On August 27, 2026, 55 acres of land belonging to a long-closed textile mill in Faujdarhat, Chattogram, was handed over to the Bangladesh army. This site, some 245 kilometres southeast of the capital Dhaka, is being developed to produce modern weapons, ammunition and other military equipment.
Bangladesh’s army chief, Gen Waker-Uz-Zaman says it is part of an effort to improve the country’s defence capabilities. “We have decided that whatever we fire, we will manufacture it ourselves. Because it is not possible to fight a war by importing,” he told those gathered at the handover ceremony.
Viewing the Faujdarhat initiative as a standalone project, however, risks overlooking its wider significance. Bangladesh’s plans to acquire Chinese fighter jets, establish unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) production with China, expand defence cooperation with Türkiye and potentially joining the Makkah Defence Alliance raise a broader question about the country’s security policy.
Is Bangladesh reshaping its security strategy in the post-2024 period or are these developments part of a longer-standing process of military modernisation?
Bangladesh’s emerging defence industry, growing military cooperation with China and Türkiye, and potential interest in the Makkah pact are reshaping the conversation around its security policy. The changes also have implications for its relationship with India
THE CATALYST
M. Humayun Kabir, president of the think tank Bangladesh Enterprise Institute (BEI) and a former ambassador to the United States, believes that the drive to strengthen military capabilities is linked to a growing sense of national confidence and self-assurance among Bangladeshis after 2024. That was the year a student-led mass uprising resulted in a political transformation that ended Sheikh Hasina’s 15-year premiership. One reflection of this is the growing interest in strengthening military capabilities, he says, adding “if necessary, we can ensure our own security.”
Security analyst Air Commodore (retd) Ishfaq Ilahi Choudhury does not see these developments as a direct consequence of the political changes. “Military strategy and foreign policy are long-term perspectives,” he tells Eos. “I do not think a single event, such as July 2024, would lead to an overhaul of either.”
Bangladesh’s recent moves, however, cannot be explained solely by the need to replace ageing military equipment.
For Kabir, the changing security environment in South and Southeast Asia is also shaping Bangladesh’s calculations. Alongside tensions between India and Pakistan, the Rohingya crisis and Bangladesh’s border with Myanmar are among the country’s security concerns. Kabir says the spillover of Myanmar’s military operations into Bangladeshi territory had made the need to strengthen Bangladesh’s air-defence capabilities more apparent.
Dr Delwar Hossain, a professor of international relations at the University of Dhaka, also rejects the idea that Bangladesh is seeking to emerge as a military power. Rather, he says, the country is seeking to address gaps in its defence capabilities.
NEW PARTNERS
China has long been a major source of defence equipment for Bangladesh. An important aspect of the country’s recent initiatives, however, is that its defence relationship with China is extending beyond the purchase of ready-made military hardware.
In January 2026, the Bangladesh Air Force and China Electronics Technology Group Corporation International signed an agreement to establish a UAV production and assembly facility in Bangladesh, including technology transfer. In August, an aide to the prime minister revealed that a draft had been prepared for the purchase of Chinese J10-CE fighter jets and attack helicopters.
Bangladesh’s defence cooperation with Türkiye is also expanding. Türkiye’s foreign minister Hakan Fidan visited Bangladesh in June this year and discussed the formation of a joint committee at the defence and foreign affairs ministerial level. In July, Bangladesh announced plans to establish a drone manufacturing facility in Bogra in cooperation with Türkiye.
Taken together, the Faujdarhat initiative and the proposed drone factory in Bogra point to another aspect of Bangladesh’s defence push: the country is not only seeking to diversify its sources of military equipment, but also to build domestic production and technological capacity.
MAKKAH PACT AND THE REGIONAL CALCULUS
While Bangladesh’s defence cooperation with China and Türkiye has largely focused on weapons, technology and production capacity, the Makkah pact raises a different question about the country’s security policy.
In August 2026, Saudi Arabia, Türkiye and Pakistan signed the Makkah Defence Alliance. Bangladesh is not a member. However, on August 27, foreign minister Dr Khalilur Rahman told parliament that Dhaka would “positively consider” membership if the member states expressed an interest in bringing Bangladesh into the alliance.
The possibility of joining the pact, however, raises questions about how Bangladesh would reconcile such a security arrangement with its long-standing policy of non-alignment.
Kabir believes Bangladesh should weigh the implications for its strategic autonomy before considering joining the pact. “We have not joined any military alliance for a long time, over five decades,” he says. His preferred approach, he adds, is: “We will not join anyone, but we will pursue our interests with everyone.”
Ishfaq also questions the strategic value of joining the pact. Bangladesh’s principal security concerns, he argues, are concentrated in South and Southeast Asia, raising questions about the value of joining a military arrangement centred on a more distant region.
Bangladesh’s recent efforts to strengthen its defence capabilities are unlikely to escape New Delhi’s attention. Both of Bangladesh’s plans, to acquire Chinese jets and its potential participation in the Makkah pact, could become relevant to India’s regional security calculations.
So far, India’s public position has been one of cautious observation rather than outright objection. After Bangladesh’s foreign minister expressed a positive position on the possibility of joining the Makkah pact, India’s foreign ministry responded by saying it was closely following developments that could have a bearing on its national security.
Analyst Hossain believes Bangladesh’s intention is not to threaten any country. But he acknowledges a key concern: “If Bangladesh’s capabilities increase, those who are friendly now may wonder whether Bangladesh is becoming much stronger.”
NEW DEPENDENCIES OR STRATEGIC INDEPENDENCE?
The question now is whether sourcing arms and technology from multiple countries will give Bangladesh greater strategic independence, or simply replace one form of dependence with another.
Expanding domestic capacity to produce weapons and military equipment could give Bangladesh more options if external supplies are disrupted. But sustaining such an industry would require technology, financing, skilled personnel and reliable access to components and other inputs.
It remains unclear whether Bangladesh is moving towards a new security alignment or whether its expressed willingness to join the Makkah pact is part of a broader diplomatic strategy.
One possible reading is that keeping the option of joining the Makkah pact open could also give Dhaka greater leverage in its dealings with India and other regional powers. The issue, then, is not only whether Bangladesh joins a new security arrangement, but how the possibility of doing so could shape its room for manoeuvre in the region.
Whether the objective is to preserve strategic autonomy, as argued by former envoy Kabir, or to address gaps in defence capabilities, as posited by Prof Hossain, the two perspectives point to a broader question. As the need to strengthen Bangladesh’s defence capabilities becomes more prominent, how should those capabilities be built, and how much dependence can realistically be reduced?
The land that once produced textiles is now being prepared to produce weapons. The next phase of Bangladesh’s security strategy may depend not only on what it can build at home, but also on how it balances external partnerships with the strategic autonomy it has long sought to preserve.g
The writer is a Bangladeshi journalist whose work has appeared in various international publications. He can be contacted at marufhasan57983@gmail.com.
X: @the_MarufHasan
Published in Dawn, EOS, September 13th, 2026
