THE Punjab government has recently drafted a bill “to provide for control of habitual offenders and anti-social behaviour that affect the writ of state, cause public nuisance and expose society to criminal activities” in the province. The proposed law will replace The Restriction of Habitual Offenders (Punjab) Act, 1918, and the Punjab Control of Goondas Ordinance, 1959; one a pre-independence colonial preventative law to restrict activities of habitual offenders, and the latter a post-independence drive by a military governor to restrain ruffians in 1959. Both laws have outlived their utility and effectiveness, and the Punjab government has come up with an alternative for deterrence against deviant and anti-social behaviour. This approach reflects the mindset of a ‘hard state’, ie, terrorising people into submission. Such laws help unpopular governments curb dissent through draconian legislation.
Section 6 of the proposed law contains some very controversial definitions of so-called anti-social behaviour: causing “fear or alarm to the public by threats, verbally or in writing or through social media, or by making, publishing or circulating false statements, rumours or reports”. Another provision of deviant behaviour refers to the dissemination “through electronic means or through print or social media platforms, anything which he knows to be untrue and based on misinformation or disinformation”. And publishing “on social media platform, provocative content with obscene objects including display of weapons or arms or knives”. All these objectionable activities are contained as offences in either the Pakistan Penal Code or special laws like Peca and the Anti-Terrorism Act. Is an attempt being made to create a parallel administrative punitive system to avoid judicial due process that involves registering cases, collection of evidence through investigations, prosecution and trial of such cases before the courts of law? Administrative tribunals comprising retired judges and civil servants are being established through an unconstitutional executive criminal justice mechanism.
The Punjab government’s proposed law against ‘anti-social’ behaviour carries controversial clauses.
Section 9 declares anyone as a habitual offender “against whom a criminal case has been registered and report under Section 173 of the Code [of Criminal Procedure] has been submitted”. This amounts to double jeopardy. Anyone against whom an SHO has submitted a challan in a court can also be condemned as a habitual offender and parallel administrative penalties may be imposed. In a culture of lies, deceit, vendetta and corruption, a person implicated in a false case, pushed through a servile police hierarchy, can find himself dubbed a criminal, subject to harsh penalties. In addition, a person arrested more than once in theft, robbery, narcotics or terrorism offences can also be declared a habitual offender, notwithstanding the culture of subjecting an individual to multiple arrests in cooked-up cases. Over and above, any other person “who, on the basis of credible evidence and after due inquiry, is found to be repeatedly or habitually involved in anti-social behaviour or organised criminal activities affecting public order, public safety or writ of the state”, can be declared a habitual offender. This amounts to curbing of dissent and protests against the state machinery.
In order to control anti-social behaviour, the following executive orders can be issued by the intelligence committee: a) furnishing a surety bond for a period up to six months; b) placing the name of the offender on the Provisional National Identification List; c) impounding his passport; d) blocking his passport or CNIC or both; e) removing the offender’s account from cyberspace, confiscating any gadgets like cellular phones and laptops; f) cancelling arms licences or getting to forfeit arms and ammunition; g) seizing movable property or attaching immovable property; h) freezing bank accounts; i) keeping the offender under surveillance through modern technology; and j) monitoring the offender through a device like an electronic ankle bracelet. An offender “who tampers with or destroys the electronic monitoring device” can be imprisoned for up to three years, but not less than a year. A fine of Rs1 million can be imposed for causing damage to the surveillance equipment. These harsh penalties can only be invoked after a proper trial of someone implicated in a serious offence and convicted accordingly by a court of law. To give the powers of the judiciary to district administrators, police officers and intelligence agencies is a travesty of justice. Such practice has all the traits of an autocratic surveillance state.
The institutional mechanism for the control of habitual offenders is proposed to vest in intelligence committees at the provincial, divisional and district levels. They will be convened by commissioners and deputy commissioners at the divisional and district levels respectively. Regional and district police officers, including head of special branch and CTD will be members. However, representatives of the intelligence agencies of the federal government have been given a formal role.
Section 5 stipulates the intelligence committees “shall take all measures necessary to … ensure safety of the public by checking all those persons who challenge the writ of the state”. They are required to “prevent an act or a person or a group of persons from doing anything which is anti-social behaviour”. Monitoring and reporting misuse of social media is also part of their functions. They are to “keep an eye on public regarding various sensitive issues and events”. This amounts to legitimising their intrusive role and will cause a breach of fundamental rights of privacy and freedom of the citizens.
Such innovations do not have a place in the civilised world. Intelligence agencies are required to monitor and report sensitive matters to executive officers to aid their decision-making in public interest. Their role or signatures are never revealed in documents. The responsibility squarely lies upon the executive officers who take the decisions in their discretion after considering all the facts and material. However, the constitution of joint interrogation teams and such committees does not only carry the risk of bringing secret agencies into the open but also gives them a direct role in administrative decision-making. Unfortunately, civil officers often use them as crutches to shift responsibility to avoid being blamed. Such collusive arrangements compromise accountability. What is the cost of this folly? The social contract between the state and the people of Pakistan will weaken further.
The writer is a former police officer.
Published in Dawn, July 3rd, 2026
