GOLD has long been the ultimate hedge against political folly. Now it is becoming such folly’s collateral damage. Washington’s decision to place three Chinese gold companies on its so-called “Uyghur Forced Labour Prevention Act Entity List”, followed by the London Bullion Market Association’s suspension of their Good Delivery status, is a test of whether the United States can weaponise the financial system without ultimately weakening the system itself.

The China Gold Association says the US sanctions have no factual basis and accuses Washington of politicising “human rights” to pursue protectionism. It has also criticised the LBMA for acting without sufficient fact-checking.

The bigger danger lies in the financial shadow cast over international transactions involving Chinese companies. Good Delivery status is a passport into the London bullion market. Losing it can mean greater due-diligence costs, fewer counterparties and more complicated access to international derivatives markets.

The “UFLPA Entity List” adds another layer of uncertainty, encouraging banks, traders and suppliers to distance themselves from US-designated “politically risky” entities. Sanctions work not merely by closing doors but by making everyone nervous about opening them.

With veteran financial tycoon Scott Bessent as US Treasury chief, the US administration increasingly treats dollar dominance as an instrument of hegemony. Currency swaps, Treasury-market intervention, sanctions and settlement requirements are being woven into a broader strategy aimed at preserving the US’ financial hegemony with China being one of the unspoken targets. The same logic now applies to gold: control a critical node and you acquire leverage over everyone connected to it.

The US’ financial power rests on trust in institutions that are supposed to be more durable than any US administration.

If access to dollar liquidity becomes a geopolitical favor, if Treasury markets are bent toward political objectives, and if gold certification is an extension of US sanctions, foreign governments have an obvious question: what happens when their interests diverge from Washington’s?

The answer is diversification. It is pragmatic and reasonable for China to try and create a renminbi payment option, a more autonomous gold market and enough financial resilience to ensure that a US financial sanction does not trigger a systemic crisis. That explains the growing importance of the Shanghai Gold Exchange. If the LBMA becomes politicised, China has an incentive to internationalise its own delivery standards, deepen the “Shanghai Gold” benchmark and expand gold cooperation with emerging markets. What begins as defensive diversification can eventually become institutional competition.

Yet any measure taken by other countries to counter the US’ economic coercion is seen by Washington as “an unforgivable act of defiance”. The White House published a so-called “The Great Transshipment Scam: Rise, Scope, and Costs” report last week. The report smears China’s normal international trade and investment as a “scam” and fabricates a false narrative about a so-called “shadow transshipment network”.

As a spokesperson for China’s Ministry of Commerce said, the arbitrary tariffs imposed by the US are the root cause of threats to the security of global supply chains. Attributing domestic economic issues to external factors will not resolve the deep-seated problems within the US itself.

The broader strategy is clearly visible in Washington’s policy consultation circle. The Information Technol­ogy and Innovation Foundation, a think tank in Washington, has been publishing its “Mobilising for Techno-Economic War” series, advocating strategic technology-economic pacts and a comprehensive effort to constrain China.

As shown by these reports, the US’ containment spans technology, trade, finance, resources, markets and information to realise a precarious new equilibrium: strategic rivalry without a full showdown. The old bargain — economic interdependence generating gains for both sides — is being replaced by a world in which every supply chain is examined for strategic vulnerability and every financial institution becomes a choke point, with costs that are structural for the global economy.

When currency swaps become political favors, gold certification an extension of sanctions policy and Fed independence a bargaining chip, the credibility underpinning the dollar’s global role is eroded. By weaponising the very institutions that made the dollar indispensable, the US risks losing the longer war for financial trust. Gold, after all, has a long memory. It may eventually remember who made it political.

Published in Dawn, August 24th, 2026