THE debate on the formation of new provinces continues to go on with renewed vigour, driven by the practical difficulties of governing a nation whose population now exceeds 240 million. There have been calls for additional units, while opponents have been emphasising the heavy fiscal, administrative and political burden of such a move. Experience suggests that new units would not automatically cure deeper ailments of weak institutions, elite capture and insufficient accountability; they might merely transplant the same patronage networks closer to the districts.
The protracted difficulties that have marked the merger of the former Federally Administered Tribal Areas (Fata) into Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (KP) illustrate how restructuring can go on for years. Having more provinces would also complicate federal arrangements for resource-sharing and Senate represent-ation, while smaller entities might prove financially fragile and more dependent on the centre.
All such arguments have to be viewed against the historical evolution of Pakistan’s provincial map. In 1947, the western wing consisted of four provinces and the acceding princely states, such as Bahawalpur, Khairpur, Kalat and others. Karachi was separated as the federal capital territory, and the Baloch states briefly formed a union. Then came the One Unit scheme in 1955 aimed at establishing parity with East Pakistan. Though intended to reduce costs and facilitate constitution-making, the arrangement centralised power and provoked deep resentment among those who viewed it as an assault on regional identity.
The system lasted 15 years till the Legal Framework Order (LFO) of 1970 dissolved West Pakistan and restored the four provinces along roughly the pre-1955 lines. In the meantime, Karachi had lost its federal status, replaced by Islamabad. After 1971, these four provinces formed the core of the residual state, and the 1973 Constitution later confirmed the structure. Subsequent refinements included the formalisation of Islamabad Capital Territory (ICT), greater autonomy for Gilgit-Baltistan (GB) and the merger of Fata into KP.
Running parallel is the equally uneven history of local governments. Colonial-era panchayats and municipal bodies were inherited in an attenuated form, and received scant attention in the early years of independence. The system of Basic Democracies (BD) in 1959 established a hierarchical network of union, tehsil, district and divisional councils whose members served both as local adminis-trators and as the presidential electoral college. In 1979, elected local bodies were revived based on non-party elections.
The devolution plan of 2001 created a three-tier structure of union, tehsil and district councils headed by elected nazims, transferring substantial administrative and developmental powers and reserving seats for women and other groups. Each of these military-era experiments elevated local institutions, but civilian adminis-trations have often delayed elections, dis-solved councils or recentralised authority.
The 18th Amendment of 2010 consti-tutionally required provinces, under Article 140-A, to establish elected local governments and devolve administrative, financial and political powers. Provincial laws followed, and elections were held in phases from 2013 onwards, but implemen- tation has remained inconsistent, with frequent interruptions and an incomplete fiscal autonomy structure.
Political parties, both in parliament and beyond, may approve one or the other set of proposed arrangements with consent, semi-consent or a mix of both, but only time will tell the extent to which any proposal gets implemented. Any lasting reorga-nisation should be based on broad national consensus and meticulous design if it is not to aggravate the hurdles it seeks to resolve.
Muhamad Mohsin Iqbal
Islamabad
Published in Dawn, September 26th, 2026
