IN a region where rivers carve the landscape and also trace the fault lines of politics, the Kabul River basin stands out as a microcosm of looming water insecurity. For Pakistan and Afghanistan, the river system presents an unusual hydrological and diplomatic twist, which in the absence of a comprehensive treaty, means increasing the risks of conflict, over a resource that is both a lifeline and geopolitical.

The Kabul River system has emerged as a potential flashpoint in Pak-Afghan relations, with growing concerns that Afghanistan’s accelerated dam construction — supported by foreign actors, particularly India — could alter river flows critical for Pakistan’s irrigation, hydropower, and food security.

Pakistan’s complex position as both an upper and lower riparian on different tributaries of the basin presents both risks and opportunities. The Chitral River originates in Pakistan and flows into Afghanistan as the Kunar River, before re-entering Pakistan to join the Kabul River and eventually the Indus. This geographic configuration gives Pakistan upstream leverage, yet its downstream dependence makes it vulnerable to flow reductions.

The Kabul River system has emerged as a potential flashpoint in Pak-Afghan relations.

Recent hydrological estimates indicate that Pakistan currently receives around 17 million acre feet annually from the Kabul River system, contributing nearly 20 per cent of total Indus inflows during the early Kharif season. Projected upstream development by Afghanistan including up to a dozen dams could reduce flows by approximately 3 MAF (about 16pc), directly impacting early cropping, water storage, and energy generation in KP and downstream Punjab. Climate change further compounds this risk by reducing glacial melt predictability and altering seasonal run-off patterns. The result: rising potential for hydropolitical tension and environmental insecurity in a basin already lacking a formal water-sharing framework.

The core political challenge constitutes Afghanistan’s use of water infrastructure as a potential political or economic pressure tool to threaten Pakistan’s water and food security. India’s technical and financial involvement in Afghan hydropower and irrigation projects such as the Shahtoot Dam near Kabul and proposed Kunar-Panjshir developments adds a geopolitical layer, effectively turning the Kabul basin into an extension of South Asia’s broader water rivalry.

Pakistan must therefore respond with a strategy that protects downstream flows and agricultural security, preserves its international legal standing as a responsible riparian, counters Indian influence through constructive regional engagement, and converts hydrological vulnerability into diplomatic and economic leverage. While Pakistan is technically an upper riparian on the Chitral segment, its practical capacity to divert or store significant volumes upstream is restricted. The terrain is mountainous, infrastructure options limited, and large-scale diversion would be cost-prohibitive and environmentally risky.

From a legal perspective, deliberate manipulation of flows would violate key principles of international water law, including equitable and reasonable utilisation, and obligation not to cau­se significant harm. Such action would und­e­r­­m­ine Pakistan’s credibility in other transbo­undary contexts, most notably under the Indus Waters Treaty with India, where Pakistan relies on the same legal norms for downstream protection.

Thus, while Pakistan retains hydrological leverage, it should not pursue coercive diversion as a countermeasure. Instead, this leverage should be exercised through strategic hydro-diplomacy and cooperative basin governance by developing a strategic response framework to:

Establish a bilateral water commission: Initiate negotiations for a Pakistan-Afghanistan Water Commission under a structured ‘Kabul River Basin Dialogue’; include data-sharing, minimum flow guarantees, flood forecasting, and seasonal regulation protocols; seek facilitation by World Bank, ICIMOD, or UNESCAP to ensure neutrality and technical credibility.

Promote a ‘benefit-sharing’ model: Propose joint hydropower or irrigation projects where both sides gain proportionally from regulated storage; Pakistan may offer to purchase surplus hydropower from Afghan dams or finance co-managed reservoirs that ensure stable downstream releases; the model transforms the river from a zero-sum resource into a shared economic asset.

Deploy climate diplomacy tools: Frame the Kabul basin as a climate-vulnerable transboundary system needing adaptation finance; mobilise Green Climate Fund or Loss and Damage finance windows for joint resilience projects — glacier monitoring, early warning systems, irrigation modernisation — creating shared dependence on cooperative governance.

Counter Indian influence through engagement: Offer Afghanistan direct technical cooperation and concessional energy trade to reduce dependency on Indian-backed infrastructure; engage multilaterally (ECO, SAARC, SCO) to make unilateral Indian-Afghan projects politically less viable.

Develop strategic water intelligence & monitoring: Strengthen satellite-based hydrological monitoring of the Kabul basin using the capabilities of Suparco and Wapda; establish a national cell under the National Security Division to continuously assess upstream developments, construction progress, and foreign technical involvement.

Prepare contingency response plans: Model the economic and agricultural impact of a 10-20pc flow reduction scenario to inform national drought resilience planning; accelerate domestic measures — groundwater regulation, small storage schemes, and canal efficiency — in KP and the Indus plains to offset potential losses.

Pakistan faces a critical juncture in its water diplomacy with Afghanistan. The choice is between reacting to provocation of ‘water weaponisation’ or proactively shaping a rules-based, climate-resilient, and mutually beneficial framework for transboundary water management. Pakistan should adopt a strategy that emphasises regional hydro cooperation by securing predictable downstream flows, limiting India’s geopolitical encroachment, strengthening its international standing as a responsible riparian, and transforming the Kabul River from a security liability into a platform for regional stability and shared prosperity.

Water must be managed as an instrument of strategic leverage, not confrontation. However, if diplomatic initiative, technical readiness, and climate framing through cooperation does not work, Pakistan retains its upper riparian leverage to defend its future water security.

The writer is the chief executive of the Civil Society Coalition for Climate Change.

aisha@csccc.org.pk

Published in Dawn, November 17th, 2025