THE evolution of the Pakistan-Afghanistan relationship has always been inconsistent, and rooted in deep mistrust, blame games, propaganda, conspiracy theories, perpetual external interference and repeated cycles of violence.
The bilateral equation has experienced many irritants, each having abundant potential for a complete breakdown. Despite these complexities and substantial investments by external players, the relationship has somehow survived every dilemma, only to experience new and more challenging negative developments.
The current state of bilateral tensions – though one of the most damaging – is nothing new and should be seen in context.
Since August 1947, there has never been a decade in which Afghanistan did not make a deliberate effort to export insurgencies and unrest to Pakistan, mostly by exploiting internal socio-political grievances within segments of Pakistani society, or by capitalising on ethnic and linguistic affiliations.
These offensive trends were initiated by Afghanistan in the pursuit of enduring objectives such as Lar-O-Bar Yaw Afghan, Pakhtunistan, historical claims and, at times, on the behest of third parties pursuing inimical motives towards the integrity and sovereignty of Pakistan.
The concept of ‘strategic depth’ was relevant till the conclusion of World War II. Given its hostile conduct since Aug 15, 1947, no sane person could have imagined such ‘depth’ for Pakistan on Afghan territory
On the other hand, Pakistan persistently claimed to be working for a stable, peaceful, and friendly Afghanistan, objectives that to this day are interpreted as a quest for ‘strategic depth’. Irrespective of the past statements by a couple of leaders, it is naïve to consider that Pakistan was pursuing ‘strategic depth’ in Afghanistan.
In the security domain, the concept of ‘strategic depth’ was relevant till the conclusion of World War II, and was generally understood as a mutually-agreed arrangement under which one nation-state could place its most precious military hardware and forces in a neighbouring state, while facing military aggression from an enemy.
Given Afghanistan’s very hostile conduct since August 15, 1947, no sane person could have imagined such ‘strategic depth’ for Pakistan on Afghan territory while facing a military threat from its arch-rival, India.
Successive military leaders, the intelligence community and political forces envisioned a stable and friendly relationship with Afghanistan that would afford them an environment to concentrate their entire military potential on the eastern border with India, without being distracted by the defence of western frontiers.
During previous crises in Afghanistan, successive Pakistani governments have opted for alignments with important factions primarily for post-crisis normalcy. This was primarily done to help dominant factions or external players create a stable government in Kabul.
Losing the north?
The much-maligned support for the Taliban’s rise in 1996 also had the same objective. Most of these efforts by Pakistan, however, were not viewed favourably by the people of Afghanistan, particularly by ethnic communities in the north of Hindu Kush range. One can conclude that while supporting dominant players in the Pakhtun belt of Afghanistan, Pakistan lost positive relevance with the people of the north.
Capitalising on the resultant opportunity to hurt Pakistan’s interests, India strongly aligned itself with communities of the north throughout the period of Afghan Jihad and for years afterwards. As of today, however, the whole paradigm appears to have undergone a tectonic shift.
While people of the north appear willing to engage with Pakistan, the Pakhtun belt under the Afghan Taliban regime is accepting transformative influence and a strong relationship with India. Those interested in history can trace out the reasons behind this shift, some of which are even shaping the current conflict.
Back in 2011, a Pakistani delegation visited one of the important Central Asian Republics. The delegation had an engagement to discuss Afghanistan’s situation with the defence minister of that country, who had also served in Afghanistan as a regimental commander for years during Soviet invasion.
After a lengthy presentation by our delegation, when it was the hosts’ turn to present their views, the defence minister summed up Afghanistan in one sentence. He said, “Gentlemen, Afghanistan will remain Afghanistan”.
This was a profound statement, as he attempted to predict Afghanistan’s future, which he thought would remain hostage to violence, tribal feuds, external influence, proxy wars, and perpetual instability.
His opinion has, thus far, withstood the test of time. We should all, however, pray and hope that he is proven wrong, sooner rather than later.
Perpetual instability
'Starting with the First Afghan War of 1839, repeated British invasions of Afghanistan kept the country at war until the close of the 19th century. Afghanistan’s geography, history, and culture had always shaped and sustained ethnic, linguistic, and tribal divisions for centuries.
Throughout the many Afghan wars, the British capitalised on these divisions, only to further exacerbate social and political fault lines. From the beginning of the 20th century until the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, there were intervals of stability, progress, and the evolution of peculiar governance structures that relied on accommodating tribal and ethnic interests to keep various regions aligned with the government in Kabul.
These limited cycles of stability, however, could never lead to enduring internal cohesion, participatory democracy, and overarching inclusivity.
It will take a collective effort by the people of Afghanistan to enforce a moderate interpretation of Islam and an inclusive government on the Afghan Taliban
The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979 provided an opportunity for the US to orchestrate yet another clash of political ideologies in a third country, which by that time had become a trend in the international order. The consequent so-called containment of communism through proxy warfare was a globally-shared geopolitical objective, fully backed by the US-led West and many influential nation-states in the Muslim world.
Pakistan, being geographically contiguous, became the most important enabler for both logistics and training infrastructure for the Mujahideen, whose rank and file were drawn mostly from Afghanistan’s southern Pakhtun belt. Pakistan joined the effort primarily to safeguard its own security interests in the face of the Soviet military presence in Afghanistan and the wider regional consequences of the conflict. But this participation further alienated the ethnicities of the north, as well as the Pakhtun factions who later suffered at the hands of the Taliban during the 1990s.
When the Soviets withdrew in 1989, Pakistan had two choices: one, leave Afghanistan to the Afghans, as was done by every country involved during the Afghan Jihad. Two, attempt reconciliation among warring factions and support most dominant group with the hope for stabilising Afghanistan’s internal dynamics. When reconciliation efforts did not work and Taliban rose as most dominant and powerful interest group, Pakistan opted to exercise second option, which later proved very costly.
‘War on terror’
At the start of 21st century, when Afghanistan was once again invaded under the garb of the ‘war on terror’, Pakistan made every possible effort to prevent the invasion. Having been unable to convince Taliban over the future of Osama bin Laden, Pakistan opted to join the US-led ‘war on terror’, in a support role, under compulsions of mandatory UN resolutions and clearly stated global priorities.
During the run-up to the US exit in 2021, Pakistan’s standing among Taliban-aligned constituencies in Afghanistan, particularly in the Pakhtun belt, had also eroded as Islamabad was increasingly viewed as having sided with the US-led intervention.
Paradoxically, throughout the same two decades, successive Afghan governments, Isaf, Nato, and US officials repeatedly accused Pakistan of complicity with the Taliban. Afghan Presidents Hamid Karzai and Ashraf Ghani, along with successive US political and military leaders, consistently pressed Pakistan to militarily confront the Taliban as part of the wider war effort.
Islamabad, though, resisted such a course, fearing that direct confrontation could trigger serious internal instability and security blowback.
At the same time, successive Pakistani governments firmly rejected allegations of state-sponsored material or financial support to the Taliban and repeatedly called for evidence establishing such institutional complicity. Despite years of accusations, no publicly disclosed evidence conclusively established direct sponsorship of the Taliban by Pakistani state institutions.
Yet, an insurgency capable of sustaining a two-decade war against the world’s most powerful military alliance clearly required dependable financial, logistical and external support. Pakistani assessments have consistently maintained that significant elements of such support originated elsewhere in the region.
The larger point is that allegations against Pakistan became a convenient explanation for the failures of the Afghan war, while the wider regional networks that sustained the insurgency received far less scrutiny.
What Afghans must do
Looking back at almost two centuries of Afghanistan’s evolution, one can conclude that Afghans have been victims of ruthless pursuit of superpowers’ geostrategic interests under the garb of the illusionary ‘Great Game’ or the global ‘war on terror’.
Resultantly, generations of proud Afghans have lived through perpetual violence and bloodshed. This has led to emergence of a mindset, particularly in the Pakhtun belt in which violence, mercenaries, and proxies are viewed as a routine affair.
As successive wars and insurgencies were forced upon the Afghan people by external powers, it is a moral obligation of the international community to help rebuild the country for a stable, peaceful, and prosperous future for its freedom-loving and proud people.
For this to happen, Afghanistan has to move away from exclusivity and realign its statecraft with globally acceptable norms and external behaviour. Not only its external conduct; sooner or later, Afghanistan will also have to re-orientate its internal dynamics towards internationally accepted practices and norms.
The Afghan Taliban regime steering such a realignment appears to be a distant possibility. It will call for a collective effort by the people of Afghanistan to enforce a moderate interpretation of Islam and an inclusive government on the Afghan Taliban.
It is time for the people of Afghanistan to understand that integration with the international political, economic, and financial order in today’s globalised world is not a matter of choice but a compulsion. They also need to understand that such integration does not call for giving up the unique ethos, values, religious sentiment, or cultural imperatives of a nation-state.
The Afghan Taliban regime does not accept this publicly, but in their internal discourse, its policy towards Pakistan is driven by three overarching objectives.
Firstly, they want status quo ante on the Pakistan-Afghanistan border, allowing unhindered movement of people and materials without any oversight mechanisms.
Secondly, they want Afghan transit trade to continue without any new measures imposed by Pakistan.
Thirdly, and most importantly, the Afghan Taliban regime has a deep desire to see a government in Pakistan that follows its interpretation of Sharia. Having defeated Isaf and Nato, the Afghan Taliban regime feels confident that its allies like Tehreek-i-Taliban Pakistan, Baloch Liberation Army and others can achieve similar success against Pakistan.
Alternatives
Pakistan’s intelligence community has convincing and abundant evidence related to these objectives, not only to the extent of internal discussions within the Afghan Taliban regime but also regarding their future plans and support for terrorist organisations working towards such an agenda against Pakistan.
Pakistan has made every possible effort to convince the Afghan Taliban regime to abandon such objectives and work towards peaceful coexistence for realisation of benefits of geo-economic connectivity. Since 2021, there have been repeated engagements by Pakistan on political, diplomatic, intelligence, and military tracks with Afghan counterparts but every engagement has led to an impetus both in the frequency and lethality of terrorist attacks emanating from Afghan soil.
Against these misplaced ambitions, Pakistan has been offering them three alternatives.
First, Pakistani interlocutors have been pleading with the Afghan Taliban regime to select any border management arrangement with any of their neighbours as a model and enforce the same on Pakistan-Afghanistan border through reciprocal efforts.
Second, they have always asked the Afghan Taliban regime leadership to double the volume of transit trade but align it with existing mechanisms used in any of transit-trade models for landlocked countries around the world.
Third, they have consistently argued that Pakistani society is inherently moderate, despite the marginal representation of far-right political forces our people envision their future in participatory democracy. Hence, they must walk away from the shared vision of terrorist organisations seeking to enforce a government based on extreme interpretation of Sharia.
Publicly and through mediations, Pakistan has been consistently asking Afghan Taliban regime to come good on commitments made at Doha in preventing use of Afghan soil by terrorist organisations operating against Pakistan.
The Afghan Taliban regime continues to hide behind capacity issues and obligations under ‘Pakhtunwali’ as hindrances to controlling terrorist organisations, despite accepting their presence on Afghan soil in closed-door meetings with Pakistani counterparts. Having made every possible and conceivable effort within the realm of soft power, Pakistan recently embarked upon the use of hard power to convince the Afghan Taliban regime to abandon its dangerous objectives against Pakistan.
Debate over kinetic actions
Having exhausted political, diplomatic and other non-kinetic avenues over an extended period, Pakistan has increasingly resorted to kinetic measures that it describes as necessary acts of self-defence against terrorism emanating from Afghan soil. Few states confronted with sustained cross-border terrorism would indefinitely exclude the use of force.
Nevertheless, some political forces within Pakistan have expressed reservations over the use of hard power and continue to advocate greater engagement with Kabul. Such differences are part of Pakistan’s political discourse, but they can also be exploited by the Afghan Taliban to misread Pakistan’s resolve or expect divisions within its polity to constrain a sustained response.
For the policy shift to remain effective and nationally sustainable, these differences should be addressed through structured political consultation and the sharing of credible information regarding the nature and scale of the threat. Pakistan should therefore maintain consistency in its security policy while keeping open every credible opportunity for direct, bilateral or mediated engagement with Kabul.
The Afghan Taliban regime also needs to understand that terrorist organisations or insurgents usually succeed when they operate against a state apparatus that is not defended by strong national armed forces. Their own triumphs in 1996 and 2021 were primarily because of the absence of strong Afghan national armed forces.
The Afghan National Army, raised, funded, and trained by Isaf, had yet to transform into a truly national army; hence, the Taliban succeeded in taking over Kabul without any resistance. No matter how many proxies operate from Afghanistan, they will not be able to experience such a walk in the park against Pakistan. It will not happen even in the decades ahead.
If Afghanistan chooses not to carry the burdens of its past into its future, it can unlock immense opportunities for its own people, and for the wider region. The responsibility now rests with the Afghan Taliban regime to recognise that governing a state demands a fundamentally different mindset from fighting an insurgency.
Afghanistan’s future will depend on whether the Taliban can make that transition, from a guerrilla movement shaped by decades of war into a responsible leadership capable of pursuing peace, stability, economic integration and constructive relations with its neighbours. One can only hope that this transformation begins before another generation of Afghans is condemned to suffer the consequences of repeating the cycles of the past.
The writer is currently serving as chairman of the Water and Power Development Authority. This article was published in the Oct 1 and 2 editions of the paper as a two-part series. Both parts have been reproduced above for the convenience of our readers.
Published in Dawn, October 2nd, 2026
