: his steady, unrelenting loss of stamina and energy even as he set aside acute stress to travel to Peshawar, Dhaka, Lahore, and also attend important events in Quetta and Karachi.

At 50 cigarettes a day for decades, M.A. Jinnah’s lungs and body were close to a final collapse. Neither Ziarat nor Quetta nor ministrations by the medical team led by Colonel Illahi Buksh could reverse or halt the rapid decline in his health in early September 1948. Despite his instructions not to inform the prime minister or the cabinet about his final journey to Karachi on the afternoon of September 11, it is inexplicable as to why and how the air travel in a special plane by the head of state in a critical health condition could be kept a secret. The mystery is compounded by Col Buksh’s son’s claim that sections of his father’s memoirs dealing with the founder’s last days were removed by the government before their publication was permitted. Will we ever know?

Mr Jinnah was greeted at the Mauripur airfield by only his military secretary, an ambulance and a Cadillac car. The governor-general then had to bear intense discomfort, the heat and flies when his ambulance broke down after travelling only four miles. It took almost an hour to fetch another ambulance, as the car could not carry the stretcher he was resting on.

And thus were spent the last few hours of one of the greatest men history has produced: helpless and without aid in the country he had created.

Though alive for only 13 months after he crafted the miracle of Pakistan, the Quaid surpassed many of those who lived long after their respective countries gained their independence. The opening four sentences of Stanley Wolpert’s biography, Jinnah of Pakistan, best express the magnificence of his work:

“Few individuals significantly alter the course of history. Fewer still modify the map of the world. Hardly anyone can be credited with creating a nation-state. Mohammad Ali Jinnah did all three.”

The writer is an author and a former senator and federal minister. He can be reached at javedjabbar.2@gmail.com

The grandeur of Mughal rule had waned by the 18th century. Aurangzeb’s successors, from Bahadur Shah I to Muhammad Shah, had proven weak and vulnerable; their reigns characterised by poor governance, internal disputes, a lethargic and unorganised army, and an inability to effectively maintain law and order. The fragmentation of the Mughal empire provided an opportunity for the British to fill the power vacuum, which they did by establishing their hold over India following the Battle of Plassey on June 23, 1757.

The Raj was finally able to entrench its dominance in the aftermath of the massive bloodshed during the ill-fated War of Independence of 1857, which had been infused with a still inchoate sense of Indian nationalism. After the war was over, the British blamed the Muslims for the upheaval and set about unleashing their fury on the community. It was Sir Syed Ahmed Khan who, through his movement for a Muslim renaissance, sought to alter British perceptions about Muslims while urging his co-religionists to seek modern scientific education. When the Indian National Congress (INC) was formed in 1885 to provide a united forum for the people of British India, Sir Syed advised Muslims to distance themselves from the Congress’s politics.

The Muslims would later form their own political party, the All-India Muslim League, which was the first practical step towards securing themselves a separate political identity, as envisioned in Sir Syed’s Two Nation Theory. Quaid-i-Azam Muhammad Ali Jinnah stepped up to lead this endeavour after joining the Muslim League in 1913 at the invitation of Wazir Hassan. Jinnah’s transformational leadership style and the Muslim citizenry’s faith in his persistent struggle, organised and disciplined way of leadership, greatly contributed to keeping the movement intact. The following are some of the most iconic characteristics of Jinnah’s charismatic leadership, which captured the imagination of Muslims across British India.

Individuality

Jinnah’s single-track mind, selflessness and extroversion enabled him to make firm decisions, take an inflexible stand on principles, and lead from the front. He had a dominant personality and a talent for arguing convincingly while debating political issues. His conscientiousness and persistence earned him the trust of his followers, who were greatly influenced by his fairness, integrity, intellectual brilliance and epistemic curiosity, as well as emotional stability in dealing with difficult situations. One of the unique attributes of Jinnah’s leadership was his sound judgment, which enabled him to differentiate between wrong and right and do the right thing by sensing what was realistic and likely to work.

Jinnah’s transformational leadership style and the Muslim citizenry’s faith in his persistent struggle, organisation and disciplined way of leadership greatly contributed to keeping the Pakistan Movement intact.

Seeking out the truth and generating new ideas contributed to his agility in navigating political complexities. His sober look, perceptive nature and dynamic persona greatly contributed to the success of his legal and political journey. Jinnah’s self-confidence and pride in what he did was incredible. His early career as a pleader reflected a rare ability to grasp the facts of law quickly. So was the case with his political career, where he grasped the legal, geographical, and historical facts of the case for Pakistan like few others could. His integrity in pleading and leading was never questioned by his opponents throughout his legal and constitutional battles. Stanely Wolpert rightly believed that Jinnah’s life was governed by his love of justice, fairness, and the law.

Moreover, Quaid-i-Azam Muhammad Ali Jinnah was a great strategic thinker with an acute intellect who was able to forecast how events were likely to unfold. He judged the changing dynamics of politics accurately by weighing up all possible choices and finding a line of argument that would refute the unsound propositions of the British rulers as well as Congress leaders.

Courage is both the moral and practical ability of leaders to step forward through fear. Quaid-i-Azam Muhamad Ali Jinnah had the courage to speak up and accept responsibility for his actions. He took risks, broke barriers, reduced boundaries, believed in a higher purpose, and initiated change. In the view of Hector Bolitho, Jinnah remained what he had always been—logical, obstinate and honest, and never gave up his virtues, which included parsimony, prudence and ambition, despite cynical and violent opposition from political extremists. His political genius, bravery, temperament, overwhelming determination and lasting charm shaped his entire political leadership.

Initiative

Jinnah took several initiatives which shaped the course of South Asian history. In 1910, he was elected to the Imperial Legislative Council, where he started his parliamentary career. He began to demonstrate a commitment to the Muslim cause by introducing a legislative proposal aimed at securing the recognition and protection of waqf properties, which occupied great significance for Muslims. The bill, known as the Waqf Validating Bill, was passed by the British in 1913. It contributed significantly to the protection of Muslim properties used for religious and charitable institutions. Later, he also sought the protection and promotion of these institutions under the 12th point of his 14-point charter of demands.

During his affiliation with Congress, he worked tirelessly to bring Muslims and Hindus together. Through another initiative, the Lucknow Pact of 1916, Quaid-i-Azam Muhammad Ali Jinnah was able to secure distinct political representation for Muslims. The pact was the first formal agreement between the INC and AIML, and it only became possible because of his active coordination. It was a crucial moment in the sense that Congress, for the first time, acknowledged the Muslim League as the representative of the Indian Muslims and accepted separate electorates, which was important for securing the representation of Muslims in all legislative bodies, protection of their rights, and preservation of their distinct political identity.

Hindu-Muslim unity was inimical to the British policy of divide and rule, and it increased the worries and fears of the Raj during the critical years of World War I. The British had already promised to deliver progressive self-rule to the sub-continent at the end of the war, but, instead of keeping their pledge, diverted the Indians’ attention by imposing the oppressive Rowlatt Act. Under the Act, the rulership took measures including arrests without warrants, detention without bail and house arrests of suspects without warning. The Act also put restrictions on the movement of people, their political gatherings and processions. The sacrifices of Hindu and Muslim soldiers who fought for the British were largely ignored, and this caused great unrest among these communities. Disheartened Indians began to share a common goal: liberating India from colonial rule. However, the strategies of assorted political groups were far from mutual. Quaid-i-Azam Muhammad Ali Jinnah sagaciously knew that the Act would be disastrous for liberty and freedom, and he resigned from the Imperial Legislative Council. The British rulers’ condescending attitude resulted in a spectacular failure to understand the harsh realities and sentiments of the people, which reached a tragic climax in the Amritsar Massacre in April 1919, marked as one of the blackest events in the history of the British Empire.

Insight

After 1919, the British were forced to devolve some authority. They did so by trying to balance the interests of various political groups and allowing communal electorates. In order to perpetuate imperial interests, the state attempted to reduce anti-British resistance and assuage public opinion through the Montague-Chelmsford reforms, which went a step further than the 1909 reforms in granting the principle of dyarchy and engaged non-official Indians in dealing with some subjects at the provincial level. The reforms also suggested that three out of six advisors to the viceroy be Indians, and there ought to be a bicameral legislature. However, Congress considered these reforms inadequate, unsatisfactory, and disappointing. A political uprising continued for the next eight years. In 1927, the Simon Commission was formed to enquire into the workings of the Government of India Act of 1919. The commission was strongly opposed by both the INC and AIML, and its report was rejected even before it was published in 1930.

Instead, Motilal Nehru of the Congress compiled his own report and demanded dominion status for India with complete self-government. The report opposed the idea of a separate electorate and indicated that Congress was clear that India would be ruled by a Hindu-majority party. Thereafter, the temporary alliance between the INC and the Muslim League, sealed during the Khilafat Movement (1919-24) and the Non-Cooperation Movement (1920-22), came to an end. Jinnah was thoroughly disappointed by the anti-Muslim attitude of the Congress as evidenced in the Nehru Report of 1928, and considered this a parting of ways with the INC.

Jinnah, who possessed deep insight into Indian politics, became wary of Congress’s intentions and the minds of the Hindu political class and presented a counter-proposal in the form of a charter comprising 14 points. He had an eye on the political horizon and the changing circumstances of British India. The 14-point charter, circulated in 1929, guaranteed the distinct identity of Muslims in India. The points displayed faith in federalism, democracy, and parliamentary institutions, and they sought the participation of the Muslim masses in the political process by ensuring Muslim representation in all legislatures and decision-making bodies. Jinnah, through his carefully designed legal framework, challenged the prevailing power structure, protected economic empowerment, preserved social prestige and cultural heritage, and maintained the legacy of Muslim nationalism. These points cleared the political confusion around the Muslims’ separate status and heralded a significant change. His points were a legal roadmap for defending nationhood and contained a strategy to end the Muslims’ identity crisis. Nevertheless, under the pressure of the Hindu Mahasabha, the Congress did not fully endorse the points and joined the Gandhian Salt March against the British to start a civil disobedience movement.

Inspiration

The Second World War had a profound impact on the political situation in India. The British joined the war without consulting the leaders of major political parties. Nevertheless, in order to garner support from India, the British promised in August of 1940 that they would give India full dominion status after the war was over if all parties agreed to take part in framing a new constitution. The Indian National Congress rebuffed the offer and began to put pressure on the British through the Quit India Movement, which started in August 1942. The party did not publicly support the British war effort, but many Indians still contributed to British strength through supplying personnel, logistics and war materials and by volunteering activities. The Muslim League, under the leadership of Quaid-i-Azam Muhammad Ali Jinnah, adopted a clear policy and demanded a separate state for Muslims. Soon after the beginning of the war, the Muslim League passed the historic Lahore Resolution on March 23, 1940, which proved a major milestone in the history of British India. The resolution was a revolt against the prevailing mistreatment of the marginalised Muslim nation by both the British and the Hindus. It became a turning point in formalising the demand for a separate nation-state.

Jinnah, as a man of probity, became a source of trust and inspiration in this sensitive period. He inspired the Muslim masses by presenting a credible vision, and with his inventiveness, acumen, and unique leadership style. He adopted an innovative and cautious approach. Muslims were impressed with his ideas and joined the Muslim League to embark on a new journey for a separate homeland. Eventually, in March 1946, the British sent a Cabinet Mission to act in association with the viceroy and to consult major parties to secure their consent for framing a future constitution. Although the move brought back the concept of a united India, as introduced by the Cripps Mission in 1942, it indirectly also provided a way forward. Thus, despite his predicament, Jinnah accepted the move because the Cabinet Mission proposals not only mirrored the Two-Nation Theory but also provided legal grounds for the creation of Pakistan. Motivated by a deep sense of history, his political wisdom and his masterly grasp of geographic and political realities, Jinnah inspired his contemporary leaders and followers to unite to the cause.

Improvisation

Jinnah improvised the resources he needed to accomplish his goals. He began by revitalising the All-India Muslim League, as he believed that it would otherwise remain a forum for mere debate and discussion without political power and solidarity and, therefore, unable to make a breakthrough in the political arena. Jinnah decided to convert the forum into an organised and action-oriented party equipped with political power and training in electoral politics so that it could mobilise the Muslim masses under its banner. He established a Central Election Board and worked in coordination with provincial leaders. He achieved tremendous success in reorganising and popularising the Muslim League in provinces where the Congress was in power during 1937-39. K.B. Sayeed has argued that Jinnah’s success in popularising the Muslim league was due to the techniques he used to exhort various regional groups and other factions to overcome their differences. As a result, the Muslim League showed remarkable performance and won all the Muslim seats in the central assembly in the 1945-46 elections, polling 75 per cent of the total Muslim vote cast in the provincial elections.

Involvement

Jinnah’s evolution as a statesman was the result of his active involvement with the people. He kept himself engaged and dedicated his life to secure the Muslims their political, economic and social rights. K.B. Sayeed has quoted Jinnah as saying: “I found that the Musalmans were in the greatest danger. I made up my mind to come back to India, as I could not do any good from London.” This shows his personal involvement with the plight of the ordinary people. He made sacrifices in his personal life and endured many losses mainly due to his inexorable dedication to the cause of the Muslims.

Implementation

The partition of India was a remarkable event in world history. The creation of Pakistan as a new nation-state was justified based on the historical legacy and political importance of the Muslim community, which possessed a unique cultural identity. Quaid-i-Azam Muhammad Ali Jinnah shaped the nation’s destiny and played a crucial role in setting the key objectives of the Pakistan Movement, devising strategies to achieve these within a short span of time. S.M. Burke has argued that Jinnah’s triumphs had the appearance of a one-man show throughout his struggle.

The newly formed nation faced daunting challenges of immense magnitude. These included the establishment of political and economic institutions, the creation of new legal and administrative structures, the management of the refugee crisis, and the protection of its territory against a hostile neighbour which never accepted the reality of Pakistan. These challenges were handled by the founding father of the country with great courage, resilience, wisdom, political prowess, and art. Had our political leaders absorbed the Quaid’s qualities, there would not have been a concomitant crisis of leadership, causing political malaise and an inability to implement the Quaid’s vision in letter and spirit to this day.

The author is a professor and director of the Pakistan Study Centre at the University of Sindh, Jamshoro.

In August this year, the winds of change blew away Sheikh Hasina’s regime in Bangladesh (former East Pakistan). A student-led movement demolished a quasi-tyrannical state apparatus that was becoming dangerous for the people of that country. With the regime change, there were also many departures from previous norms. Bangladesh began looking towards Pakistan with the hope of reviving ties in various walks of life. Some headways were made instantly. The 76th death anniversary of M.A. Jinnah was commemorated in Dhaka at the National Press Club. Urdu songs and poetry were presented on the occasion. Many speakers dilated on Jinnah and the ideas that he stood for. They lauded his struggle for the Muslim polity of the Indian sub-continent. Many were of the view that without his able leadership, Pakistan may not have become a reality. And without Pakistan, Bangladesh may not have come into being!

While this air of cordiality is a welcome sign for the people and the state of Pakistan, it would be apposite to review the role of Bengal in the Pakistan Movement, as well as Jinnah’s viewpoints about the various attributes of Bengal during and after the creation of Pakistan. Bengal showed signs of political awakening from the early 20th century. It was Nawab Salimullah Khan of Dhaka and his illustrious comrades who founded the All-India Muslim League (AIML) in December 1906. It became the most important platform for the Muslims of the subcontinent. Jinnah joined the AIML in 1913 and eventually became its president in 1916.

Bengali nationalism was not an accidental construct. Bengali society had continued evolving intellectually during the British Raj. It benefited from the thoughts, ideas and discourse of intellectuals like Rabindranath Tagore, Raja Ram Mohan Roy, Kazi Nasrul Islam, Mir Musharraf Husain and more. The transformation seen in this region during the British Raj is also known as the Bengal Renaissance. The 1905 partition of Bengal by the British greatly agitated the Bengali people, especially their youth. Nationalist songs by Tagore, like ‘Amar Shonar Bangla’ (My Golden Bengal) emerged during this time. The partition itself was undone a few years later.

During the entire freedom movement in the Indian subcontinent, the Bengali people and their leadership maintained an exclusive identity — often taking strong positions. Jinnah was quite aware of the Bengali leadership’s attributes and responded to political situations accordingly. One such moment came when the stakeholders — the British administration and Indian National Congress — proposed to partition Bengal, Assam and Punjab under the Partition Plan. Jinnah was vehemently against the partition of Bengal and Punjab during the creation of the states of India and Pakistan. Nonetheless, the partitions were eventually realised. Calcutta (now Kolkata) became the capital of Indian West Bengal. Most of the developed areas and urban locations were included in West Bengal. The bulk of East Bengal territory was pastoral, which saw frequent natural disasters such as floods, cyclones and typhoons. Dacca (now Dhaka) and Chittagong were the prominent towns. There was a general dearth of trained administrative and police officers as well as other cadres of administration. Eventually, these ranks were filled with officers who came from West Pakistan. The attitude and conduct of many of these officers were reported to be arrogant, which did not go down well with the local population. Jinnah was aware of these difficulties and tried to address them as best as he could during his extremely short tenure as the governor-general of the new dominion.

Jinnah was quite aware of the Bengali leadership’s unique strengths and attributes; he responded to political situations accordingly.

However, there were also some areas where Jinnah’s decisions were criticised. Foremost in this regard was the language issue. It should be noted that Bangla was more than a language to the people of East Pakistan: it was a binding force for this populous and dense region. It was also the vehicle for the reform and renaissance of thought that was led by Bengali intellectuals for more than a century. Peasants, farmers, fishermen, boat people and the like — the majority of whom were illiterate — possessed a strong connection to Bangla literature, poetry, music, dances, fables and folklore. Storytelling, theatre, music recitals and traditional dance performances were common ingredients of everyday life in cities, towns and villages. Sharing of new political ideas, engagement with local and national leaders, and general communication all took place in the Bangla language.

While the Bengali people cherished the idea and state of Pakistan, they could not let go of their strong association with their culture, traditions and Bengali value system. Against this backdrop, Khwaja Nazimuddin, the premier of Bengal, pushed the policy of enforcing Urdu as the national language. To obtain support for his stance, Nazimuddin invited Jinnah to visit East Pakistan. Jinnah arrived on March 19, 1948 and was well received. However, during a public meeting in Dhaka on March 21, Jinnah spoke emphatically about enforcing Urdu as the national language. His move was met with voices of dissent. According to many scholars, this move created a wedge between the two peoples of East and West Pakistan, which widened with the passage of time.

Huseyn Shaheed Suhrawardy was perhaps one of the most popular Bengali leaders when Pakistan came into being. Suhrawardy was instrumental in the AIML victory in the 1946 elections, which paved the way for Pakistan. Like Jinnah, he was a strong proponent of keeping Bengal united. When the option failed, the United Independent Bengal scheme was professed by several Bengali leaders, including Suhrawardy. These leaders discussed the option with both Mahatma Gandhi and Jinnah. According to accounts, both the leaders gave careful thought to it. However, the INC leadership later opposed the idea, and the partition of Bengal was thus carried out. Jinnah and all others had to accept the new reality under the given circumstances, but some differences emerged between Jinnah and Suhrawardy. Thereafter, several leaders who were aligned with Suhrawardy and his ideas grew aloof from Jinnah and the AIML. After partition, the overall popularity of the AIML began to drop in East Pakistan. This happened because the immediate challenges faced by the people after independence were not effectively addressed by the AIML leadership. Jinnah’s critics regret that perhaps the language issue was a vital matter that made ordinary people drift away from the AIML and Bengali nationalism became stronger in the times to come.

On the political front, Jinnah assigned crucial importance to political leaders and senior members of the AIML from Bengal. When Jinnah became the president of the constituent assembly in August 1947, Maulvi Tamizuddin Khan — a prominent Bengali lawyer and politician — was appointed his deputy.

Jinnah aptly defined the contours of Pakistan in his famous speech on August 11, 1947. The contents of the speech clearly indicate that Jinnah desired Pakistan to become modern, progressive, enlightened, inclusive and an open country for all who existed in it. Jinnah took many steps to show the world the same. Among these was the appointment of Jogendra Nath Mandal, a scheduled caste leader from Bengal, to become a minister in Pakistan’s first cabinet. It is saddening to recall that the situation changed after Jinnah’s death. Hindus in East Pakistan, though socially more integrated, faced many challenges and predicaments at the hands of the majority. Many prominent leaders, including Mandal, had opted to live in Pakistan. After Jinnah’s demise, Mandal was appalled to see the unfriendly conduct of the administration and their henchmen towards the minorities. He resigned his post. Several subsequent blows to Jinnah’s vision for Pakistan eventually led East Pakistan to secede in 1971.

It is unfortunate that, after the creation of Bangladesh, relations between the two countries remained cold. The present times, however, offer a new opportunity to put the past behind us and reconstruct cordial and brotherly relations with Bangladesh. Perhaps this will be one move which will bring us closer to the ideals that Jinnah stood for.

The writer is an academic and researcher based in Karachi.

History is commonly devoid of the verity and probity that may best characterise a man who is surprisingly as relevant today as he was over 100 years ago. The world is not short of examples of influential figures retaining lasting historical significance for the people of their nations. However, one fumbles for words to honestly describe someone who is so excessively quoted, often cited, and frequently remembered by the literati and intelligentsia of even rival states in both favourable and unfavourable terms.

In a similar vein, words beg for more equivalent alternatives both from native and foreign languages to portray someone who was buried in a marbled mausoleum over seven decades before but remains a central point of reference even in the contemporary nationalist discourse of the nation next door. Lurking behind a secular façade, they ruthlessly engineer false narratives by sponsoring a cabal of contrary historians, who, out of inner resentment and ingrained malice, tamper with historical records to the extent of rampant vituperation and state-funded vilification of those who dared to hold a different view.

Even though the yearly observance of December 25 as the birthday of Quaid-i-Azam Muhammad Ali Jinnah, the founder of Pakistan, has been reduced to just another public holiday or state ritual, the relevance it holds for present-day Pakistan, along with its neighbour, is as significant as it was before the country was created as an independent Muslim state in the 1940s.

When discussing Quaid-i-Azam Muhammad Ali Jinnah, one often wonders about his transformation from an ardent Indian nationalist and a fervent supporter of Hindu-Muslim unity to a unanimously endorsed ‘Quaid-i-Azam’, or Great Leader — the flag-bearer of a separate and sovereign state for Muslims to be carved out of Hindu-majority British India.

No doubt, the creation of Pakistan as an independent Muslim state was not an ordinary achievement, nor was the emergence of Jinnah as the face of the All-India Muslim League, the sole representative of Muslim rights and interests in India. Jinnah is often erroneously compared with the leaders of his era, namely Mahatma Gandhi and Jawaharlal Nehru, but neither of them altered the course of history, changed any geography or established a new nation-state out of thin air. Jinnah, as famously eulogised by Stanley Alber Wolpert, did all three.

When viewed through the prism of history, Quaid-i-Azam Muhammad Ali Jinnah stands far taller than other political leaders of his era.

Odd man out

It is always worth mentioning that, for the Muslim majority of united India, Jinnah was seemingly the odd man out and was initially ridiculed, fiercely taunted, and often looked at with suspicion by the crème de la crème of Muslim literati because of his beardless looks, Western-inspired outfits, and modish appearance untypical of a ‘standard Muslim’ of that era. He was neither passed out from a madrassa nor had any religious background. To cap it all off, he could not read Urdu, let alone Arabic or Persian, the major languages spoken by the Muslims of India.

However, even for contemporary historians, what is more surprising is the steady rise of Jinnah as the leading Muslim voice in the subcontinent. A few years before the creation of Pakistan, the intent of the entire leadership of the All-India Muslim League, not excluding Muhammad Ali Jinnah, was vociferously questioned by the Muslim clergy, who challenged the Muslim electorate if they could ever find a ‘prayer mat’ in the houses of their Muslim League leaders. In marked contrast, a significant chunk of the Muslim clergy in India decided to move to Pakistan after its creation, and they referred to the nascent country as the ‘Castle of Islam’ even though those who led the Pakistan Movement were initially seen as British agents who had nothing to do with religion.

Despite the presence of such towering religious scholars as Maulana Abul Kalam Azad, Abul Hassan Ali Nadwi, Hussain Ahmed Madani, Maulvi Ashraf Ali Thanwi, Allama Shabbir Ahmad Usmani, and many others, Jinnah’s steady emergence as the sole spokesman of Indian Muslims was not a coincidence. From a historical perspective, his journey from Jinnah Poonja to Quaid-i-Azam was the destined outcome of a historical process that led to his phenomenal rise as the voice of India’s largest yet cornered minority, which, since ages, had been suffering from the lack of strong political leadership to safeguard its cultural, political and socio-economic interests in a religiously heterogeneous country.

A leader for the Muslims

The watershed moment came when the Indian Revolt of 1857 took place, and soon after that, British forces started targeting India’s Muslim minority in general and ulema in particular, mainly because of their active role in challenging colonial rule tooth and nail and fuelling Anglophobia through the pulpit. Post-1857, a large number of ulema, now mockingly referred to as maulvis and mullahs, were ruthlessly executed by canon, and their unsung sacrifices sowed the seeds of independence, laying the foundation of a separate country for Muslims 90 years before its actual creation and a couple of decades before Jinnah was born. Still, their divided and out-of-place interpretation of the existential crises facing the Muslims of the subcontinent left an enormous political void, which was later filled by Jinnah and his followers.

Most importantly, the then representatives of the Muslim clergy, along with their opinion leadership, could not shrug off the romanticism of Hindu-Muslim unity in pursuit of a fancied nationhood in a united India and shied away from the mainstream political process owing to misinformation and various conspiracy beliefs hatched by those opposing Sir Syed Ahmed Khan and his Aligarh Movement. Intrinsically divided on the basis of seminary ideologies, sectarian beliefs, and political understandings, the Muslim religious leadership of the late 19th century could not put its finger on the pulse of the time.

Later, those who opposed Jinnah and his pursuit of a separate Muslim homeland thought they were doing so in the name of Islam, as they perceived the Pakistan Movement merely as a ploy to divide the Muslims of the Indian subcontinent and reduce their strength vis-à-vis an unassailable Hindu majority. Interestingly, those who supported Jinnah and fully endorsed his demand for a separate country did so also in the name of Islam, as the idea of a new model Muslim state on the map of the world was akin to a Muslim uprising which would also strengthen the ummah as a whole, help the other occupied states rid themselves of colonial powers, and be a model welfare state to be emulated by the rest of the Muslim world.

Much to the dismay of liberal and secular intellectuals, Islam was the dominant factor throughout the Pakistan Movement, as evidenced by the flag adopted by the All-India Muslim League, a flurry of slogans raised during the movement, the literature created by leading writers and poets, and speeches delivered on various occasions by none other than Quaid himself. The Muslims of the subcontinent, under the leadership of Quaid-i-Azam, were driven mainly in the name of Islam since, other than Islam, no compelling reason or power could have steered over five million Muslims to leave their centuries-old ancestral homes, lands, and possessions behind and go through the throes of a blood-ridden migration to settle in a nascent country where everything had to be started from scratch.

It was all out of a sense of profound brotherhood and religious fervour that the real struggle for a separate Muslim state, to be made in Sindh, Punjab, Balochistan, and North-West Frontier Province (NWFP), was waged by the Muslims of Uttar Pradesh, Bihar, and Central Provinces of India. Those who want to eliminate Islam from Pakistan’s independence movement history need to first eliminate Muhammad Ali Jinnah from it, as his miraculous rise from Jinnah to Quaid-i-Azam would not have been possible had he not departed from the illusory idea of a united India to one of absolute Muslim independence both from British colonial rule and the emerging Hindu hegemony in one go.

A man for the times

At a historical juncture when institutional democracy was fast replacing coercive means of governance worldwide, the idea of a separate nation for Muslims could have only been championed by a rational voice like Jinnah. The time needed a consummate statesman, a seasoned negotiator, and a firm believer in a peaceful and democratic struggle who could rise to the occasion to defend Muslim independence and address their concerns on a larger horizon, that too, in a language and mannerism that could be well understood and appreciated by the Empire.

More than an advocate of militant struggle or a firebrand rabble-rouser pitting the vulnerable Muslim minority against the colonial Goliath, the political dimension of the Pakistan Movement required an astute lawyer who had never lost a case in his career and could best defend the case of Indian Muslims, enumerated in millions. That was Jinnah’s commitment, which helped him self-award himself the case of his life, which he won by establishing an independent nation-state for Indian Muslims. For an accomplished barrister like Jinnah, the Pakistan Movement was not about freeing an innocent individual from an erroneous court conviction and unfair persecution; it was about saving the country’s largest minority from impending disaster in the form of British colonialism and Hindu hegemony after the exit of British forces.

When viewed through the prism of history, Jinnah stands taller than other political leaders of his era. In a political career spanning over four decades, Quaid-i-Azam stayed away from the politics of agitation and intimidation — uncommon characteristics in today’s political milieu. Although the top leadership of the Indian National Congress in general, and Mohandas Karamchand Gandhi in particular, promoted in their rhetoric the principle of satyagraha, or non-violent resistance, to British colonial rule, it was Muhammad Ali Jinnah who always steered clear of populism and demagoguery and never stirred popular discontent or exploited collective frustration to advance his political agenda. He was not known for staging a long march or sit-in for political point scoring or calling for a civil disobedience movement at the expense of innocent people’s lives, widespread anarchy, and a heavily compromised law and order. Similarly, his dictionary had no such words as political blackmailing, non-cooperation drive, protest strike, work stoppage, and boycotts of British manufacturers and institutions.

Thus, the Quaid’s political modus operandi marked a radical shift in the subcontinent by winning mass support from all quarters of Muslim intelligentsia and social strata through non-violent rallying instead of inciting public angst.

Standing tall

Since the creation and breakup of Pakistan, the entire state machinery of India has been moving heaven and earth to depict Jinnah in a negative light for his role in making an independent Muslim state carved out of India. However, his foresight and prudence, along with their relevance to the contemporary subcontinent, keep emerging as acceptance of the inevitable for the people of both India and Bangladesh.

Quaid-i-Azam Muhammad Ali Jinnah, on the one hand, has stood firm with his entire ideology as the nation’s founder since the creation of Pakistan 77 years ago. The people of Bangladesh, on the other hand, have not only demolished the statutes of their purported founding fathers after the country’s creation 51 years ago, but also observed this September the death anniversary of Mohammad Ali Jinnah as the bona fide founder of both Pakistan and its erstwhile eastern wing, realising the fact that “Pakistan would not have been created without him, and without Pakistan, Bangladesh too would not exist.”

“If Bangladesh had not been part of Pakistan in 1947, we would have been in the same position as Kashmir today, with the Indian junta holding weapons to our necks. Bangladesh gained independence because of Pakistan, which Jinnah helped create,” said one of the speakers on the 76th death anniversary of Muhammad Ali Jinnah, which was commemorated at the National Press Club in Dhaka, Bangladesh, in September this year.

In 2022, in New Delhi, India’s capital, the farmers of the Indian Punjab were seen hoisting the placard, “Jinnah! You Were Right.” If Jinnah had emerged as the key proponent of the Two-Nation Theory a hundred years before, the current plight of religious minorities, including Muslims, in India alludes to the more advanced version of the theory, describing its evolution from Hindus vs Muslims to Hindus vs non-Hindus, thanks to the divisive Hindutva ideology steering the country in the opposite direction.

Back to first principles

Although today’s Pakistan does not reflect his ideals, Quaid-i-Azam and his relevance to our times are irrefutable for several reasons. Above all, those who regard Jinnah as merely a glorious chapter of the past yet fail to find a true leader within their ranks, may draw the most important lesson from his ultimate struggle: a man of principles, he never looked towards the ruling establishment for favouritism or wheeling and dealing. In his entire political career, he never compromised his principled stance in return for vested interests, asked the establishment to intervene in matters beyond its jurisdiction, or held any backdoor negotiations with them.

Jinnah was a consummate proponent of a legitimate political process through dialogue and consultation with all stakeholders. In the first two decades of the 20th century, his rise to the political scene at the Indian National Congress platform was marked by sobriety, high principles, firm uprightness, absolute honesty, and iron discipline. Those were some of his trademark qualities, out of many, and which he adhered to till his last breath in September 1948 as Pakistan’s founder and the country’s first governor-general. From day one, his political credentials were bolstered by his resolute personal standing as a learned, well-bred, untainted leader with a strong sense of political dignity and statesmanship.

As things currently stand, the phrase ‘Unity, Faith, and Discipline,’ Jinnah’s guiding principles, as well as Pakistan’s motto, has been reduced to cliché for the citizenry en masse and for those at the helm of power. However, the phrase best describes Jinnah as a person of high principles and character. It also sums up his underlying approach to achieving the formidable task of carving out a separate country for his people despite all odds.

When it came to unity, for example, Jinnah was tasked with the most challenging job of bringing together a scattered people historically known for internal division, profound disunion, and diverse factions based on sectarian adherence, seminary affiliation, caste, language, and region. Yet again, Jinnah’s exemplary leadership put Indian Muslims on a single political platform to pursue a single-point agenda, kept them united until the cause was fulfilled, and never allowed them to lose their faith — one of the essential components of his core principles. Jinnah was aware of the fact that the making of a separate nation-state would be a distant dream until the fragmented Muslim community turned into a disciplined single force. Thus, over and above individual success, such key attributes as ‘Unity, Faith, and Discipline’ are the sought-after characteristics a country must also possess to thrive in the comity of nations. Pakistan is no exception.

Having lost over seven decades in our failed nation-building efforts and fragmented transition to becoming a modern, welfare Islamic state, the need of the hour is to refer back to the ideals as envisioned by the Father of the Nation and supported by generation after generation of the Indian Muslims all through the Pakistan Movement.

The writer is associated with a local publication as a member of its editorial board. He can be reached at faizanusmani76@gmail.com

Or is that so?

The more the certainty in such sweeping statements as those made in the preceding paragraph, the greater the need to question such certainties — in order to reflect upon their implications. As also to explore what is left unsaid or is deliberately excluded from the statement of such convictions. So that if, eventually, one is to return to the certainties outlined at the outset, there is the assurance that these have been adopted only after some consideration.

Identity yes; security no?!

After all, in the 19th century and the first few decades of the 20th century, the long-held, exclusive, well-formed Chinese national identity could not prevent British colonial interests and then Japanese forces from taking control of mainland China to hold its people in bondage. It then took the Communist Party’s Long March and other factors to expel alien domination. In almost equally long-established Egypt, the people’s sense of distinct national identity did not deter foreign invasions and occupation by European or Ottoman powers. Is national identity then only one of multiple elements that build national security?

Four factors

Let us begin with how words are used and how they are understood. Even before we attempt to examine the term ‘national identity’, let us visit the core word of ‘nation’. Nations of one kind or another have always existed in history, without necessarily being described as nations. In the modern context, the coupling of “nation” and “state”, and sometimes inadvertently misusing one term for another, has come to be widely used to define the formally organised units through which large groupings of people established their autonomy and presently conduct relations with other units.

The concept of ‘nation’ has evolved and crystallised quite rapidly in the first half of the 20th century. Perhaps four factors shaped the emergence of this concept and common use of the word ‘nation’.

First: The cumulative impact of the Treaty of Westphalia in the 17th century. That pact initiated growing respect for the sanctity of territorial frontiers and, at least in a theoretical and formal sense, the principle of non-interference in the affairs of another state. This process encouraged a sense of solidarity among people living within demarcated frontiers which brought together groups and communities that began to see themselves as a nation instead of only being parts of clans, tribes and kingdoms. The focus also shifted by such entities gradually becoming people-centric rather than being exclusively ruler-centric.

Second: the cataclysms and catastrophes of the two World Wars in the first half of the 20th century in which the emotions, interests and aspirations of nations were incited and inflamed — and held to be valid justifications for mass slaughter and destruction.

Third: the end of colonial empires including the Ottoman and British empires in particular but also the end of colonial occupation of Africa, Latin America and Asia by the French, Spanish, Dutch, Italian and German states of Europe. All popular movements against colonial occupation effectively used slogans appealing to national affinities.

Fourth: the establishment of the United Nations in 1945 with the signing of the UN Charter by 51 member-states. Over the past decades that number has almost quadrupled to its present level of 193 member states. The sheer proliferation of members of the UN has deepened and broadened the concept of “nation”. Incidentally, if the USA did not already exist in 1945, the more appropriate name of the new global body should have been “United States”!

Two parts of national identity

Regardless of the enormous variety of groupings and communities that are formally recognised as nations and nation states as well as sub-nations within a single state, it is necessary to note that national identity in all cases is always in two parts. One part is that of inherited identity whichever particular factor of inheritance it may be, eg language, ethnicity, faith, etc.

The other part of national identity is always contemporary, evolving and in a state of flux because people’s lifestyles and characteristics are inevitably affected by the exact places where they reside, by the impact of international, regional, national and local conditions that influence their livelihoods and their cultures. Thus, a sizable part of national identity changes subtly and incrementally over time: it is not fixed or static

Pakistan’s national identity

In Pakistan’s case, there are two alternative views of national identity. One has deep roots in history. In his book Historical Foundations of Pakistan and its People by the (late) scholar Ahmed Abdulla, published in 1983, an analysis of the sovereignties exercised over the territory that now represents the land of Pakistan (post-December 1971) found that this part of the world was mostly autonomous and self-contained or subject to frequent intrusions from the north-west (Central Asia) or from the west (Persian or Arab).

Over thousands of years, direct control from centres like Delhi, Agra or elsewhere lasted for only 700 years. For over 6,300 years the ancestors of about 90 per cent of the people of today’s Pakistan (the remaining approximately 10pc being those whose grandparents/parents migrated from other parts of South Asia and India in 1947 and later) resided and thrived, conflicted, or co-existed in peace with each other on the territory of contemporary Pakistan for most of recorded history. Despite being divided into tribes, fiefdoms or kingdoms, they had a direct relationship with the land that is now Pakistan.

Therefore, the creation of a nation state in August 1947 can be seen as the unavoidable, pre-destined fulfilment of a long, historical process reaching a new formative phase.

Seen from this perspective, the growth of Muslim nationalism in South Asia after the abolition of the Mughal dynasty in 1857 became an inescapable, logical manifestation of a natural, continuous evolutionary saga.

The other view of the national identity of Pakistanis is more limited and far more recent with a more sceptical interpretation. In this reading, Pakistan is seen as an “overnight nation” while simultaneously also becoming an “overnight state”.

Because before August 1947 no nation had existed by the name of “the Pakistani nation”. Indeed, before January 1933 when Choudhry Rahmat Ali published his pamphlet ‘Now or Never’, even the very word “Pakistan” which he invented — leave alone a whole nation — did not exist. Such scepticism is also used to move to an even more cynical view: that the creation of Pakistan was a freak, abnormal deviation imposed by the British. And that, therefore, the alleged fabrication of a nation called Pakistan in which religion bound people together was so fragile that East Pakistan broke away in December 1971 and thereby demolished the claim of there being a genuine and sound basis for Pakistani nationalism and for Pakistani national identity.

Authenticity of Muslim nationalism

But fortunately, harsh reality crushes such cynicism, and even scepticism. The authenticity of a separate, distinct Muslim nationalism has been eloquently authenticated by the fact that, subsequent to December 1971, the people of Bangladesh fervently want to maintain their distinct Muslim Bangladeshi independent national identity. They do not want to be merged with Indian Hindu West Bengal on the basis of shared history, ethnicity or language — to prove that religion is one of the most potent factors in shaping national identity and aspirations.

In December 1971, a combination of elements, including insensitivity by West Pakistani elites to East Pakistani rights and expectations, blunderous political and military decisions within Pakistan and a covert Indian conspiracy followed by overt Indian military intervention led to the disintegration of the original Pakistan. That turning point represented a rejection of the state structure of Pakistan — but it did not represent the rejection of Muslim nationalism.

So distinct is Muslim national identity in South Asia that even though Muslims in India reside in different parts of the Indian state, speak different languages and have different lifestyles, they nevertheless share pride and exclusivity in their Muslim identity while remaining loyal citizens of the Indian state.

The ugly spread of Hindutva in recent years expressed in the persecution of Muslims in general and in India-occupied Kashmir in particular has only strengthened Muslim identity as being separate from Hindu identity. Muslims in India are unavoidably or willingly, as the case may be, able to continue living in a single Indian state.

Resilience of Pakistani identity

The loss of East Pakistan was a devastating psychological and physical blow to the emerging national identity of Pakistan that had begun to grow over the 24-year period from 1947 to 1971. Yet it is a remarkable phenomenon of history as to how rapidly and resolutely the desire and passion of the people in (West) Pakistan expressed itself to ensure the continuity of the name of the State of Pakistan.

One reflection of this instinctive urge to retain and to further build the broad, unifying national identity of being Pakistani is the fact that, in the past 52 years, through 11 general elections at the national and provincial levels, not a single political party based on ethnic or sub-nationalist elements alone has come to power at the federal or even, most of the time, at provincial levels. Parties such as the Awami National Party (ANP) in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa or the Pashtoonkhwa Milli Awami Party in Balochistan or the Balochistan National Party or the MQM in Sindh have almost always had to rule only as part of larger coalition alliances. Or, as in the case of ANP in KP in 2008-13, voters permitted that category of parties only one electoral term.

Post-1971, the country’s political landscape is dominated by political parties with a national, federal, unifying vision rather than by parties that espouse narrow versions of nationalism or religious sectarianism or extremism. This voting preference of the people of Pakistan, illiterate or literate, from one corner of the country or another testifies to the basic humanism and unifying dimension of Pakistani national identity.

If all the meanings of a “nation” remain elusive, the word “identity” is comparatively straightforward. Identity comprises those physical and/or tangible characteristics that, in this context, determine the specificity of large numbers of people who see themselves as being part of a single nation-state even if some of them, at the same time, equally believe that they are also part of sub-nations or even full nations older in time than the nation to which they presently belong.

When we come to consider the relationship of national identity with national security, the first clarification required is to note that the term “state security” is a more accurate and appropriate term than “national security” — even though the two terms can be said to be interchangeable and synonymous.

Yet it is necessary to retain the specificity of state security as being relevant to the context of this essay, rather than the term “national security”.

Security and insecurity

To consciously exaggerate, but only to make the point: it is only historical nation states that have existed for hundreds or thousands of years that can be assumed to possess national security in the meaning of continuity, stability and even permanence as national entities, regardless of the precise form of the state structure within which these historical nations exist.

Virtually all other nations are relatively speaking in comparison to historical nations, still evolving and growing. Therefore, except for historical nation states, and perhaps also those founded by religious factors, all the others are, to a larger or lesser degree, insecure!

In 2024, predominantly white Christian Italians, Hungarians, Germans, French, British feel threatened by the immigration of a few thousand non-white, non-Christians from Africa and Asia who seek refuge from violent conflicts and poverty.

In this sense, after allowing for the distortive, misguiding role of populist elements in Europe, and in the USA, national identity also seems to have a strangely fragile facet that is easily vulnerable to exploitation by threats magnified out of all proportion to their actual scale.

One element of national security is unchangeable ie its location — if it is landlocked without access to the sea or a navigable river, that state is virtually at the mercy of one or more immediate neighbours.

16 elements of national security:

There are possibly 16 elements of nation-state security:

a) The capacity of a country’s armed forces to ensure the sanctity of borders and territory.

b) The capacity of supporting civil armed institutions, eg the police, paramilitaries, etc to enforce a minimum degree of internal law and order.

c) A national will in the people of a country to maintain the stability of the state and its permanence.

d) Adequate resources to sustain prolonged armed conflict with an external adversary, or against internal threats.

e) Possession of an ultimate deterrent usable against one or more external adversaries if the state’s very survival is threatened.

f) The strength of the resolve by society and state to confront internal violent extremism or terrorism.

g) Capacity to use effective counterterrorism agencies, most especially intelligence-gathering and the ability to conduct decisive pre-emptive operations.

h) Support from friendly overseas countries, in cash and in kind eg oil supply on credit.

i) Support from overseas countries through diplomacy at the UN and in other international forums.

j) Capacity to mitigate the adverse impact of climate change and ensure water and food security for the people.

k) A productive economy that harnesses the human and natural resources of a country through advanced human development and good governance, without heavy dependence on foreign aid and loans.

l) Balanced population growth and particularly the health, education and work-status of girls and women.

m) Quality of relations with immediate neighbouring states.

n) Nature of location of the state’s territory and its size, eg access to seas, or being landlocked.

o) Maturity of the political structures of the state to ensure accurate representation and articulation of the views of all, or most parts of the nation, including freedom of worship and representation for religious minorities.

p) Cyber power capacity, particularly for timely detection of attempted hacking of sensitive security cyber networks and systems, and to retaliate with cyber power capacity if threatening intrusions recur. Similarly, capacity to survive in hybrid warfare, if unleashed upon the country by hostile forces.

There is a direct linkage between some elements of national identity and some elements of national security. For instance: those dimensions that personify the determination to survive formidable odds and setbacks as those faced in 1947 and 1971 are linked to the strength of a nation’s will to ensure the permanence of the state, despite external and internal dangers.

One element of national security is unchangeable ie its location — if it is landlocked without access to the sea or a navigable river, that state is virtually at the mercy of one or more immediate neighbours which do have access. Another element of national security is not entirely within the control of a country eg the volume of its external trade that shapes its economy is determined by international flows of commerce and tariffs.

Yet another element of national security, particularly for a country like Pakistan whose carbon emissions are less than one per cent of global emissions, is nevertheless rated to be one of the 10 out of about 200 countries that are becoming the worst victims of climate change.

In the quality of relations with immediate neighbouring states, in the case of Pakistan, the state of relations with India is predominantly affected by India’s hegemonic posture and its historic animosity against Pakistan. At the simultaneous birth of Pakistan and India in August 1947, more than one Indian leader (falsely) predicted that Pakistan would not last more than six months. Despite the partial fulfilment of this malignant attitude 24 years later with the formation of Bangladesh, Pakistan has survived for 52 years. This reality does not sit well with the extremist Hindutva forces that currently dominate Indian political power.

As if this were not bad enough, another immediate neighbour, Afghanistan, has refused to fully accept the permanence of the Durand Line demarcated in 1897 and enforced in 1947 as the border between Afghanistan and Pakistan. Support by Afghanistan to the TTP, as of 2024, is a reflection of this basic hindrance.

While there have been some limited positive phases in relations with these two immediate neighbours, by itself Pakistan is unable to concretise this particular element of national security because the onus for truly accepting the permanence and reality of Pakistan lies with India and Afghanistan.

The 16 elements of national security can be divided into three clusters ie one over which the Pakistani nation state has no direct control whatsoever eg global-scale climate change, global economic trends. A second cluster of elements consists of those over which there can only be partial control by Pakistan eg relations with immediate neighbours, level of response from international community, etc. A third cluster of elements comprises those in which Pakistan can exert virtually complete control eg balanced population growth, effectiveness of pre-emptive operations against internal threats from violent extremism.

In 2024, while cohesion between the political and military parts of the state is unhealthily dominated by the military, a more vigorous and sustained effort is required to also transcend the divisive schisms that come with partisan-based democracy — to apply a concerted, holistic, unified approach to bind national identity with national security.

The writer is an author and former senator and federal minister. This text is a specially condensed, adapted version by the writer of a previously unpublished, original essay which appears, for the first time, in the anthology titled Shade & Light, published by Paramount Books in August 2024.

javedjabbar.2@gmail.com

Header image: The Quaid attends a rally.

EVERY new government that comes to power in Pakistan reiterates its commitment to restoring the country as envisioned by its founder, Quaid-i-Azam Muhammad Ali Jinnah. However, concrete measures have never been realised or taken in accordance with Jinnah’s ideals of a truly progressive, democratic, and free society in which all people could live together in harmony and with equal opportunity.

Once again, Pakistan is in dire straits, and the state is generally unable to perform its essential functions smoothly. Therefore, before this goes any further, it is high time we refer back to our founding father’s ideals. As Muhammad Ali Jinnah stated in his historic speech on August 11, 1947, he envisioned Pakistan as a progressive, democratic state where religion was a personal matter and had nothing to do with state affairs, ensuring no discrimination against any minority — religious or otherwise.

Jinnah believed the state’s primary duty was to protect the lives and property of all citizens and promote their welfare. He saw all citizens as equal members of a new nation with a constitution rooted in democracy, social justice, and the rule of law. Jinnah wanted Pakistan, a newly created Muslim state, to follow the principles of mutual goodwill in the comity of nations. From the word go, Jinnah envisioned the country as modern, moderate, and enlightened.

However, things have gone otherwise, contrary to the dreams of the founding father. Or, in the words of Faiz Ahmed Faiz, this is not that long-awaited daybreak we had longed for. At this point in time, regrettably, Pakistan finds itself at a critical juncture where religious radicals, along with right-wing forces, are gaining greater influence, and the country is literally held hostage by unelected forces — far away from the ideals of justice and democracy once revered by Jinnah himself.

Pakistan’s journey as a forward-looking nation state now hinges on developing a long-term, multipronged strategy to imbue Jinnah’s ideals into all strata and levels of society.

Long story short, Pakistan’s journey as a forward-looking nation state now hinges on developing a long-term, multipronged strategy to imbue Jinnah’s ideals into all strata and levels of society, including the general populace, academia, and civil society, not to exclude the armed forces too. Given that similar attempts in the past have failed, Jinnah’s untimely death in September 1948 left him unable to foresee the challenges Pakistan would face later. Subsequent rulers have miserably failed in nation-building and governance, unable to maintain law and order or protect citizens.

However, achieving such a formidable task requires a long-term process and unwavering willingness, laced with an ironclad determination to make it happen without resorting to quick fixes.

Daunting challenges

Considering the daunting governance challenges facing the country, the current administrative setup, which is based on a single federal territory and four provinces, hinders sound management, proper administration, and equitable justice and is thus no longer workable in our case. A solution could be dividing the country into at least 20 ‘administrative units’ or ‘states’ and rechristening Pakistan as “United Pakistan.”

This would create a federation similar to the UAE, the UK, the USA, or the erstwhile USSR. At the same time, the proposed administrative units or states would be demarcated administratively, disregarding any kind of linguistic or ethnic divisions.

In a similar vein, each state would have its own capital city, governor, chief minister, and state assembly, supported by a robust local administrative structure. This would bring governance closer to the people, improve law and order, and address citizens’ concerns more effectively.

It would also foster new and young leadership based on merit and enhance local identity and distinctiveness. India and the US are examples of countries where smaller administrative units successfully led to improved local governance.

Pakistan should also consider whether a parliamentary or presidential system is more appropriate for the nation, reflecting practical political experience and popular sentiment.

The feudal system is a significant impediment, and creating more administrative units could diminish the power of feudal lords and expedite the devolution of power at the grassroots level. Shortening the parliamentary term from five to four years could promote democratic norms and reduce feudal influence.

Separating legislative roles from ministerial appointments could also reduce corruption. Ministers should be appointed based on expertise and qualifications, not parliamentary membership. This would ensure competent leadership, particularly in the health, education, and finance sectors.

Surveys indicate that provincial governments are not effectively addressing citizens’ problems, while local governments are more responsive. Strengthening local governance by creating smaller administrative units could improve service delivery and governance.

The writer is a communication practitioner and founding chairman of the Society for Global Moderation, a think tank strengthening tolerance, interfaith harmony and democracy.

chairman@moderates.com.pk

PAKISTAN is currently facing a dismal state of perpetual turbulence and huge democratic crisis, mainly because of our failure as a nation to uphold the principles of pluralism, democracy, and genuine interfaith harmony. Political complacency with the instances of injustice, sectarian violence and discrimination against minorities have tarnished the image of the country which was envisioned by Quaid-i-Azam Muhammad Ali Jinnah as a democratic and inclusive nation state where the rule of law would reign supreme ensuring equality of all citizens.

Political instability and the lack of sincere leadership have caused the decline of democratic culture mainly because of inability of our leaders to understand virtues of the Quaid’s transformational leadership, acumen, vision, and moral standing.

The political system has become incapable of opening dialogue and debate on key challenges triggered by changing global power dynamics, domestic politics, and regional security environment. Egocentric nature of political narratives and immature political leadership have prevented us from pursuing the democratic path to resolve political issues through deliberations in flexible and friendly manner. Impatience, with undemocratic vision, has further caused unstable politics, weak economic growth, and deteriorating law and order in the country, where corruption is rapidly affecting all aspects of national life.

Forgetting the past

The present leaders have forgotten the past. However, the ruling elites still control knowledge and build narratives for their own benefit because they believe in George Orwell’s saying that “Those who control the present control the past, those who control the past control the future.” Thus, instead of learning from the past, they are committing blunder after blunder which demotivates the youth from playing a vital role in the development of the country.

Jinnah never believed in fragmentation. Instead, he firmly believed that the honest and selfless leadership can convert disunity into unity.

The Congress, dominated by a Hindu majority, was determined to deny the Muslims rights and deprive them of their own homeland. Our youth need to understand that the Quaid-i-Azam and his colleagues held liberal views and followed the principle of rule of law in letter and in spirit. Their demand for Pakistan was purely based on political, nationalistic reasons supported by geographical and demographic factors, and it was the Muslims’ reaction to nefarious intentions of the Congress leaders.

History poses many unsolved questions. One of these, in fact an enigma, is the failure of the Quaid’s successors to develop democratic institutions. They did not create a society based on enlightenment and democratic values. Frustratingly, we are often unable to reconnect ourselves with the past and understand the experiences of Muslims who were targeted as a minority community. Suppression of their nationhood and political identities was the marker of pugnacious mindset of Congress leadership, which divided people of India and put the lives of Muslims in danger by adopting aggressive posture and propagating extremist ideas during its rule (1937-39). Had our politicians understood the past and followed the Father of the Nation, there would not have been such irresponsiveness to the multifarious crises Pakistan faces even after 77 years of its creation.

Nearing a century

We have hardly 23 years to correct ourselves and make sure that we are on the right path as Pakistan completes a century of its creation. Society require leaders and policymakers free from narcissistic traits who can guide it towards protecting its unique civilisation and culture and lead it to navigate global challenges that differ so markedly from the present century.

Pakistan’s politicians should get deep inspiration from the Quaid’s commitment, dedication, and untiring efforts he made as the sole spokesman of Muslims of British India, who gave their leader wholehearted support for his firm and inflexible stand and edged inexorably towards their destination. Nevertheless, perfectly mannered and impressive-looking Jinnah was described by many leaders as a man with matchless leadership style, which made him very effective in situations that required initiative, creativity, and independent action.

Jinnah’s way of making arguments and debating issues was remarkably persuasive and very convincing. H.V. Hodson in The Great Divide has gone so far as to suggest that Lord Mountbatten was not the first viceroy to be baffled in debate with Mr Jinnah, who was unbeatable and thus Mountbatten was unable to make headway despite using his best persuasion techniques. Hodson further believes that when the argument was legal or constitutional, Jinnah was almost always right as a successful pleader. Congress had Mr Gandhi, Pandit Nehru, Sardar Patel and Acharya Kirpalani to represent different viewpoints within their party. But All-India Muslim League (AIML) had only one Jinnah who, unlike Mr Gandhi, possessed both unchallenged supreme authority as well as firm responsibility of being the single spokesman of the Muslim community.

Being a compassionate and conscientious leader, Jinnah possessed remarkable ability to get along with others in politics and to pursue his goal in a purposeful way. His high moral leadership, and way of distinguishing right from wrong and doing right, seeking the just, honest, and moral conduct in his actions increased his personal impact on hearts and minds of his followers during a troubled time in the history of the subcontinent. Confluence of these qualities offers great opportunity to learn what our Quaid left for us: his legacy teaches us four magnificent lessons that can rekindle our spirit and pave the way for a brighter future for our generations to come.

Far-sightedness

First, the Quaid’s vision transcended the boundaries of his time, and continues to serve as a beacon of light for us. He strongly believed in democratic and constitutional means to secure the rights of Muslims in British India. His 14 points were a fine example of his unflinching belief in democracy and constitution. Muslims’ economic rights were guaranteed in his legal framework, which suited India at that time. Nevertheless, negative attitude of Hindus towards Muslim demands further created a sense of deprivation among Muslims. Jinnah’s unflappability, commitment and sincere leadership gave them hope and confidence to achieve their homeland through a democratic and peaceful mass movement.

But the post-independence politicians kept people in the dark. The education system remained in tatters, having been systematically deprived of adequate funding to keep people uneducated. Being at the lowest in the government’s priority list, education did not work as a prescription for social ills. The unequitable system of education failed to address gender bias and thus women remained always worse off in our crisis-driven society. Further the lack of awareness about voting, electoral politics and democratic values caused the decline of democratic culture in Pakistan.

The lack of democratic education generated moral decay, bigotry, and narrow-mindedness. Political bickering and intolerance began in the 1950s, when governments were toppled and parties were switched overnight. The centralisation of power and denial of provincial autonomy fuelled the politics of identity and caused ethnic divide. The mainstream leaders did not possess flair or capacity of Jinnah to deal with sensitive issue of provincialism and ethnic-based nationalism, which later caused disintegration of the country. Insensitiveness to issues and public irritation were rooted in monopolisation of power by an arrogant bureaucracy under General Ayub Khan’s regime, which generated the feelings of deprivation among people and created the way for our hostile neighbour to exploit the situation.

Further, in the absence of political dialogue and our leaders’ lack of belief in the institution of democracy, the nation lost its other half. However, the new Constitution of 1973 under the Pakistan’s Peoples Party, led by Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, was made with parliamentary consensus after many unsuccessful attempts in the past. It created new hope for survival of democracy in Pakistan’s political environment, marked by active civil-military dichotomy. The lingering turmoil of 1977 created reasons for Ziaul Haq’s intervention in politics. He made changes to the Constitution and manipulated religion to remain in power. The process of religionisation of politics began with a vengeance by the repressive Ziaul Haq regime to increase tensions and polarised the situation further by creating various extremist groups who carried out violent acts of terrorism and vendettas against each other.

This triggered two major outcomes: sectarian violence and terrorism during the 1980s and 1990s onwards. Pakistan faced disastrous consequences of the wave of terrorism and extremism during the post-9/11 era, which forced the country to embark on stringent measures under the National Action Plan.

The trend of intolerance affecting democratic process has continued and remained unstoppable during the last many decades due to lust for power and greed for wealth. Leadership of mainstream political parties including PML-N, PPP, PTI, JI, MQM and others was unable to come out of the political quagmire to figure out how this trend could be reversed. Consequently, almost all elections became controversial, and thus, politics of revenge started soon after the formation of various governments, with the opposition launching smear campaigns, creating public disillusionment with democracy. Thus, democracy did not thrive due to disruptions caused by intolerant and egregious behaviour of rulers and their failure to channel dissent and disagreement in a positive way.

They lacked patience, maturity, and democratic resilience. Only a few leaders were able to make strides in key fields. Surprisingly, these leaders were also made controversial, and their sacrifices were ignored due to prejudice against democracy. It can be argued that some politicians came into politics to make money and others joined politics to quench their thirst for power. Most of them largely ignored the advice of our great leader who in his address in 1948 shared his strong belief in maintaining discipline and selfless devotion to duty as key to achieving big national goals.

An inclusive society

Second, Quaid-i-Azam Muhammad Ali Jinnah envisioned Pakistan as an inclusive society. He joined Muslim League in 1913 and created political consciousness among Muslims. He tried to create unity between Hindus and Muslims through Lucknow Pact in 1916 for the purpose of collaboration between two major communities. However, Congress politics, based on communal lines, was inimical to Muslim interests and thus, it was exposed during the movement for restoration of Khilafat (1919-1924). Later, in the wake of Simon Commission, an all-India conference was organised to respond to the British challenge that Indian political leaders were not capable of making a constitution for India. In response to the British, the Nehru Report recommended unitary form of government and rejected separate electorate system for Muslims, which was agreed by Congress in the Lucknow Pact. Unlike the Nehru Report, Quaid-i-Azam’s 14-points outlined the legal edifice of a true democracy and recommended federal system with provincial autonomy. The 14-points charter not only safeguarded the political and economic rights of Muslims, but also protected Muslim education, culture, language, religion, personal laws, and institutions to ensure Muslim unity. The seventh point among the 14 points created pluralistic society by ensuring “full religious liberty, ie, liberty of belief, worship, observance, propaganda, association, and education for all communities of India.”

Further the rights of all communities were protected under the eighth point that “No bill or resolution or any part thereof shall be passed in any legislature or any other elected body if three-fourths of the members of any community in that particular body oppose such a bill, resolution or part thereof on the ground that it would be injurious to the interests of that community.” This point clearly indicates that Jinnah strongly believed in pluralistic society and in his view protection of the rights of all communities was imperative for harmonious communal relations. The third point codified the rights of minorities and provided that “in all legislatures in the country and other than elected bodies shall be constituted on the definite principle of adequate and effective representation of minorities in every province without reducing the majority in any province to a minority or even equality.”

After a series of constitutional plans, major points of Jinnah were incorporated in the Government of India Act of 1935. The elections based on this act were held in 1937. These elections provided opportunity to make assessment of the causes of unsatisfactory performance of AIML. Secondly, the dictatorial rule established by Congress made it clear that this Hindu-dominated organisation will never be in a position to protect Muslim interests. Thus, they began to join the AIML which was reorganised by Jinnah, who exhorted factions and groups within the party to overcome their conflicts. Its policy was made clear when the party passed for the first time a resolution in 1940 which remarkably increased the popularity of Muslim League by orchestrating the demand for a separate homeland.

Eventually the AIML took the shape of a movement led by the great leader. The Quaid took a strong position and based his concept of nationhood on secular orientation, and his firm belief in democracy. He said at the time of independence that “Islam and its idealism has taught us democracy. It has taught us equality of men, justice, and fair play to everyone. In any case, Pakistan is not going to be a theocratic state.” He reiterated that both Muslims and non-Muslim communities will enjoy same rights and privileges. He strongly believed that equal citizenship and protection of minorities would strengthen further the foundation of Pakistan.

In post-independence period, the disunity among people became a big challenge and the nation was divided into groups based on ideological, ethnic, and sectarian orientation, which banished harmony and affinity from society. Radicalisation and extremism in post-independence society further increased the insecurity for minorities, endangering citizenship contrary to the vision of Jinnah. The post-independence politicians failed to implement the pluralistic vision of Jinnah who made it clear that everyone in Pakistan, irrespective of his religious affiliation, would be treated as a citizen of the state with equal rights and obligations.

Today’s ever-growing bellicosity of political system is threatening our society with intolerance and undemocratic attitudes. Here is the great lesson that we can learn from the epic struggle of Jinnah that he never believed in fragmentation. Instead, he firmly believed that the honest and selfless leadership can convert disunity into unity of the nation. Our leaders and policymakers must follow Jinnah’s integrity, honesty and selflessness which are core values he was committed to throughout his life. In 1947, at the time of independence, Quaid-i-Azam advised the government officials “to sink individualism and petty jealousies and make up their minds to serve the people with honesty and faithfulness.”

Third, strong institutions and their disciplined behaviour was the real power to run a new state of Pakistan. Jinnah was a lifelong believer in strengthening of institutions. During the various phases of the Pakistan Movement, the Quaid not only developed political institutions but also strengthened their credibility. For instance, he organised AIML to compete with the Indian National Congress. He created among party workers a new motivation and enthusiasm and enabled them to work together for achieving the goal with unwavering commitment and dedication. This provides enough guidance to our politicians. They have established dynastic control over party politics. They are wasting their energies just to keep their political opponents down. The country is now politically too poor to afford such activities. It is not just because of intervention of external undemocratic forces that parties disintegrate. The rot that causes terminal damage to their reputation starts within their own hierarchical structure and rash policies.

The party bosses have remained engaged in politicising national institutions and exerting relentless pressure on bureaucracy to get things done. Every minister possesses a huge number of assistants who work according to political whims and serve their political bosses like khalifas of pirs. Their political bosses want obedient civil servants who are supposed to be in the hands of their masters like a corpse in the hands of the washer of the dead. Quaid-i-Azam knew that without maintaining high reputation and prestige of civil service the democratic system will not work. Thus, Jinnah stressed the point that administrative structure must be free from corruption and the government officials should not be influenced by any political pressure. In his informal talk to civil servants on April 14, 1948, he advised the officers that “If you want to raise the prestige and greatness of Pakistan, you must not fall victim to any pressure, but do your duty as servants to the people and the state fearlessly and honestly.”

Corruption, bribery and nepotism were considered by Jinnah as horrible diseases which could devastate the legitimacy of institutions slowly and gradually. The major causes of these diseases pointed out by the Father of Nation included the lack of professionalism, inadequate training, and failure to find the right person for the right job. These factors caused unbearable loss to people who were already reeling under the ravages of red tape and administrative corruption sheathed in discretionary powers.

‘Live as free men’

Fourth, at the core of Jinnah’s thoughts was the idea of freedom. In his speech of October 11, 1947, he said that “the idea was that we should have a state in which we could live and breathe as free men.” The Constitution of Pakistan provides the freedom of speech, movement, assembly, association, and freedom to profess religion. However, concept of freedom should not be interpreted according to wishes of ruling elites. Encroaching unnecessarily upon the private sphere of people under recent political arrangements can endanger peace and stability. Freedom and democracy are inseparable ingredients of desired political culture. Neither democracy without freedom can flourish nor freedom can exist without democratic values and ethos. True democracy enables the people to freely express and contribute ideas in an organic way for improvement of governance. Nevertheless, curbing media and putting restrictions on freedom creates space for dictatorship, generates public discontent, and plunges the country into a chaotic situation leading to derailing of democracy and the constitutional order.

Thus, political leaders and legislators ought to use politics as an avenue of solving contentious and complex issues in a simple way, avoid downgrading each other, improvise a way out and remain steadfast in pursuit of the Quaid’s principles of justice, equality, tolerance, and fairness.

The writer is professor and director, Pakistan Study Centre, University of Sindh, Jamshoro.

shuja.mahesar@usindh.edu.pk