Pakistan has set itself an ambitious target. The Pakistan-Africa Economic Council, launched this month, has reaffirmed the goal of taking bilateral trade with the African continent to $15 billion by 2030. How Pakistan intends to get there is far less clear.
At present, Pakistan-Africa merchandise trade stands at roughly $4.85bn, with Pakistan exporting about $2.24bn and importing around $2.61bn. Reaching $15bn therefore requires nearly tripling within a few years. Yet the scale of the challenge also reveals the scale of the opportunity. Of the $32bn worth of goods Pakistan exported in FY25, 54 African economies together took barely seven per cent, roughly what Britain buys alone.
The export basket explains why the number remains so low. According to the Pakistan Business Council, rice and worn clothing together account for almost 62pc of Pakistan’s exports to Africa, with rice alone contributing well over $1bn. Yet, a $15bn relationship cannot emerge simply by multiplying the existing basket several times over.
The larger opportunity lies in leveraging industries where Pakistan already has globally credible capabilities and developing African markets around them. Pharmaceuticals, surgical instruments, sports goods, engineering products, information technology and processed foods remain significantly underrepresented in Africa. Pakistan exported more than $424 million of sports goods globally in FY26, yet its African footprint remains small; a similar gap exists in surgical instruments. Pakistan already makes what this market needs; what is missing is market penetration.
Trade between Karachi and Mombasa does not require passage through Hormuz, Bab el-Mandeb or Suez
Defence production is another area that can bring the target closer. Nigeria already operates Pakistani JF-17 fighters and Super Mushshak trainers, while Zimbabwe has ordered 12 Super Mushshaks. In December 2025, Reuters reported a Pakistani defence deal worth over $4bn with the eastern-based Libyan National Army. Such platforms differ from a shipment of rice or textiles because they create continuing commercial relationships involving spare parts, maintenance, training and future upgrades. Defence production should therefore be viewed as one high-value accelerator within a much wider trade strategy.
The relationship also needs to be understood in both directions. Pakistan already imports more from Africa than it exports, pointing to genuine economic complementarity. Morocco supplies phosphoric acid and fertiliser inputs; South Africa supplies coal, Kenya tea, Zambia copper and Tanzania cotton, while Nigerian energy exports have periodically made Nigeria one of Pakistan’s largest African suppliers. A more robust relationship can therefore be built around two-way supply chains, investment and long-term procurement, with export growth as one part of it.
Interestingly, the ongoing war in the Middle East has, in one important respect, redrawn the map in Pakistan’s favour. Disruption around the Strait of Hormuz and Bab el-Mandeb has demonstrated how exposed global trade remains to a handful of maritime chokepoints. In the short term, this makes the path harder, as both Pakistan and many African economies face more expensive energy, shipping and foreign exchange.
Strategically, however, the same disruption strengthens the logic of Pakistan-Africa engagement. East Africa sits directly across the Indian Ocean from Pakistan. Trade between Karachi and Mombasa does not require passage through Hormuz, Bab el-Mandeb or Suez.
Coal offers an immediate example. South African coal can sail directly from Richards Bay to Port Qasim without crossing any contested chokepoint, at a time when LNG supplies and prices remain vulnerable to developments in the Gulf. With imported-coal power plants still part of Pakistan’s generation mix, longer-term supply arrangements with South Africa could provide a useful bridge while the country gradually shifts towards domestic Thar coal.
Diversifying trade routes also creates an opportunity to diversify the currencies in which this trade is conducted. Standard Bank and China’s ICBC have been authorised to operate the Renminbi Clearing Bank of Africa across 19 African countries. Pakistan could explore using these networks for selected African purchases, including coal and fertiliser inputs, where suppliers are willing to accept renminbi. This would make commercial sense for African exporters that already purchase Chinese machinery and manufactured goods.
For Pakistan, the benefit would depend on how those renminbi are acquired. Buying them with dollars would merely change the currency in which reserves are spent, while borrowing them would create another repayment obligation. The opportunity becomes more interesting where renminbi can be earned through exports or matched against existing trade flows, giving Pakistan an additional payment channel whenever dollar liquidity becomes expensive or scarce.
Pakistan is not starting from zero. Exports to Africa have already risen from about $1.48bn in FY20 to $2.24bn in FY25. The next step is to widen both the basket and the map: more pharmaceuticals, surgical instruments, sports goods and engineering, matched by African energy, minerals and agricultural inputs. If Pakistan can connect these flows through direct maritime routes, stronger banking channels and permanent commercial networks, $15bn begins to look like a starting point.
The writer is an economist and an educationist.
Published in Dawn, The Business and Finance Weekly, September 21st, 2026
