IN the first 50 years of its existence as an independent state, India had uneasy ties with the US. India preferred in those years a close partnership with the Soviet Union. Since the dawn of the 21st century, however, India’s relationship with the US has morphed into a strategic partnership, with unprecedented levels of politico-military cooperation. The primary dynamic behind this upswing is the US competition with China, a rising economic and military power. The US would like to see India as a counterweight to China, and has engaged it in its Indo-Pacific strategy, the Quad, and similar initiatives that are seemingly aimed at containing the further rise of China.
The Indo-US strategic partnership covers a broad range of areas of cooperation. Notably, the US is India’s largest trading partner in goods and services, whose value has grown 10 times since 2000, and the third largest source of FDI for India. Americans of Indian origin have integrated well into American society, and are occupying important positions in the political, economic and technology domains. The relationship enjoys bipartisan support in the US Congress, where India is viewed as a fellow democracy. The India Caucus in the US Congress has over 150 members.
What has further cemented Indo-US ties is a consistent rise in the economic profile of India, which has come a long way from an inward-looking economy, facing a serious balance-of payments crisis in 1991 to a broadly liberal economy, the fifth largest in 2024, with aspirations to become the third largest in the near term. India has also surpassed China to become the world’s most populous country and emerged as a lucrative market for the US-led West. Its foreign currency reserves exceed $650 billion.
With increased wealth at its disposal, India is currently the fourth largest military spender. Its defence cooperation with the US is multifaceted, and includes a growing number of joint military exercises. Defence procurements from the US are also increasing, and major US-origin platforms are now in India’s use. The two countries have signed a series of defence agreements to pave the way for access to each other’s logistics, encrypted communications, geospatial intelligence, and fast-track technology exchange. During Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s 2023 visit to the US, Washington agreed to the co-production of F-414 jet engines, including significant technology transfer for India’s indigenous aircraft manufacturing capabilities, and an agreement to supply India with advanced drones to enhance its intel and operational capabilities.
The Indo-US partnership covers a range of areas of cooperation.
However, the US has serious concerns about the relationship. According to the Stimson Centre, there are hurdles to taking cooperation to the next level. Firstly, India’s capacity to absorb foreign technology faces many legal, coordination, and procedural issues. Secondly, the US is ‘unsure’ of India’s political will to deter China in the Western Pacific, because India’s priority seems to be the Indian Ocean region. Thirdly, India has not blocked its trade and investment ties with China. Fourthly, Washington is deeply concerned over New Delhi’s close relations with Moscow and its independent stance on Ukraine and the purchase of Russian oil. Fifthly, India is teaming up with BRICS to explore trade in currencies other than the dollar. Sixthly, the US has concerns over India’s policy of persecuting religious minorities and sending operatives to assassinate opponents on foreign soil.
This is not to suggest that the US is having second thoughts about its relationship with India. In fact, it is going out of its way to ignore the Indian leadership’s tendency to assert India’s ‘strategic autonomy’. Although the American ambassador to India was blunt in challenging the use of the term ‘strategic autonomy’, his government did waive the CAATSA (Countering America’s Adversaries through Sanctions Act) for India to let it buy a missile system from Russia.
Last month, Senator Marco Rubio introduced a bill in Congress calling for treating India like Japan, Israel, South Korea and Nato members, in terms of sharing advanced weaponry with it. The bill was blatantly anti-China and also echoed the Indian view of Pakistan.
The US tilt raises deep security concerns for Pakistan as it encourages the Indian leadership to act as a net security provider, ie, hegemon, in South Asia. Washington tends to view Islamabad from the lens of Sino-Pak ties, and thus maintains minimal contact with it.
It is clear that whoever wins the US presidential elections in November will continue efforts to strengthen Indo-US ties, and would be unlikely to change the low-profile trajectory of Pak-US relations, which might oblige Pakistan to explore other options.
The writer is a former foreign secretary, and chairman Sanober Institute Islamabad.
Published in Dawn, August 25th, 2024
