THE clouds of uncertainty are gradually disappearing as Pakistan’s well-thought-out Middle East strategy becomes clear. Islamabad has shown an eagerness to expand its security footprint in the Middle Eastern region with renewed security cooperation at the bilateral and multilateral levels. This is evident from the signing of its mutual defence pact with Saudi Arabia, which proposes the creation of an ‘Arab-Islamic task force’, supporting US President Donald Trump’s Gaza plan, participating in the Gaza-based international stabilisation force (ISF), and offering a mutual defence pact to Qatar.

Islamabad’s security activism in Middle East is its new currency of relevance. But this raises a critical question: why is Islamabad pursuing an elevated role in Middle Eastern geopolitics?

First, Pakistan has already established substantial institutionalised security cooperation with several Arab Gulf countries. For instance, the deployment of troops, training of naval and air officers, weapons procurement, joint military exercises, etc, are areas where operational cooperation in various fields already exists between Islamabad and some of these countries. By building upon existing institutional frameworks and adding new security measures, Pakistan wants to be strategically relevant to the Middle Eastern region. There is a realisation within the civil and military leadership that in the past, Pakistan missed a strategic opportunity when its parliament voted for declining the invite to join the Saudi-led campaign in Yemen.

Islamabad now believes that Pakistan paid significant strategic, economic and political costs due to its decision of neutrality in the Middle Eastern conflicts. The policy of neutrality had downgraded Pakistan’s strategic relevance, and dented Islamabad’s credibility as a reliable security partner. Therefore, Islamabad seems eager to rebuild trust with its Arab partners with renewed strategic overtures.

Islamabad’s security activism in Middle East is its new currency of relevance.

Second, Islamabad’s higher security stakes and strategic relevance in the region would ensure sustainable economic assistance and uninterrupted oil flows even during the prospective armed conflict with New Delhi. Moreover, the elevated role on the security horizon would likely ensure deepening joint defence production, and research and development in weapons technologies, with various Arab Gulf states.

Third, Islamabad has calculated that its proactive security overtures in the Middle Eastern region will likely complement Washington’s interests. For instance, the Saudi-Pakistan pact and Islamabad’s participation in the ISF will allow Washington to offload some of its Gulf security responsibilities onto a capable regional partner, lowering Pentagon’s need for permanent deployments. Moreover, being Washington’s traditional ally, Islamabad’s presence will strengthen a pro-US security architecture in the Middle East. Islamabad’s security assurances to Riyadh will serve as a deterrent to entities deemed hostile such as the Houthis and will discourage Iran from initiating a proxy campaign to strategically encircle Saudi Arabia. Additionally, Islamabad and Washington both share interests in securing energy routes. By actively participating in Middle Eastern security affairs, Islamabad could come closer to Washington’s strategic calculus.

The Biden administration remained under the impression that Islamabad had already opted for Beijing over Washington. The growing economic and strategic ties between China and Pakistan were viewed by Washington as an indicator of Islamabad’s choice. Although Islamabad remained consistent in its position of balancing between US and China, it could not convince the Biden administration. However, Trump’s positive gestures and convergence between Islamabad and Washington on the Middle East security architecture have helped Islamabad reiterate its stance on two major powers.

Lastly, Pakistan is concerned about the Indian growing influence in the region. New Delhi’s cultivation of partnerships with the Arab Gulf states has been viewed negatively in Pakistan. The growing Indo-Arab relationship is taken as an attempt by New Delhi to deprive Islamabad of reliable economic and strategic partners in the Arab Gulf region. Therefore, Islamabad is keen to have a greater strategic role in the Middle Eastern security architecture, so that it can limit Indian influence in the region.

Despite these calculations, Islamabad’s expanded role in the Middle East will bring complex, multilayered foreign policy challenges.

First, Islamabad views the Arab Gulf countries as a monolithic entity, which is a flawed approach. The six GCC states have adopted distinct policies and strategies to various geopolitical conflicts in the MENA region. Moreover, the smaller Arab countries are concerned about Saudi Arabia’s monopolisation of the regional security architecture. By aligning more closely with Riyadh, Islamabad might have disturbed the strategic calculations of some of the smaller Arab Gulf states, which could create diplomatic and economic problems for Pakistan.

Secondly, a proactive role in geopolitical conflicts will dent Islamabad’s credibility as a ‘neutral’ state that could facilitate mediation between the Arab Gulf states as it did during the Qatar diplomatic crisis.

Third, Tel Aviv will likely not welcome Pakistan’s elevated role in the Middle Eastern region. Pakistan’s growing role in the region will provide another reason for Tel Aviv to ally itself more closely with India for an Indo-Israel strategic partnership, which could further embolden New Delhi to act against Pakistan.

Fourth, Islamabad’s stakes in the Middle Eastern security architecture are growing at a time when Tehran is at its weakest position since 1979. The recent Israeli and American air strikes inside Iran have also weakened Iran’s regional ambitions. Therefore, Iran might not be in position to openly challenge Pakistan’s elevated role in the regional security architecture. However, if Iran seeks to reclaim a larger strategic role in the regional security architecture, it will inevitably increase pressure on Pakistan’s diplomacy. Joint Saudi-Pakistan retaliatory measures against the Houthis could further unsettle Iran’s ambitions, forcing Islamabad to make difficult choices between a neighbour (Iran) and a strategic partner (Saudi Arabia). Already, the Houthis’ recent seizure of an LPG vessel carrying 24 Pakistanis signalled their displeasure with the Islamabad-Riyadh defence agreement.

Lastly, Islamabad’s active role in Middle Eastern conflicts could reignite internal sectarian fault lines. Therefore, Islamabad must now weigh its choices with precision: is the price of stepping into the vortex of Middle Eastern security rivalries truly lower than that of becoming a distant economic partner?

The writer analyses Pakistan’s strategic affairs. The views expressed are his own.

X: @itskhurramabbas

Published in Dawn, December 2nd, 2025