THE old world is dying, we are told. The chaos, the uncertainty, the economic downturn and the rise of populists, are all signs of this coming end of the post-World War II order. Perhaps this is also why some of these signs and trends are so similar to what the world witnessed in the inter-war period, which too struggled with the end of one order and the beginning of a new one. Then too, there was recession, populists, wars and shifting alliances.

But a world order doesn’t weaken just on its own. It does so along with the hegemony of the power that underwrote the system. And the system that came into being at the end of World War II was built on US hegemony, an aspect of which was America’s military presence around the world. Now that the hegemon is weakening, it is reconsidering its global military commitments. In other words, it is not merely about a populist, whimsical president, as many would argue.

Take the recent friction with European allies over Ukraine and the continent’s security. The pressure from Washington as Europe is chided for not paying enough for its own defence and the insistence to end the war with Russia are the result of a world power now struggling with the burden of its global security commitments. It’s not without reason that there’s a strong lobby within the country that no longer supports involvement in conflicts around the globe. The instability in the Middle East can also be seen as part of this trend.

This was a region of considerable importance in the US-dominated world order for several reasons. For decades, the region, or parts of it, remained frozen in time as changes swept across other parts of the world. The wave of democratisation (as it was then known) following the end of the Cold War, bypassed the Middle East entirely. Dictators and monarchs in this region, thanks to oil wealth and strategic partnerships, were under no pressure to offer procedural democracy as in many other parts of the world. For similar reasons, Operation Desert Storm ended without dislodging Saddam Hussein. The US did not, at the time, want to destabilise the region any further.

It is not merely about a populist, whimsical president.

But this changed with 9/11. The Islamist threat and the arguments about how to counter it allowed neo-cons in America to argue in favour of Iraq’s invasion. It was to be followed by bringing down the regimes in Syria and Iran but the protracted conflict in Iraq prevented further (mis)adventures. However, the invasion did end up weakening the balance of power the US had maintained in the region for long; Iran was able to assert itself more as Iraq weakened.

At present, though, the region is facing upheaval, which can be explained by a weakening superpower. Along with Europe, the US is also looking to reduce its presence in the Middle East. During his first presidential term, Donald Trump had said that Saudi Arabia should pay for what the US was doing in the region; reports subsequently suggested that this was happening. This statement had come around the same time as troops were withdrawn from countries such as Syria. Washington’s interest was focused on reducing its military commitments — until 2026 when the Iran conflict began and reversed this trend.

Whether the present conflict changes the overall view and policy remains to be seen. But there’s no doubt that the instability in the region is linked directly to the very superpower that once was seen as the reason for the stability. Indeed, in the coming days, this very intervention of the US will reshape the region, as its invasion of Iraq in 2003 once did.

The first change will come to Iran itself. This is not just in terms of what will transpire if Iran is defeated militarily — after all the initial mission was accomplished quickly in Iraq as well but the US forces stayed on for eight years — but also what would happen in case the US leaves without vanquishing Iran.

Second, will be the emergence of Israel as a hegemon — it is now expanding not just into the West Bank and Gaza but also Lebanon. With its hegemony now unchallenged, how much of a threat will it become for the rest of region? Many fear the Gulf states, or at least some of them, may be next. Even if they are not, there will be discomfort with the one-sided balance of power in the region. This discomfort will bring new defence pacts and alliances which will further reshape the region.

Third, for the first time, American military involvement in the region has impacted the economies of the Gulf states. This is something which will become clearer with time. Will the economies bounce back quickly or not? Will their spending priorities change with time? Will states such as Bahrain find it difficult to maintain control over their people? All these questions are being asked.

And with time, it will also become clear how strong the alliance of these Gulf states with the US remains. Already, there are muted comments and media reports about anger at the poor defence being provided by the US or the impact the conflict is having economically. There is hardly any chance of any of these complaints going away once the war is over and there is little on what will be done to address them in the future.

But all this is now closely linked with the weakening of American power and consequently the weakening of the larger alliance underwritten by US power at the end of World War II. This is as true of Western Europe where the emphatic refusal of most of Europe to help Trump open the Strait of Hormuz was significant. For it showed, as had Trump’s earlier treatment of the Ukrainian president, that the Western alliance was falling apart. And now in the Middle East, we’ll perhaps witness another alliance weaken or fall apart and a region reshaped. Both will be part of the story of the end of the American empire.

The writer is a journalist.

Published in Dawn, March 24th, 2026